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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been argued by some that WTO member finding itself in a 
losing position in the WTO dispute settlement system has a free choice 
on whether or not to actually implement the obligations spelled out in 
the adopted Appellate Body or panel reports: the alternatives being 
simply to provide compensation or endure retaliation. This is an 
erroneous belief. […] To allow the countries to “buy out” of their 
obligations by providing “compensation” or enduring “suspension of 
obligation” also creates major asymmetries of treatment in the 
system. It favors the rich and powerful countries which can afford 
such “buy outs” while retaining measures that harm and distort trade 
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of the system. It turn that can 
only diminish the extent to which companies, trading and investing, 
can rely on the rules to provide market predictability. 
Consultative Board to the WTO Director-General, 2004. 
 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism of the multilateral trade system has motivated 
an impressive volume of studies and reports worldwide since the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (henceforth WTO). Trade flows have increased and multilateral commercial 
exchanges are currently – and more than ever -, extremely important elements of international 
relations among States.  
Trade is not only an exchange of products and services between countries, but 
also a relevant tool for the development of economies and societies. Among many benefits, 
trade liberalization promotes the improvement of better negotiation environments which were, 
as a result more: (i) conducive to foreign investment; (ii) open for the formation and 
improvement of scale economies - with the consequent overall drop in prices of products; (iii) 
conducive to the technological innovation and the exchange of knowledge through joint 
research and development around the world; (iv) improving to the level of economic 
development of multilateral players by providing wider access to goods, services, 
employment and knowledge. 
As trade relations increased and became more sophisticated, the disputes related 
to trade topics ruled by WTO agreements also became more frequent. Indeed, the number of 
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reports under WTO law has increased substantially compared to the dispute settlement under 
GATT. In its young existence, the WTO dispute settlement system has dealt with no less than 
427 disputes to date.  
The large number of trade disputes indicates not only disagreements between 
members on the consistency of trade measures, but also that the establishment of a rule-
oriented mechanism brought a safer and more comfortable environment for the settlement of 
disputes. The dispute settlement system addresses stability to the multilateral trade and 
indicates the credibility of members to solve their controversies under a predictable settlement 
system. 
Unquestionably, the WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most important 
innovations of the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, though the system appears to be very 
effective, there are failures and defects that must be taken into consideration and accounted 
for. Moreover, it is remarkable that every instance of noncompliance in the WTO is very 
problematic in terms of economic and social losses. 
The present research endeavour is motivated by the quest to better understand the 
instances of noncompliance and the remedies available to address the failures in 
implementing the Dispute Settlement Body (henceforth DSB) recommendations and rulings. 
Despite the fact that there are significant problems in the disputes where the complainant and 
the respondent are powerful economies, the study focuses on complications that arise when 
the complainant in a WTO dispute is a developing country member while the respondent is a 
developed country member. 
More specifically, this study is interested in the implementation phase of DSB 
decisions. That is the phase when the economic asymmetries are highlighted, as the greater or 
lesser importance of a certain market access seems to be determinant to the decision to 
comply with a WTO dispute settlement decision. Indeed, if an affected developed country 
member confronted by a winning developing country member in the dispute settlement 
prefers to pay the price of noncompliance instead of complying with the decision, there seems 
to be no way for the complainant to induce compliance. 
Taking into account the abovementioned scenario, this thesis tackles the remedies 
provided by the Dispute Settlement Understanding to deal with problems of implementation 
and compliance with decisions taken pursuant its provisions. Especially, the study focuses on 
the mechanism of cross-retaliation in intellectual property rights, as it has been repeatedly put 
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forward by academics and professionals as a possible solution for the economic asymmetries 
of opponents in a trade dispute. 
Thus, the hypothesis raised in the present dissertation assumes that even though 
the dispute settlement system has held high rates of compliance since the establishment of the 
WTO, there are challenges to the effectiveness of the system once it allows developed country 
members to buy out their obligations in different ways. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
cross-retaliation in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (henceforth TRIPS) 
appears to be a successful solution at first glance, the study will address challenges that may 
be present in the actual use of such mechanism and whether it is really a feasible option for 
WTO developing country members. 
Accordingly, the research problem that motivates the study can be formulated as 
follows: taking into account the large economic imbalances of WTO members and the 
difficulty of developing country members to induce compliance with WTO decisions, does 
cross-retaliation in TRIPS contribute to a better effectiveness of the dispute settlement system 
in what concerns developing country members? 
In that sense, the main objective of the present study is to analyze the real utility 
of the suspension of concessions or other obligations under TRIPS to the greater effectiveness 
of the dispute settlement system (especially referring to the developing country members) and 
whether it addresses the issue of noncompliance with DSB decisions.  
Before proceeding, one clarification is due. Although the concept of developing 
country is going to be better explained in the body of the research paper, it is worth defining 
from the start, what the author considers to be a developing country. The WTO does not give 
any detailed definition of the concept, and only separates it in a different and explicit category 
from that of the Least-Developed Countries.  
Nonetheless, for the sake of this study and with practical purposes, the author 
chose to divide the country members into two groups, that of developed and that of 
developing country members. The former are the most powerful economies identified by the 
World Bank with a high level of economic, social, health and education development; such as 
the United States, most European countries, Japan, Canada, among others. The latter are all 
the other 153 WTO members that are clearly not developed (including the very small 
economies). Inside this last group the author highlights an exception for Brazil, China, India 
and other developing country members with especial economic characteristics that make their 
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economies more competitive and distinguishes them from regular developing country 
members1. 
The proposed research question is a comprehensive reflection that goes beyond 
the realm of purely legal or economic issues; instead, it seeks elements for understanding the 
complexity of decisions in international trade. The author intends to promote an interplay of 
theories of Public International Law, International Relations and International Economic Law. 
Gathering the information made available by the authors of those disciplines, the research 
aims to map important elements and promote a grounded discussion on WTO dispute 
settlement issues. Certainly, the retaliation in the WTO is one of the most multi-disciplinary 
issues of the system, and therefore one of the richest subjects in terms of details and fine-
grained nuances. 
Notably, the lessons from International Public Law are fundamental to the 
development of the present research project. Above all, the notions of State responsibility are 
indispensable here. The WTO (and its members) as an international organization established 
by a treaty of International Public Law shall observe the legal provisions of the general 
international law framework. Therefore, States that breach international law obligations – in 
this case, WTO law -, shall be held responsible. 
International Economic Law is the central area of studies that guides the 
discussion in this dissertation. Trade and economic relations are all designed and directly 
influenced by provisions of International Economic Law. All WTO subjects are defined by it. 
To address elements of the economic globalization and the multilateral trade relations, the 
present study used mainly writings of John H. Jackson and Peter Van den Bossche. Among 
other important sources used, those authors presented a robust understanding of the 
International Economic Law following the same stream of thought which is considered 
adequate to the discussion proposed.   
Adding to those authors, especially in what refers to the issues of WTO dispute 
settlement, other scholars, among whom are Gregory Shaffer, Marc L. Busch and Eric 
Reinhardt, Petros Mavroidis, Steve Charnovitz and William Davey were used as important 
sources and contribution to the argumentation of the present research endeavor. More 
                                            
1 For the sake of information, according to the World Bank data, Brazil is classified as an upper middle income 
economy; China is classified as a lower middle income economy and; India is classified as lower income 
country. For more information see: <http://data.worldbank.org/country>. 
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specifically and in what refers to cross-retaliation in TRIPS, the contributions of Frederick 
Abbott, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan and Joost Pauwelyn were indispensable to the 
development of the research and confronted with different positions of other distinguished 
authors.   
By analyzing elements and facts in a different and comprehensive manner, the 
present dissertation brings a contribution to the state of art of international law. With a 
comprehensive research on available sources on the subject, the study seeks to contribute with 
a competent and detailed reflection of the cross-retaliation in TRIPS and the real utility of this 
mechanism to the developing countries. Also, since the backbone of the present research 
endeavor is the imbalance of the multilateral trade relations, the author intends to address 
ways of correcting the current system by focusing on the dispute settlement. 
The relevance of the subject is clear. Most of the trade exchanges around the 
world are subject to WTO law. Most of the members that adhered to the multilateral system 
experienced an increase in their social welfare. Nonetheless, the asymmetries that separate the 
countries are significant and seem to become even more so when smaller economies do not 
have the strength i.e. financial resources and building capacity to follow the increase of trade 
shares.   
In that context, the implementation phase of WTO dispute settlement decisions is 
the moment when the asymmetries are highlighted. Normally, millions of dollars are involved 
in one single dispute. That may not be very meaningful to powerful economies, but may crash 
entire sectors of economy of developing countries. Intellectual property rights came to the 
arena because intellectual assets are mostly located and developed in wealthy countries. Even 
though suspension of concessions or other obligations are normally understood as a great 
“discovery” and a strong threat in order to cross-retaliate, this dissertation aims to go in detail 
and identify whether the mechanism is useful (and if so to what extent) for all WTO 
developing country members and in which conditions. 
The dissertation is divided into three chapters and a conclusion. The methodology 
used to develop the research is inductive while the method of procedure is monographic and 
comparative. The research was carried out mainly with the use of bibliographical references, 
official data and primary documents. 
Chapter two aims to present a comprehensive approach of the emergency of the 
global economy and its institutions. Special emphasis will be given to the creation of the 
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multilateral trading system and the institutional framework of the World Trade Organization. 
Since all the subjects treated in this chapter are elements of International Economic Law, 
which is a branch of International Public Law, it is necessary to address elements of the latter 
that affect the present research. For that reason the beginning of the chapter will refer to issues 
of State responsibility and State sovereignty. Further on, the chapter will describe history and 
evolution of the multilateral trading system and the main objectives and principles of the 
World Trade Organization.  
Chapter three focuses on the dispute settlement system specifically by tackling the 
elements that form and define the dispute settlement framework for multilateral trade 
disputes. It will also analyze the jurisdiction and procedures of the system, with especial 
attention to the implementation phase of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Also and very 
important, the chapter will address the binding effect of DSB recommendations and rulings 
and the primary effects identified because of the economic asymmetry of WTO members. The 
chapter ends by addressing the possibility of cross-retaliation for developing country 
members. 
Still, chapter three refers to the compliance with the DSB recommendations and 
rulings. After the debate carried out in the previous chapters, it is relevant to understand what 
compliance at the WTO means and whether the high rates indicate that there is no need to 
worry about the system. As compliance is an element of general international law, the chapter 
initiates addressing the literature on compliance in public law before proceeding to identify 
compliance at the WTO. After a thorough discussion on suspension of concessions in TRIPS, 
this chapter aims to understand whether and until what extent cross-retaliation in intellectual 
property rights addresses the basic issue of noncompliance. The study tries to seek ways 
towards a more balanced trade once what stimulates the whole dissertation is, after all, the 
imbalance in multilateral trade relations. To finalize the chapter, the author refers to issues of 
reform of the system suggested by WTO members discussing their feasibility.  
Next, using the knowledge provided by the previous chapters, chapter four is 
especially dedicated to the issue of intellectual property rights. In this chapter the possibilities 
of cross-retaliate in TRIPS will be tested as well as whether or not there are feasible options 
for developing country members. The chapter presents an overview of intellectual property 
theory, with emphasis on the different intellectual property rights and to the TRIPS 
Agreement. The overview provides the background to discuss the suspension of intellectual 
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property obligations related to cross-retaliation in the WTO. The chapter also reflects on the 
basic rationale to valuate TRIPS obligation and to calculate the level of retaliation. Very 
important to the conclusions of the dissertation, the chapter furthermore addresses the 
challenges and the costs – economic, political, legal - of cross-retaliating in TRIPS. Finally, 
the chapter reviews the three WTO cases in which requests to cross-retaliate in TRIPS were 
approved. 
Chapter five presents the conclusions to the central research question: taking into 
account the large economic imbalances of WTO members and the difficulty of developing 
country members to induce compliance with WTO decisions, does cross-retaliation in TRIPS 
contribute to a better effectiveness of the dispute settlement system in what concerns 
developing country members? At the end a summary of the research and its findings is 
presented. 
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2. THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a concise overview of the multilateral 
trading system and discuss the emergence of a global economy after the advent of the Second 
World War. Also and more important, this chapter intends to explore the institutional 
framework of the World Trade Organization and its most important principles so as to ground 
the discussion that will follow. 
This chapter starts with a brief reflection on the current situation of international 
relations particularly in what concerns aspects of international law and the emergency of a 
global economy. So as to understand the complexity of decisions in international trade within 
the theory of Public International Law, International Relations and International Economics, 
the chapter presents essential elements of International Law and addresses issues of economic 
globalization and economic development which are considered important to understand the 
purpose of this dissertation. 
Section 2.3 deals with the history and development of the WTO since the GATT -
1947 explaining how the WTO became one of the most important international organizations 
in the world nowadays. 
To complement section 2.3, section 2.4 encompasses the objectives and principles 
of the WTO, the goals pursued by the Organization and its members. This section will also 
tackle the efforts done by the WTO to promote and liberalize the international trade. 
In possession of the information brought by the theoretical framework chosen for 
this first chapter, this dissertation will be conducted with the intention of exploring the 
interplay between asymmetries among WTO members and whether they influence or are 
related to the (non) compliance with WTO rulings, as well as the role of cross-retaliation in 
TRIPS as a second best option for developing country members. 
 
2.1 International Law and International Economic Relations: overview 
 
The discipline of International Law encompasses a number of terms and 
definitions that can be discussed in this dissertation. The main focus of this work is not to 
delve into the concept of these terms, however, it is worth highlighting that some important 
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concepts - such as State responsibility and sovereignty of States should remain clearly defined 
throughout this work, since they may directly or indirectly influence the reflections proposed 
hereafter. 
All the principles of international law are briefly taken into account in this work, 
in order to explain how the WTO was born through a treaty of international public law among 
States. However, some concepts central to the research question, such as the responsibility of 
States as actors of international law and their obligation to implement the decisions adopted by 
the Organization, will be discussed in greater detail. Also, it is important to bear in mind what 
this dissertation understands by sovereignty of States in a world with social, political and 
economic globalized traits. 
 
• International Responsibility of States 
 
Following the thought of Pierre-Marie Dupuy that international responsibility of 
the state "is the epicenter of a legal system"2 the international responsibility of States is one of 
the pillars of international law relations among these subjects. There has been great difficulty 
for the actors of international relations to assimilate their obligations and, therefore, the 
responsibility they have in the international community with other states under international 
law since the formation of the modern state and the recognition of sovereign equality of States 
in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
The French Revolution may be regarded as a milestone for the end of the absolute 
irresponsibility of States. With the consolidation of the modern State and the promulgation of 
the French Constitution in 1789, international law effectively imposed a series of obligations 
on states, which then became equally sovereign and therefore equally responsible; thus having 
to comply with international norms. From that combination of factors arises - as Oppenheim 
says - , the fact that the international responsibility of a State to respect its international legal 
obligations is different from its internal autocracy. The responsibility for such obligations, 
according to the author, is a "quality of every State as an International Person, without which 
                                            
2 Dupuy, 1984, p.21  
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the Family of Nations could not exist peacefully. State responsibility concerning international 
duties is therefore a legal responsibility”3. 
Indeed, the growing interdependence of countries on the one hand, and the need 
for a more flexible notion of the Westphalia sovereignty on the other, reaffirms the daily 
increase of social, economic and political interaction among States4. 
To date, States remain the main actors of the international law and international 
relations, and much of international norms, customary or conventional, derive from the will of 
the State. In the absence of a supreme entity to which all States must submit, the respect for 
the principle of international responsibility has particular importance as it establishes and 
guarantees (or tries to ensure) the sovereign equality of States, especially when there are 
breaches of an obligation under international law5. 
Departing from the argument that the international responsibility of States, 
especially after the Peace of Westphalia, represents, together with the principle of national 
sovereignty, the axis of any relationship among states within the international community, it 
was in this period - between the 16th and 17th centuries - that the authors concerned with 
international law began to think and design theories for the accountability of States. 
Alberico Gentili redefined the concept of international responsibility of states and 
added possible solutions to the problem of accountability of states, in relation to each other6. 
Strongly based on principles derived from Roman law, therefore, private law, Gentili founded 
his whole idea of responsibility from the theory of guilt and deceit, as well as humanistic 
reasons systematized by him about a just war7. 
                                            
3 Oppenheim, 1937, p. 273. 
4 Despite the benefits of this tangle of connections that exist today worldwide, it is important to note that these 
relationships significantly increase the international responsibility of countries. 
5 According to Pereira, the international responsibility of the state is the "response to a disruption in the legal 
balance (triggering event), which seeks out direction to remedy the situation caused”. See Pereira, 2000, p. 22. 
6 The strong connection that Gentili (1552-1608) makes between the private and the need for rules and 
limitations for the international community is explained by the fact that the author found himself embroiled in 
a historical moment of rupture between the theological concept of the international community from the 
Renaissance, and the first steps of Modernity. 
7. See Gentili, 2004, p. 39. Note that Gentili lived in a remarkable moment in history, on the border of modernity. 
This explains why the author did not use the term international law, but law of nations or the law of war and 
explains why Gentili brings strong connections in his work with private law (Roman) with the latent need for 
an international law that regulated and limited the relationship among states. 
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Following the developments in international law, the theory of international 
responsibility of states found in the work of Hugo Grotius an even stronger identity8. Based on 
the writings of this Dutch author from the school of natural law the theory of international 
responsibility of the state develops and is spread by Zouch, Pufendorf, Wolff, Cocceio, 
Burlamarqui, and Vattel9.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century Anzilotti started to outline the concept 
of international responsibility of States as the majority of authors accept it nowadays. In 
developing his theory of international responsibility of States, Anzilotti reaches an objective 
concept of international unlawful act, which, according to the author consists in "any violation 
of a duty imposed on an international legal norm, i.e., contrary to a promise of one State to the 
others."10 
As aforementioned, State responsibility was outlined by historical practices and 
customs, and the main coding attempts appeared in the early twentieth century. In April 1930, 
at the Conference for the Codification of International Law, the League of Nations attempted 
to formulate a project on international liability for damage to persons or overseas goods, but 
there were no practical results on this topic11. 
Over the years, the relations among states are refined and strengthened. It is 
therefore in a context of gradual internationalization of relations between subjects of 
international law that arise, especially after the Second World War, robust multilateral 
organizations to handle the most varied topics of interest of nations. 
After the Second World War, the legacy of the League of Nations on rules 
regarding the international responsibility of States was transferred to the United Nations 
together with the task of promoting the codification of international law12. 
The International Law Commission (ILC), so as to delve into the coding of the 
issues involving the international responsibility of States appointed, in 1963, the Italian 
                                            
8 See Grotius, 2005, p. 17. Translation of Ciro Mioranza. 
9 Ago, 1978, p. 274. 
10 Anzilotti, 1964, p. 386. In the same stream of thought as Anzilotti, in 1913 Marinoni affirms that the State is 
an unit for the international law and it is the holder of international law. The state, within the framework of 
international law presents itself as a unit subject to rights and duties, says Marinoni.  Internally it results from a 
real diversity of staff, which together form the State organization. See Marinoni, 1913 
11 This project was constituted by ten articles that can be found in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission of 1956. 
12 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1969, § 41. 
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rapporteur Roberto Ago. Ago presented eight reports on the subject between 1969 and 1980. 
Departing from Ago’s reports and studies, the ILC took note of thirty-five articles, which now 
form the basis of the current coding project, approved in 2001 by the UN General Assembly13. 
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility are divided into four parts. The first part 
deals with the internationally wrongful act: general principles (Chapter I); attribution of 
wrongful conduct to the State (Chapter II); break of an international obligation (Chapter III); 
State liability in connection with the act of another State (Chapter IV) and; the circumstances 
that lead to preclusion of wrongfulness (Chapter V). The second part deals with the content of 
state responsibility: general principles (Chapter I); compensation for damages (Chapter II); the 
serious violations of obligations of peremptory norms of general international law (Chapter 
III). The third part, in turn, deals with the implementation of international responsibility of the 
state: the invocation of the responsibility of the State (Chapter I) and countermeasures 
(Chapter II). Finally, the fourth part addresses general provisions. 
The ILC articles seek to formulate, according to James Crawford - rapporteur of 
the current project - by way of codification and progressive development of the theme, the 
basic norms of international law concerning the responsibility of States for their 
internationally wrongful acts.  
The reason for this brief overview about the international responsibility of States 
relies on the fact that the WTO is an international organization born under a treaty of 
International Public Law meaning that every relation between members of the WTO is under 
that umbrella14. 
 
• Sovereignty of States 
 
                                            
13 See Yearbook of International Law Commission 1970, § 22. It is worth mentioning that further developments 
of international law – with emphasis to the creation of the United Nations after World War II -, strengthened 
the notion of State responsibility. If a State commits an internationally wrongful act, such breach gives rise to a 
liability not only to the injured state, but also to the organization and the international community itself. 
14 Moreover, it is interesting to mention that the actual draft of Convention on International Responsibility of 
States make it clear that "general international law that the state can be held responsible for illegal actions and 
omissions, and legal consequences that follow." Crawford, 2002, p. 74.  
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Sovereignty is one of the fundamental concepts of international law. It is part of 
the principles that affirm the equality and political independence of States referred to in 
Article 2 of the UN Charter15. 
The elements that compose the classical concept of sovereignty clearly appear in 
the international scenario of the seventeenth century with the end of the Thirty Years War16. 
The Westphalia treaties of 1648 that ended the Thirty Years’ war in the Holy Roman Empire 
and the Eighty Years’ war between Spain and the Dutch Republic, were a milestone for the 
European society of that century. To the extent that with the treaties the peace was restored in 
Europe, they established the beginning of a new phase in the political history of that continent, 
while eliminated the supreme power of the Catholic Church, giving the States the right and 
power to freely negotiate on their own, thus being responsible in international policy17. 
The term sovereignty was then in close connection with the definition of the 
modern state. The State is manifested through the sovereignty, which in turn justifies the 
actions of the absolutist States as it attributes to the States the absolute power.  
Indeed, after the Middle Ages it was considered that the power of the State was 
independent and offered to prince unconditionally all the. The sovereignty doctrine was 
transformed into absolutism. Moreover, in accordance with Jellinek, while Bodin was inserted 
in the turbulences of the civil wars he may have considered that the only way for salvation of 
the state was the recognition of the omnipotence of the King18. 
                                            
15 United Nations Charter, 1945. 
16 The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) consisted of a series of religious and political bloody conflicts, especially 
in Germany, where German constitutional issues, especially the rivalry between Catholics and Protestants 
gradually spread to the rest of the European continent. Despite the cause of religion, the conflict involved the 
efforts of France and Sweden to eliminate the Habsburg dynasty in Austria. 
17 According to Daillier, Dinh and Pellet, the Treaties of Westphalia were described as Europe's Constitutional 
Charter, which formally legalized the birth of new sovereign states and the new European policy letter that 
resulted therefrom. See Daillier; Dinh; and Pellet, 2003. Note that by the XV century it was understood that 
sovereignty was an unlimited and perpetual power, which was subjected only to divine and natural laws. There 
was a belief in the need to fully concentrate power in the hands of the ruler towards his subjects. The sovereign 
power would be fully transferred to the divine representative. The concept of sovereignty was first 
systematized by the French jurist Jean Bodin. The author, a staunch defender of the monarchy, has examined 
the principle of sovereignty in his Les six livres de la Republique, in which he conceptualizes sovereignty as 
unlimited and perpetual power, finding its limits only in the divine and natural laws. Bodin, 1977 
18 Jellinek, 2000, p. 415. 
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Yet, Thomas Hobbes appears in the XVII century publishing ideas that reinforced 
the concept of absolutism, although he was against the divine origin of power, affirming that 
power is originated in a political contract19. 
Hobbes understood that the sovereignty primary belonged to each man before the 
contract and started belonging to the authority created from the pact which could never be 
terminated. The authority from the contract is “an agent with unlimited, absolute and 
unquestionable power”20. 
In the course of time, a conceptual change of the term sovereignty can be noticed 
in accordance with the forms of power organization. The idea of supreme power that was in 
the center of the notion of sovereignty bothered many people and thinkers who had come to 
disagree with this assumption to raise their voices. 
Rousseau was the great contractual thinker after Hobbes, adapting the concept of 
pact to his own theories, but in a very different way from the English author21. To Rousseau 
sovereignty belongs to people. Its content is put into the legislation as an expression of general 
will and all power is established in favor of the governed. The function of the sovereign is to 
enforce laws, and this function is revocable at any time. Nevertheless, given that in Rousseau's 
sovereignty is the exercise of general will, it cannot be transmitted. The sovereignty is 
inalienable, indivisible and insusceptible to representation or limitation22.  
More recently, in the early twentieth century, when discussing the legitimacy of 
sovereign power, Leon Duguit analyzes the issue of sovereignty making a criticism of its 
divine origin, which according to him, uses the omnipotence of the term the state legitimizes 
to abuse power since it comes from God. Duguit will redeem in Rousseau the idea that 
sovereignty is a will that determines itself, which has its own power and which is independent 
of any other will23. 
                                            
19 Ferrajoli, p. 16-17. 
20 Azambuja, 1996, p. 59. 
21 Rousseau, 1978. 
22 Id., p. 43-46. Inspired by Rousseau’s speeches, the most widespread definition of sovereignty, adopted by 
many constitutions,  is established in Europe more precisely in 1789 in the French Revolution with the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 
23 Duguit, 1942, p. 150. Also, it is important to mention that Duguit deals with the impossibility of maintaining 
the absolutism that is referred to by the sovereign principle when it comes to international relations between 
States. To confirm his theory, Duguit mentions the League of Nations, which was as a “super-state” that was 
above all the States that adhered to it. 
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The idea that inspired the first post-war era of the League of Nations (1919) was 
that it was necessary to prevent any power from triggering again another calamity in the 
world. Unfortunately, the way the relations between countries at that moment were designed 
would not allow the League of Nations to work. The concept of absolute sovereignty was still 
too strong. 
Nevertheless, even with the failure of the League of Nations it is possible to 
observe a big change in international relations in the course of time. Especially after the 
Second World War, countries had to cede part of their sovereignty to submit to rules and legal 
standards of a global community, once the world had become a federation of countries. The 
modern State in its classical formulation of absolute sovereignty power has failed24. 
Being part of international and multilateral organizations require that States cede 
part of their internal sovereignty, which does not imply a loss of sovereign power but enables 
new standards of coexistence and collaboration between States. 
According to Ferrajoli, the notion of absolute power of sovereignty is diminished 
by the time it is sanctioned the UN Charter, in 26 June 1945 and the Universal Declaration of 
Rights, in 10 December 1948, approved by the UN General Assembly25. With those 
documents the concept of absolute sovereignty gives space to common interests of countries 
all around the world. The imperative of peace and the protection of human rights gain a bigger 
dimension in matters related to international affairs. 
The international rule of law acquires a superiority status in many parts of 
constitutions around the world. In the meantime, one can say, as did Hans Kelsen, that the fact 
that the state is sovereign means that the national legal order is one over which there is no 
other. The only order it might seem to be superior to national law is the order international26.  
This is also true in the scope of the WTO. By the time the States decide to become 
members of the Organization, they agree to be part of an institution where rules exist to be 
followed and respected. Therefore, in failing to comply with WTO law, no argument of a 
member regarding noninterference in domestic issues should be accepted. 
 
                                            
24 Martins, 1998, p. 13-28. 
25 Ferrajoli, 2002., p. 39. 
26 Kelsen, 2000, p. 545. 
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2.2 International Economic Relations: Economic Globalization  
 
 The international trade has been for a long time one of the most important 
connections to the growth of the economic relations between States and enterprises all around 
the world. The exchange of goods and services between nations is still a strong bilateral and 
multilateral way of cooperation. 
 Trade is deeply related to the process of globalization and is, in fact, the basis of 
that process. Surely, in the course of time, it is possible to suggest that international trade will 
probably be the strongest instrument for even narrower relations between countries in the 
future.  
As Peter Van den Bossche states in his book, the process of economic 
globalization is one of the defining features of today’s world, “a process characterized by high 
levels of international trade and foreign direct investment”27.  
 The increase of international relations between countries has gained a 
considerable stimulus after the Second World War, when powerful nations had to help each 
other to recover from the damages caused by the war and multilateral economic organizations 
were created to help that process. In that moment there was a consensus among the winning 
countries of the need to create instruments that would ensure world peace. It was with the goal 
of stabilizing and maintaining peace and development in all countries of the world that the 
United Nations (UN) was born in 1945. But at the time of post-war and even before the 
creation of the UN, especially the United States advocated a position that world peace would 
require a coordination of economic interests and international financial cooperation. 
Economic issues were the focus of interest of the Bretton Woods Conference in 
1944 that created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, better known as the World Bank, aiming to ensure 
international financial stability, restricting currency speculation28.  
Also in the 1944 conference, the creation of an international body that regulates 
trade relations of countries was suggested and became known as the International Trade 
                                            
27 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 02. 
28 The conference took place one year before the founding of the UN and was a kind of anticipation of it, but 
focused on economic issues. See Valls, 1997, p. 2.  
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Organization (ITO). The ITO never got off the paper, but the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade was born in 1947. 
More comments about the Bretton Woods Conference and its developments will 
take place in section 2.3 of this first chapter. The Conference was mentioned in this moment 
because it is a remarkable event for the changes that economic globalization has experienced 
in the last decades. 
The increase of international political, social and economic relations has caused 
the States to be more connected to each other and interdependent in many ways. Most of the 
decisions taken by States in the international level (or even in the national level) have 
immediate effects on their partners or on the behavior of other countries around the world. 
Especially regarding economic interdependence, John H. Jackson comments that 
with that interdependence great wealth has come to the States immersed in the economic 
globalization since “goods are produced where their costs are lowest; consumers have more 
choices; production institutions are disciplined through competition; producers can realize the 
advantages of economies of scale”29. 
Although this matter will be discussed throughout this dissertation, it is interesting 
to mention in following Jackson, that great vulnerability has come together with the economic 
interdependence of countries as: 
 
National economies do not stay alone: economic forces move rapidly across 
borders to influence other societies. Government deficits in the United States 
can have an impact on its rate, which can push heavily indebted developing 
countries to the verge of ‘bankruptcy’. An embargo or price rise implemented 
by major oil-producing nations can cause deep and frustrating 
unemployment, farm bankruptcies, and dramatic rises in the cost of living in 
the United States. A recession in one part of the world is rapidly felt in other 
parts30. 
 
David Held and Anthony McGrew state that the term globalization was used to 
denote the rapidly expanding political and economic interdependence experienced in the 
1970s. That was a period, especially for Western states, when a reflection was necessary 
about the urgent need to rethink about political, economic and social orthodox structures that 
                                            
29 Jackson, 2000a, p. 6. 
30 Id, p. 6. 
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were still governing in that moment and which were characterized by a strong separation of 
internal and external affairs, the internal and international relations, the regional and global 
exchanges31. 
The effects of globalization can be felt in distinct areas of studies. For each area 
(cultural, politics, economics, social, etc.) the diagnosis is going to be different depending on 
which characteristics or strands of the process are analyzed. There is no doubt that 
globalization is a complex phenomenon, but for the sake of this dissertation it is only the 
economic aspects of globalization which will be explored, especially in what concerns 
international trade. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to bear in mind that, as Held and McGrew say, 
reducing “globalization to a purely economic or technological logic is considered profoundly 
misleading since it ignores the inherent complexity of the forces that shape modern societies 
and the world”32. 
There is no doubt that the institutions that arose from the so called Bretton Woods 
Agreements have given a big push to the economic relations that can be witnessed nowadays.  
During the twentieth century, important international organizations were created 
to help dealing with all the demands of the international trade and the globalized economy. 
Nowadays the organizations created still have a prominent role in the multilateral scenario, 
such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation on Trade and Development (OECD), the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and of course the WTO. 
Also, a number of bilateral and regional agreements have been signed in the last 
decades, creating a parallel movement with the international organizations. According to the 
data of the WTO, as of 15 January 2012, 511 (five hundred and eleven) regional trade 
                                            
31 Held; Mcgrew, 2003, p. 9. 
32 Id., p. 6. Although the acknowledgement that the theory of globalization and interdependence is the basis of 
international relations of the present time, this dissertation does not have the aim to delve into the myriad of 
theories surrounding the concepts of globalization and interdependence, once they are not the focus of the 
proposed problem, instead, the focus of this work is to give a brief overview of the subject in order to address 
their importance and to pave the general panorama for the discussions that will follow. 
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agreements were notified to the WTO33. All the agreements, despite being inspired by political 
or social reasons, survive and become stronger due to economic reasons. 
Although protectionist practices have emerged right after the Second World War, 
since the institution of GATT protectionism gave way to gradual market liberalization and 
more remarkably in the last two decades, international relations have quickly multiplied on 
the basis of economic and commercial relations between international companies as the 
exchange of products and services between States are becoming easier and, to a great extent, 
are being facilitated and disciplined by multilateral rules emanated from the WTO. 
International trade is the basis for the so-called economic globalization that 
encompasses free movement of services and foreign direct investment. Following the concept 
given by Joseph Stiglitz, the economic globalization is understood as a closer integration of 
States, its companies and its citizens, with great reduction of costs of both transportation and 
communication, “and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, 
capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders”34. 
One of the very positive aspects of the economic globalization and trade 
liberalization is the increase of capital flows from developed countries to developing countries 
giving these more opportunities for future growth through the global capital markets and 
direct investments, the facilitation on communication through the great improvement of 
internet-based satellite communication, and the lower prices of international transport of 
people. 
Those are some examples that generally characterize the process of economic 
globalization. They are understood as the driven forces of the process as it is expected that 
trade expansion will create additional demand for finance, transport and communication, 
whereas improvement in the latter areas will make trade more efficient35. 
Although the term globalization can be studied from a number of different 
perspectives, it is broadly understood that the process of globalization is intimately connected 
to economic subjects. The International Monetary Fund assimilates the concept of 
                                            
33 Not all the 511 regional trade agreements are in force currently. For up-to-date information on the agreements 
in force, see: < http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx>.  
34 Stiglitz, 2002, p. 9. 
35 United Nations Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Globalization: opportunities and 
challenges, p. 5-7. Published online at: <http://www.unescap.org/pdd/publications/regcoop/ch1.pdf>. 
Accessed in: 11 Jan. 2011. 
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globalization as the “growing of economic interdependence worldwide through the increasing 
volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international 
capital flows, and also through the more rapid widespread diffusion of technology”36. 
With the trade facilitation enabled by a greater exchange of goods and services 
between countries, lower tariffs on products, economic and industrial integration, the process 
of globalization allows a better division of labor and a more efficient allocation of savings at 
the same time as it raises productivity and average living standards37.  
Once everyone around the world feels the effects of the process of economic 
globalization and trade liberalization, the discussions about those subjects can be quite 
emotionally charged. Of course, the effects of the process are not the same for everybody or 
every country, so it is clear that economic globalization is not felt (perceived) in the same way 
around the world.  
Economic globalization and international trade are movements that have been 
designed to serve a multilateral context since the institution of GATT in 1948. 
Notwithstanding, countries around the world are significantly different in terms of wealth, 
social and economic development; moreover, it can be said that the process of economic 
globalization has increased the gap between developed and developing countries. 
As Peter Van den Bossche states, “economic globalization and international trade 
currently gives rise to problems and tensions in developed as well as developing countries”38. 
Indeed, it can be said that the economic globalization as a whole may adversely affect 
different segments of society. 
In the same stream, Robert Gilpin observes that many aspects of globalization that 
are discussed at the present time are not new and the great majority of citizens are excluded of 
the process. He also states that despite the importance of economic globalization, it is a 
limited process “and cannot possibly possess either all negative or all the positive 
consequences attributed to it” 39. 
                                            
36 International Monetary Fund, Globalization: Opportunities and Challenges, in World Economic Outlook, May 
1997, p. 45.  
37 Id., p. 45. 
38 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 14. 
39 See Gilpin, 2000, p. 295-296 
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 Especially with the incentive given to economic globalization in the last two 
decades, the whole global society had to adapt to the fast changes that have been made in 
terms of culture, communication, transports, exchange of goods, capital flows, transnational 
services, to name but a few. The great majority of those changes are positive, but not all 
countries were or are ready for them in economic terms, a fact that can lead to difficult 
problems and tensions. 
According to Dani Rodrik there are some explicit problems in the process of 
globalization. The author states that: 
 
The process that has come to be called ‘globalization’ is exposing a deep 
fault line between groups who have the skills and mobility to flourish in 
global markets and those who either don´t have these advantages or perceive 
the expansion of unregulated markets as inimical to social stability and 
deeply held norms40. 
 
Indeed the international trade designed with GATT and nowadays under the 
responsibility of the WTO has little connection with fair trade. Instead, the economic 
globalization that surrounds international trade has delivered much more privileges to 
developed countries than to developing and the least developed countries around the world.  
Although the speech of the defenders of the globalized economy and the 
international trade normally addresses the liberalization of trade as a win-win game, that is not 
true, especially for the poorest countries that joined the multilateral trading system. Actually, 
as Joseph Stiglitz has argued, the GATT rounds were very unfair to developing countries (and 
the same is happening with WTO rounds)41. 
One assumption of this dissertation is that the problem is neither trade 
liberalization, nor economic globalization, but instead how these processes are being 
implemented along the years. It is not only monetary or financial issues that separate 
developed countries from developing and least developed countries, the differences go 
beyond those issues and are clearly reflected on the deployment of disputes of developing 
countries complaining against developed countries before the WTO dispute settlement body. 
                                            
40 Rodrik, 1997, p. 2 
41 See Stiglitz, 2006.  
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More than that, Stiglitz states that it is not only a disparate relation in resources 
between countries that separates them, but a disparate relation in knowledge as well. That is 
one of the reasons, among others, why liberalization of trade has been very asymmetric42. 
Specially economic and capacity differences should be taken seriously into consideration and 
carefully treated in the process of trade liberalization. 
There are big differences between developed, developing and least developed 
countries that can be detected with a glance at a newspaper. It is not the goal of this 
dissertation to have a deep discussion about aspects other than economic, but each society 
around the world has different problems and, especially comparing societies from rich 
countries with societies from poor countries, those problems can have a considerable 
difference. 
Complementing that, Stiglitz argues that there are asymmetries that are natural. To 
illustrate the panorama and using the example given by Stiglitz, if the United States subsidizes 
cotton (it actually happens), this action by an enormous economy like the United States harms 
all the developing countries around the world that produce cotton. But, on the other hand, if 
Cambodia subsidizes some sort of commodity, it does not affect the global market at all given 
the small market share that Cambodia has. That is one of the main reasons why developing 
countries should be given special conditions in pursuit of their policies; otherwise they will 
never be able to compete with rich countries43. 
Since the discussion on economic asymmetry is going to be the background of the 
whole dissertation, it was just a briefly introduced in this section so as highlight what is 
important to the proposed reflection.  
Before proceeding to the specific explanation of the multilateral system as such, 
the concepts regarding economic development that were already used in this section and that 
will be repeated throughout the dissertation amount to the ambition that (a) developed country 
economies; (b) developing economies and, (c) least-developed economies, will be treated 
uniformly converge. For the WTO there is no definition for developed or developing 
countries. When countries sign to enter the Organization they declare themselves as 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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developed or developing countries. Among the current 153 members, 31 were declared as 
least-developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations44. 
Without the intention of entering the sphere of the literature regarding economic 
development or for the sake of consistency, this dissertation will accept the status of 
development of the WTO members in accordance with what is accepted by the Organization. 
Also, whenever a rule or a statement can be applied both to the developing and to the least-
developed countries, this dissertation will refer to these countries as developing countries 
interchangeably unless otherwise stated. 
 
2.3 The emergence of the Multilateral Trading System: history and evolution since 
GATT  
 
So as to discuss the multilateral trading system it is necessary to bring elements 
from the history and evolution of international trade, especially taking into account the events 
that happened after the Second World War and the creation of the international organizations 
that these events triggered. 
Before addressing those post-war events, it is worth highlighting the fact that the 
international economic relations under international law are primarily governed by treaties, 
rather than by customary law45. Those treaties - as the one that established the WTO - are in 
many cases responsible for the institution of an international organization. 
Indeed and as noted by Jackson in one of his books, in all the governmental 
international organizations that are listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations, 
there are more than three hundred that are related to economic matters46. 
As mentioned in the previous section, it was in the Bretton Woods Conference in 
1944, which took place in New Hampshire, the United States (US) that the economic issues 
                                            
44 More clarification on the criteria for identification of LDCs can be found at: <http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm>. Accessed in: Jan. 2011. 
45 Jackson, 2000a, p. 32. 
46 Id., p. 32. Jackson makes a distinction between the different international economic organizations, dividing 
them into five categories: the general economic institutions, as the WTO; the other United Nations specialized 
agencies, which tend to focus on particular problems or sectors of endeavor, such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization; the regional organizations, as for example the European Union; the international commodity 
agreements and; more specialized organizations, as the World Customs Organization. Id., p. 32-33. 
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where discussed after the war and that the need for an international organization on trade was 
recognized. Among the important results of the Conference, are the charters of the IMF and of 
the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Also in that 
Conference problems involving international trade were discussed, but the Conference did not 
recognize the need for a comparable international institution to deal with trade issues and to 
complement the IMF and the World Bank. 
That would have been the ITO, which should be created to complete the 
framework of the big international economic organizations, and that should take care of trade 
openness in order to overcome the protectionism that resulted from the 1929 crises and that in 
the following decade had an impact on political tensions thus contributing to the outbreak of 
World War II47. 
A Preparatory Committee was established in February 1946 to work on the 
founding document for an international organization for trade. The first meeting took place in 
London and the work followed a proposal by the United States entitled Suggested Charter for 
an International Trade Organization48. 
As Jackson explains, the work initiated in London continued in Geneva from 
April to November 1947, where meetings were held in a Conference divided in three main 
parts: 
 
One part dealt with continuing the preparation of a charter for a major 
international trade institution, the ITO. A second part focused on negotiating 
a multilateral agreement to reciprocally reduce tariffs. A third part 
concentrated on drafting the ‘general clauses’ of obligations relating to the 
tariff obligations. The second and third parts, together, would constitute the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade49. 
 
Although there was a great improvement on negotiations in Geneva concerning 
the GATT provisions, there was a failure to agree on the ITO Charter. 
The twenty three countries that were active in the negotiations of GATT from 1 
January 1948 decided to apply the GATT through the ‘Protocol of Provisional Application of 
                                            
47 Lafer, 1999, p. 29. 
48 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 79. 
49 Jackson, 2000a, p. 37. 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (PPA), previously adopted on 30 October 
194750. 
Then, in March 1948, in Havana, the negotiations on the ITO Charter were 
successfully completed. According to Peter Van den Bossche, “the Havana Charter provided 
for the establishment of the ITO, and sets out basic rules and disciplines for international trade 
and other international economic matters”51. 
Despite being very active in negotiations, the United States Senate did not give its 
advice and consent to ratification on the Charter Establishing the International Trade 
Organization. No one would want to establish an international trade organization without the 
participation of the leading economy nation in the world52. 
 
2.3.1 GATT and its developments until 1994  
 
The ITO Charter never came into force. Notwithstanding, GATT was considered a 
valid commitment under the scope of International Law through the PPA. This Protocol had 
as it most important impact its statement of the manner of implementing GATT. 
As explained by Jackson, Part I of GATT contained the Most Favored Nation 
principle, which will be better explained in section 2.3 as it is still one of the basic principles 
of the multilateral trading system, and the tariff concession obligations. Part II (Articles III to 
XXIII) contained most of the main substantive obligations including customs procedures, 
subsidies, antidumping, quotas and national treatment. And Part III contained mainly 
procedural rules53. 
Regarding the important obligations (most of them situated in Part II), the 
GATT’s contracting parties were entitled grandfather rights applicable to any provision of the 
                                            
50 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 80. 
51 Id., p. 80. 
52 See Jackson, 2000a, p. 37. 
53 Jackson, 2000a, p. 40. See also Hoekman, Kostecki, 2002, p. 37. The creation of the GATT was much more 
complicated, even from a legal perspective. The intention here is to just give an overview of the historical, 
economic and political establishment of the GATT. 
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contracting party legislation by the time it became a party, and that was inconsistent with 
GATT Part II obligation54. 
On the other hand, GATT contracting parties must accept the tariff concessions of 
Article II of GATT as they must also fully respect the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation 
of Part I55. The MFN became one of the basic and most important principles of the WTO after 
1994 together with the principle of national treatment. As Theresia Schnell states, “the 
substantive norms of the GATT are non-discrimination, reciprocity, and the right to take 
‘safeguard’ action”56. As those principles/norms are part and guide the multilateral system 
established by the WTO, they are going to be given attention later on in a separate section of 
this chapter. 
The international trade negotiations under the scope of GATT were performed in 
eight rounds, where nations interested in reducing barriers to trade got together in meetings 
adopting the precepts establish by GATT.  
In the course of time, both the nations interested in participating in GATT 
meetings and the volume of trade increased significantly. As Van den Bossche points out, 
although the GATT was not conceived as an international organization, (rather it was 
conceived as a multilateral agreement for the reduction of tariffs), it gained importance and 
transformed itself over the years into a de facto international organization57. 
GATT was very successful in reducing tariffs on trade in goods. Indeed, Vera 
Thorstensen explains that in 1947 the average import tariff was of 40% while in 1994 that 
average dropped to 5%58. The contracting parties adopted the methodology of rounds of 
meetings for the negotiation of tariffs reduction and trade liberalization. There were eight 
Tariff Rounds during the period of GATT (from 1947 to 1994)59.  
                                            
54 This grandfather rights exception (also called ‘existing legislation exception’ allowed most governments, 
“which would otherwise need to submit the GATT for legislative approval, to approve the PPA by executive 
or administrative authority without going to the legislature”. Jackson, 2000a, p. 40. 
55 Id., p. 41. 
56 Schnell, 2004, p. 5 
57 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 81. 
58 Thorstensen, 1999, p. 30. 
59 The eight rounds were the following: Geneva Round 1947; Annecy Round 1948-49; Torquay Round 1950-51; 
Geneva Round1955-566; Dillon Round 1960-62; Kennedy Round 1964-67; Tokyo Round 1973-79 and; 
Uruguay Round 1986-94. See Koul, 2005, especially the first chapter. 
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So as to give an idea of the importance that GATT gained, twenty-three countries 
became the original contracting parties of the Agreement and the negotiations covered 
roughly 45,000 tariff concessions and U$ 10 billion of trade in the Geneva Round of 1947. 
Approximately three decades later, the Tokyo Round (1973-79) (the seventh round) involved 
102 countries and U$ 300 billion of trade60. 
Notwithstanding, the evolution of multilateral trade liberalization did not happen 
in a linear way, among other reasons, because bilateral and regional trade agreements were 
created. The most important agreement of that period was the creation of the so-called 
Economic European Community that established a common internal market with a common 
external tariff61. Moreover, as Prazeres reminds us, in 1970 the world economy suffered a 
deep crises that included the reduction of the rate of expansion of international trade62.  
Actually, after the Tokyo Round the international economic scenario experienced 
a very slow economic growth, completely different from previous years of tariff negotiations. 
Rapid inflation and high unemployment characterized the diagnosis of the economic 
stagflation of that moment.  
Nevertheless, as Koul states, the Tokyo Round was successful as it “made non-
tariff barriers visible if not eliminated and also decreased the uncertainties generated by 
governmental interventions in the markets as well as stabilized the international trading 
environment”63. 
Due to the importance acquired by GATT in matters related to international trade, 
there was a latent need for an institution, an international organization to deal with the 
subjects under the scope of GATT. Despite that need (and making it clear that there was no 
intention to create an international organization when the Uruguay Round started) , there was 
an increasing interest to involve other topics in the GATT discipline, such as trade in 
                                            
60 Koul, 2005, p. 15. 
61 As of 1950, the “European Coal and Steel Community” begins to unite European countries economically and 
politically. The six founders, for which a common external tariff was first established are: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
62 See Prazeres, 2009, especially the first chapter, 
63 Koul, Op. Cit., p. 19. 
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agricultural products, trade in textiles and clothing, trade in services and intellectual property 
rights64. 
Those interests were present in the broad mandate of the Punta del Este 
Declaration, in 1986. As Jackson shows, included in the list of negotiations were: 
 
[…] bringing agricultural goods trade under GATT discipline (a problem 
that had persisted throughout the history of GATT but that had resisted 
reforms in the two precious negotiating rounds); elaborating further on the 
rules regarding subsidies beyond that of the Tokyo Round Code; bringing 
attention to the troublesome textile protectionist-type arrangements that 
existed uneasily in the GATT context; and a number of other issues65. 
 
It is clear that the subjects that were included in the agenda for the Uruguay 
Round were not chosen randomly. The United States had a strong interest in the inclusion of 
trade in services and intellectual property rights as well as in the liberalization of trade, as 
those were sectors that were gaining importance in international economy, and, at the same 
time, agricultural issues were interesting to get the attention and to stimulate developing 
countries to participate in the discussions. 
Another issue that was becoming more important and that needed to be taken into 
account was the system of dispute resolution. The dispute settlement system of GATT was 
one of its most worrying defects, and with the purpose of reviewing it, a special negotiating 
group that would focus on the dispute settlement rules was established. More attention is 
dedicated to this in the next section. 
Among the other problems of GATT, Barral points out the GATT à la carte, 
meaning the possibility that each contracting party had to choose the specific agreement that 
they wished to join and the grandfather rights, allowing parties to rely on pre-existing 
domestic rights66. 
Despite the problems verified in the GATT structure and proceedings, its 
importance to the liberalization of international trade and the improvement of a global 
                                            
64 Jackson points out that “the European Community was hesitant to pay attention to trade in services, but later it 
began to realize the importance of this for many European Community member states (…). Some developing 
countries were extremely concerned about norms that would protect intellectual property at the expense of 
developing country needs”. Jackson, 2000a, p. 44. 
65 Ibid. 
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economy is evident. Yet, the experience acquired during the years before the 
institutionalization of an international organization for trade was substantially important to 
delineate the goals and the needs of the WTO. 
Actually, the quite successful dispute settlement system of the WTO, despite its 
many problems, especially in the implementation phase, was structured from the observation 
of the failures and the necessary changes in the GATT system. 
 
2.2.1.1 Dispute Settlement in the GATT 
 
The draft of the ITO Charter originally established a strict dispute settlement 
system, which contemplated the effective use of arbitration (not always mandatory), and also 
the possibility of appellation to the International Court of Justice in some cases67.  
According to Jackson, the proposed model of dispute settlement to GATT could 
be expressed in three main characteristics: first the possibility of conviction in case of 
nullification or impairment; second, the power of contracting parts not only to investigate or 
recommend an action, but also to require a determinate behavior; and third, the possibility that 
the country could be authorized to suspend its GATT’s obligation within other contracting 
parties68. 
The system of the GATT dispute settlement contained two articles, which 
basically foresaw the possibility of (i) consultations concerning representations that any other 
contracting party can do when they refer to the application of customs regulations and 
formalities, the anti-dumping duties and countervailing measures, quantity regulations and 
exchange rates, subsidies, trade operations to the State, among others, and (ii) protection of 
advantage, if a contracting party considers that any advantage accruing to it, directly or 
indirectly, of this Agreement is being nullified or reduced, or that one of the objectives of the 
Agreement is being impeded. 
In the first decade of the GATT, disputes were resolved by diplomatic means 
exclusively, consultation about violations and work in working groups formed by members of 
                                                                                                                                        
66 Barral, 2000, p. 25. 
67 Jackson, 1998b, p. 6. 
68 Id., p. 7. 
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the governments of the contracting countries. Basically what was done were negotiations 
outside of court or arbitration. 
There was a substantial change in this framework in the 1950s. A review was 
conducted of the Agreement and numerous provisions of GATT regarding dispute settlement 
were changed in 1955. It was decided, for example, that working groups would be replaced by 
panels of experts acting as experts and not as members of the countries69. 
But it was in the Tokyo Round that most promoted trade liberalization with the 
reduction in tariffs on a trade volume of U$ 300 billion, that some real initiatives to improve 
the dispute settlement procedure were taken into account, under the supervision of the Group 
Framework Committee. However, according to Jackson, the effort to change procedures for 
dispute settlement partially failed, in part because of the strong objection from the European 
Community (EC). In any case, the result was the adoption in 1979 of an instrument called 
Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance70. 
That Understanding explains the procedures for dispute settlement in GATT. 
However, despite the demonstrations in order to improve the dispute settlement procedure, the 
Understanding of 1979 was well below the expected trend71. 
In the body of that Understanding it was basically stated that the party could require a 
consultation to the GATT as a first step, and then should provide recognition of a conciliation 
agreement to the General Director of GATT. If a solution was not reached, the party could 
then require the formation of a panel. The panel would then make its report and submit it to 
the Council of Representatives, which was the permanent organ of the GATT. Note that this 
Council was not provided or standing in the text of the GATT, but it was established from the 
practice and decisions of the contracting parties72. Also because of practice, it was decided 
that if the Council approved the report by consensus, it became mandatory. If it was not 
approved, the report would not have binding effect. 
A major problem with the procedure of the GATT dispute settlement was exactly the 
consensus of the Council, which was "composed of all members in two key phases of the 
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process: (i) the establishment of the panel, and (ii) the approval of the panel’s report"73. Since 
all the GATT contracting parties were part of the Council, that means that the State convicted 
- that should obey and implement the panel's decision - was included. By the consensus rule 
the loser State could block consensus raising objections to it. Clearly this rule was one of the 
biggest flaws of the system of the GATT dispute settlement. 
At the Ministerial Conference in 1982, between the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay 
Round, the discussion about the problems of procedure of the GATT dispute settlement 
became one of the major worries of the system, given the general dissatisfaction of the 
contracting parties. During this ministerial conference, the States gave special attention to the 
issue of developing and encouraging a new trade round. Nevertheless, according to Jackson, 
the discussion advanced little74. The final document of this conference suggested the need to 
withdraw the rule of consensus to approve the panel’s report, so that the State convicted could 
not block or delay the approval. 
However, later practices that occurred after the resolution of 1982 did not reveal any 
change. Due to the lack of progress regarding the procedure for settling disputes, the issue 
was included in the Declaration of Punta del Este, to be discussed in the eighth round of 
GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round. 
During the 1980s, according to Jackson, while the procedure was becoming more 
legally precise, the idea that there were two types of cases in the GATT was developed: the 
cases of violation and certain cases of "non-violation", consisting in cases not involving a 
breach, but a "nullification or impairment"75. 
Actually, GATT article XXIII.1 on “nullification or impairment” states: 
 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired 
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being 
impeded as the result of  
(a) Failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under 
this Agreement; or 
(b) The application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement; or 
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(c) The existence of any other situation76. 
 
The first objective of the GATT 1947 system, embedded by the WTO dispute 
settlement system in 1994, is the withdrawal of illegal measures under article XXIII. This 
objective has strong connection with the theory of international responsibility of States briefly 
reviewed in this chapter, and is in line with the obligations set out in international public law 
to cease the illegal act and remedy the damage eventually caused. 
Still, in article XXIII.2, the possibility of suspension of obligations and retaliation 
under GATT (those provisions are also present in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of 
the WTO) is already provided, with a special difference for international economic relations, 
which is limiting the right of unilateral retaliation unless it was approved by all contracting 
parties77. 
So as to make a little reflection on this, and as analyzed by Petersmann, it is interesting 
to observe that article XXIII.2 excludes the right of unilateral suspension of GATT 
obligations without the approval of the other contracting parties which is different from what 
is proposed in article 60 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties that understands that a 
material breach of a multilateral obligation entitles the affected party to suspend, in whole or 
in part, the application of the treaty to the offending country78. 
Various aspects of the GATT dispute settlement system were included in the worries 
mentioned by the contracting parties during the Uruguay Round. Among the problems of the 
system, there were delays in the establishment of panels and in the adoption of panel report, 
the increase in non-compliance with dispute settlement rulings and incomplete or conditional 
implementation of dispute settlement findings, and the lack of transparency of GATT dispute 
settlement proceedings79. 
Indeed, Jackson also describes what he meant by the major failures of the GATT 
system, namely: (i) vague language, with few details of objectives and procedures, (ii) 
                                            
76 See GATT 1947. 
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customary law right of unilateral reprisals, whose exercise had contributed so much to the ‘law of the jungle’ 
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inaccuracy of the power of the contracting parties with regard to oversight of dispute 
resolution process, (iii) the potential to block the adoption of the panel charged by the state, 
(iii) second possible blocking, more serious than the first, in which the convicted State could 
block and prevent the adoption of the report agreed by the Council of Representatives, the 
rule of "consensus ", since it was also part of the Council, (iv) the fragmentation of the 
procedures for dispute settlement because of the existence of various procedures,  and (v) the 
pressure from government contractors on the panel members80. 
Despite the problems of the dispute settlement procedure of the GATT, it was an 
important system well admired because various interests of trade policy were submitted to it81. 
Yet, as an example of its importance, Jackson points out that the free trade agreement between 
Canada and the United States of 1988, now North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), has taken many provisions of its dispute settlement system from GATT 
provisions82. 
Moreover, all the provisions established during the period of GATT were recognized 
and embedded in the WTO dispute settlement system. Although changes were made in an 
attempt to make the system more effective and transparent  to ensure a certain level of legal 
security for the WTO members, the precepts of GATT 1947 are present and are taken into 
account in the decision making process at the Organization. 
 
2.3.2 Changes in 1994: the WTO institutional framework 
 
This section is dedicated to the institutional framework of the WTO since it is 
assumed that for a better understanding of the multilateral trading system (and of the problem 
of this dissertation) it is necessary to understand the nature of the rules that will be dealt with. 
As Douglas North has explained, institutions play a considerable role in the development of 
society and therefore they have significant influence on economic development. According to 
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the author, institutions are the rules of the game, the limitations that provide conditions for 
exchanges, be it of a political, social or economic83 nature. 
After almost fifty years of negotiations under the scope of the GATT 1947, the 
WTO was established on 1 January 1995, as a result of the efforts of the contracting parties of 
the GATT and in line with the needs to increase the international exchange of goods, services, 
international investments and the greater importance of intellectual property rights. 
At the Conference in 1994 in Marrakesh a conclusion was reached for the 
Uruguay Round initiated in 1986 in Punta del Este. Among the most important results of that 
round were, of course, the institution of the WTO signed by 129 countries and the 
achievement of a considerable reduction in tariffs for industrial goods. The Marrakesh 
Agreement instituted the WTO and encompasses the GATT, with the modifications made by 
the Uruguay Round, all agreements and arrangements concluded under its scope and the 
complete results of the Uruguay Round. 
Among the main results of the Uruguay Round a number of Agreements 
established for specific sectors of economic affairs can be mentioned: the Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Investment Measures Related to Trade 
(TRIMs), the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and a revised Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). 
The institution of an international organization established by a treaty under 
international law changes the kind of commitments that States assume when they decide to be 
part of it. It is important to stress the fact that GATT was not a formal international 
organization, but an intergovernmental treaty84. For this reason, as Hoekman and Kostecki 
state GATT did not have members but contracting parties, and that changed completely when 
WTO was instituted85.Yet, that means that GATT did not have the power to discipline the 
behavior of signatory countries, making the negotiations much more difficult, especially when 
dealing with dispute resolution, whose contracting parties could exercise a lot of pressure 
upon panel members.  
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Indeed, the WTO differs from GATT in many important aspects. While GATT 
was a relatively flexible institution, the WTO establishes rules that are applicable to all 
members, and all members are obligated to respect the dispute settlement proceedings86. 
With the development of international trade and the expressive increase of the 
number of GATT contracting parties, which had the participation of only 23 countries in the 
first round and entered the Uruguay Round with the participation of 123 countries, clearly it 
was necessary to deliver a more legalistic character to the future international trade 
organization87. Actually, the possibility of imposing punishment for the breach of its rules 
make the WTO a very peculiar organization as is going to be suggested in chapter 288. 
The legal framework resulting from the Uruguay Round Agreement is well 
understood when looking at its table of contents. The WTO chapter itself contains only ten 
pages, but the WTO agreement embraces, besides these ten pages, four extremely important 
annexes. Annex 1 contains the multilateral agreements which are mandatory for all members 
and is divided into three parts: the GATT 1994 and its agreements, the GATS and issues 
related to intellectual property. All members should also be required to accept the Annex 2 
(Understanding on Dispute) and Appendix 3, which refers to the mechanism for review of 
trade policy (trade policy review) 89. Annex 4, somehow less important, refers to plurilateral 
agreements, which are not mandatory. 
In the structure of the Organization, the highest level of the WTO is occupied by 
the Ministerial Conference, composed by representatives of all members – nowadays the 
WTO has 153 members -, which shall meet at least once every two years. The Ministerial 
Conference has an extremely important role, since it has the authority to take decisions on all 
matters under the scope of any of the multilateral trade agreements90. 
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Actually, the Ministerial Conference works as a supreme body in the structure of 
the WTO, and among the decisions that it has the power to make are the power of appointing 
the Director-General and adopting staff regulations; granting waivers; decisions on accession; 
adopting amendments and adopting authoritative interpretations on WTO agreements91. 
In the hierarchy of the WTO, right below the Ministerial Conference there are the 
General Council, the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body. The 
General Council is composed by representative of all members that shall meet as appropriate 
(normally once every two months) in the intervals of the Ministerial Conference92. 
The Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Police Review Body are two 
emanations of the General Council. Although both have their own Rules of Procedure and 
have always had a different Chairperson, they are intimately connected to the General 
Council. Actually, when the General Council deals with the trade policy review mechanism, it 
convenes and acts like the Trade Policy Review Body; on the other hand, when the General 
Council administers WTO dispute settlement, it acts as the Dispute Settlement Body93. As 
relating to the Dispute Settlement Body, a detailed explanation of its rules and proceedings 
shall be carried out in Chapter two of this dissertation. 
Following the structure of the WTO, Article IV:5 of the WTO Agreement  states 
that at the level below there are specialized councils that shall operate under the guidance of 
the General Council: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services and 
the Council for TRIPS. 
The Council for Trade in Goods shall oversee the activities and the functioning of 
the Multilateral trade Agreements in Annex 1A, which include: the GATT 1994, Agriculture, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Anti-Dumping, Customs Valuation, Preshipment 
Inspection, Rules of Origen, Import Licensing, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and 
Safeguards. The Council for Trade in Services shall oversee the functioning of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) – Annex 1B - and, finally, the Council for TRIPS 
shall oversee the functioning of the Agreement on TRIPS – Annex 1C. 
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The detailed structure of the WTO is a result of a large work during the last 
GATT trade negotiations round. Among the important achievements of the Uruguay Round, 
the ones that play a major role for the purpose of the present work are the achievements 
related to intellectual property, the dispute settlement system and the integration of 
developing countries.  
Actually, the TRIPS Agreement is considered an impressive acquisition for the 
multilateral trade system and brings substantial new international rule discipline to 
complement the protection for patents, copyrights, trade secrets and similar intellectual 
property subjects as is going to be reviewed in more detail in Chapter two.  
In what refers to developing country integration, as Jackson states, the system of 
1994 by bringing a rule discipline to the trade policies for new industrializing countries 
proportions a more comprehensive integration of developing countries than before, “given the 
requirement that all countries have tariff and service schedules, and the narrowing of certain 
less developed country exceptions”94. 
Finally, in addition to the specialized councils, the agreement of the WTO in 
Article IV:7 sets a number of committees and working parties that assist the General Council 
and the Ministerial Conference such as the important committees on Trade and Development 
and the Committee of Budget, among others. 
Before moving on to the objectives and principles of the WTO, it is important to 
note that despite the new structure of the WTO being much more developed organizationally 
and normatively than the GATT, it is explicit that the WTO shall be guided in its the 
decisions, procedures and practices by the work of GATT95. Moreover, GATT's history is an 
important element for the interpretation and understanding of the WTO as an institution and 
the GATT still exists once it is embedded in Annex 1A of WTO Agreement. 
  
2.4 WTO: objectives and principles 
 
The WTO was created from a necessity of the contracting parties of the GATT of 
having instituted an international organization for trade, where they could deal with trade 
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matters within legal security and stability on the rules and proceedings related to international 
trade matters. With the aim of establishing a fairer trade and increase the economic 
development of all the members, from the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement it is 
recognized that multilateral trade relations should be conducted with a view to  raising 
standards of living and ensuring full employment by expanding the production of trade in 
goods and services. 
With the aim of promoting development in a sustainable way, members should 
make sure of an optimal use of the world’s resources paying attention to environment 
preservation and including all members in a manner consistent with the concerns at different 
levels for the economic development of its members. 
Indeed, the agreements made under the scope of the WTO should be directed to 
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to the liberalization of trade and to the 
elimination of differential treatment ensuring that they are reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous to all members. Also, positive efforts have to be made to the inclusion of 
developing and least developed countries in the share of the growth of international trade 
taking into account their special needs. 
As it is, the endeavor of including all members in the share of the liberalization 
and improvement of the international trade and economic globalization is reflected in the 
principles of the WTO.  
Most of the principles were already guiding the negotiations during the GATT 
period and were embedded in the Organization in 1994. Although a list of principles in WTO 
agreements cannot be found, they are the cornerstones of multilateral trade system. Also, 
since they are organized in different fashions in the literature some of the principles with 
greater importance for this study will be presented in greater detail. 
 
2.4.1 Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 
 
The Most-Favored-Nation treatment (hereinafter MFN) is understood, together 
with the principle of the National Treatment, as the basic principles of non-discrimination of 
the GATT 1947 that were incorporate by the WTO, and are specifically present in the GATT 
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1994 Agreement, GATS and TRIPS Agreement. Also, this principle is reproduced in a 
number of bilateral and other trade agreements. 
The MFN treatment in the GATT refers to an obligation of equal treatment, which 
means that any favorable treatment addressed to any country with respect to imports and 
exports of products has to be extended to the other members of the agreement. It means, as 
Jackson emphasizes, “an obligation to treat activities of a particular foreign country or its 
citizens at least as favorably as it treats the activities of any other country”96. 
Jackson points out that the MFN clause dates to the twelfth century, although it 
became more famous and utilized in international trade with the growth of commerce in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the 1800s and 1900s, the MFN condition was often 
included in many treaties, especially treaties of Commerce, Navigation and Friendship97. 
Regarding goods, the MFN refers to the purpose of non-discrimination between 
similar import goods from different countries. The prohibition of discrimination among like 
products originated in or destined for different members exists in the WTO as an incentive for 
reciprocal concessions that should be extended to all the members of the WTO. 
By interpreting the MFN clause of the Article 1 of GATT-1994, one can identify 
that it has economic and political arguments. Considering political issues, it is a political 
measure entitled to dissolve offensives in international relations helping to promote 
multilateralism and diminish discriminations, since it advocates for an equal treatment of all 
WTO members. 
On the other hand, as an economic measure, it ensures that trade benefits 
negotiated between two countries will be extended to others. Yet, the MFN also secures the 
benefits of bargain during the negotiations between members, and has a multiplying effect 
since the clause often provides a generalization of liberalizing trade policies98. 
Moreover, the MFN clause as a nondiscrimination measure plays an important 
role to minimize distortions of the system. When trade restrictions or trade liberalizations are 
applied uniformly without taking into account the origin of the goods, it is expected that the 
economic system of allocation and production of products achieve the maximum effect. 
                                            
96 Jackson, 2000a, p. 161. 
97 Id., p. 158. 
98 See Koul, 2005, p. 80 and Jackson, 2000a, p. 159. 
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According to the text of GATT-1994, the MFN treatment concerns the obligation 
to grant to all the members advantages regarding customs duties, charges on imports and 
exports, internal taxes, internal regulations affecting the sale, distribution and use of products 
and any other customs-related matter. 
Given the fact that the MFN is understood as a standard of equal treatment 
between nations, it establishes a very favorable scenario to the multilateralism. Although the 
MFN clause does not necessarily exist in every multilateral system, policies that favor MFN 
also favor multilateralism.  
The MFN clause can also be found in GATS Agreement (Article II), in what 
refers to trade in services, and in TRIPS Agreement (Article IV) in aspects related to 
intellectual property. In Article II:1 of the GATS there is the prohibition of discrimination 
between like services and service suppliers from different countries, while in Article IV of 
TRIPS it is affirmed that any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a member 
regarding intellectual property rights to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other members.  
It is important to note that, according to Peter Van den Bossche, the MFN 
treatment obligation in the WTO does not concern only advantages granted to other members, 
but advantages granted to all and any other country, by that including non-WTO member. 
That means that if a WTO member concedes a trade advantage to a country that is not under 
the WTO, according to Article 1:1 of GATT the member shall be constrained to grant the 
same advantage to all WTO members99. 
The essence of non-discrimination obligations in the WTO is in the fact that like 
products, or like services, shall be treated equally and without taking into account their origin. 
Among other cases brought to the DSB, the EC-Bananas III complained about the less 
favorable treatment that bananas coming from Latin American countries were receiving in 
comparison with bananas coming from former European colonies - referred to as ACP 
countries – (Asian, Caribbean and Pacific former colonies)100. 
In the literature regarding the MFN clauses there is a distinction between 
conditional and unconditional MFN treatment. Under conditional treatment, when a country 
                                            
99 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 312. 
100 WTO DS27, EC-Bananas III.  
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grants some privilege to another, for example country A grants a privilege to country C but A 
owes a MFN treatment to B, it means that country A must grant B the equivalent privilege. 
Notwithstanding, this must happen only after country B has given country A some reciprocal 
privilege. That is not what happens in the WTO. 
Actually the WTO Agreements deal with the unconditional MFN clause, that 
means that country A must grant privileges to country B without receiving any privilege or 
return from B. It is broadly understood that unconditional MFN clauses can help spread trade 
liberalization with more efficiency and in a faster way. By granting the same advantages to all 
the members of the WTO, each country allows equal access to its own market and has the 
same opportunities to access other countries market as any other member of the Organization. 
Although the MFN clause has been widely recognized since GATT 1947 as a 
fundamental obligation among members of the multilateral trading system, it is accepted that 
there are many breaches and exceptions to the MFN treatment that allow discriminatory 
regimes and preferential systems responsible for the big part of all world trade moves that 
some countries have. Indeed the text of the GATT had foreseen that before, so much so that 
Article XXIV of its text provides exceptions for customs unions, free trade areas, and interim 
agreements leading to either, provided that they meet certain conditions. 
For example, in the case of the creation of a preferential area, a third country that 
will not make part of the new block agreement has to have its trade situation respected and not 
worsened in what relates to the countries that are going to be part of the preferential trade 
area. 
Other exceptions to the application of the MFN clause and especially important to 
this dissertation are the ones contained in Article IV of the TRIPS Agreement that determines 
exemptions of the MFN obligation in case of advantage, favor, immunity or privilege deriving 
from, for example, an international agreement on judicial assistance or law enforcement; 
granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome 
Convention and; deriving from international agreements related to the protection of 
intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the WTO 
agreement101. 
 
                                            
101 Article IV, TRIPS Agreement. 
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2.4.2 National Treatment 
 
The nucleus of the multilateral trading system is formed by the principles of the 
MFN treatment and the national treatment. Both principles together - which were put into 
force by GATT 1947 and confirmed by the WTO System in 1994 - try to ensure the non-
discrimination in international trade. As the principle of MFN, the National Treatment is also 
contemplated in the most important (and compulsory) WTO agreements: GATT 1994, GATS 
and TRIPS. 
The national treatment obligates each country to grant to the import product no 
worse treatment than that it granted to its domestic products. After cleared customs and border 
procedures, all import products have to have the same national treatment as any domestic 
product regarding regulatory and tax measures. That means that no member shall apply 
internal taxes or any other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a different 
way as the one set in paragraph 1 of Article III of GATT102. Indeed, the national treatment 
applies only to internal measures and does not worry about border measures, which are taken 
care of in other GATT Articles (especially Article XI).  
Actually, the national treatment not only refers to products, but may also be 
applied to other activities such as the intellectual property rights. According to Article 3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, it has to be confirmed by the nationals of every WTO member as a 
treatment no less favorable as each member granted to its own nationals regarding  the 
protection of intellectual property. The national treatment will take into account the 
exceptions already provided in the Paris Convention of 1967, the Berne Convention of 1971, 
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (Rome Convention). 
By way of reference, the GATS agreement mentions national treatment in the 
body of its text (Article XVII) but the meaning of national treatment related to services 
presents some restrictions in the literature. Basically it is understood, as Van den Bossche 
states, that the national treatment related to services is only applicable to the extent that WTO 
                                            
102 Article III:1 of GATT: “The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production”. 
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Members have explicitly committed themselves to grant national treatment in respect to 
specific service sectors103. 
The intention of Article III of GATT is - besides promoting nondiscrimination in 
international trade relations - to avoid protectionism of members regarding their domestic 
products and granting equality of procedures and tax measures to goods and services, either 
national or international. A good summary is brought by the Report of the WTO Appellate 
Body concerning this principle since it states that: “The Article III national treatment 
obligation is a general prohibition on the use of internal taxes and other internal regulatory 
measures so as to afford protection to domestic production”104. 
Countries in general and especially the importing ones have an inclination to 
adopt discriminatory measures to protect the national production. More than taxes application, 
there are a number of regulations, technical barriers, sanitary measures, among other features, 
that are known to be used by the countries to distort trade and competition. By the rule of 
Article III of GATT the multilateral trading system tries to impede the application of 
protectionist policies aiming to induce fair trade and trade liberalization. 
The national treatment is a wide-ranging obligation that can be invoked in many 
situations regarding goods, services or intellectual property rights. In fact it has been a major 
complaint in the dispute settlement system since GATT 1947. As Hoekman explains the 
obligation covers taxes and other policies that have to be administrated in a nondiscriminatory 
way among like domestic and foreign products, regardless of whether a specific tariff 
commitment was made105. 
 
2.4.3 Other Principles and exceptions 
 
Special attention was given to the MFN treatment and the national treatment since 
they are broadly understood as the cornerstones of the nondiscrimination treatment in the 
multilateral trading system. Notwithstanding, there are other basic principles as important as 
the ones above responsible for the outline of the WTO functioning. 
                                            
103 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 371. 
104 Report of the Appellate Body Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R. 
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A list of principles followed by the WTO cannot be found in its agreements, but 
the rules are spread in the legal texts and decisions adopted by the Organization. Hoekman 
organizes the principles in four other categories besides the aforementioned nondiscrimination 
principles, three of which will be briefly explained in this section since their clarification is 
considered important for this dissertation. To finish this first chapter, the exceptions to trade 
liberalization brought in the legal text of GATT will be mentioned. 
 
• Reciprocity 
 
The principle of reciprocity has a motivator role in the WTO system, responsible 
for granting equal privileges between countries. Taking an example from international trade, a 
country can accept to lower import duties or technical barriers in return for equal or similar 
concessions from another country. 
Reciprocity is a basic principle upon which international trade has been developed 
for a long time. Regarding the multilateral trading system, since GATT 1947 the negotiations 
were established on a reciprocity basis so to motivate countries to open their markets and 
receive equivalent advantages or privileges in return for other countries. Indeed, Hoekman 
states that the principle of reciprocity reflects the desire of getting something back (a 
payment) for trade liberalization through a better access to markets and constitutes a manner 
of limiting the scope of free-riders in liberalization process106. 
The preamble of the GATT and of the WTO agreement highlight the intention of 
achieving the objectives of the Organization by reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements toward tariff reduction as well as the reduction of other barriers to trade and 
elimination of discrimination treatment among nations relating to international trade.  
Regarding nondiscrimination, it is important to mention that the principle of 
reciprocity works very closely with the MFN treatment. As aforementioned, the literature 
divides the MFN treatment into conditional and unconditional. The principle of reciprocity 
would be closer to the meaning of conditional MFN treatment, when a country grants some 
advantage or privilege to another expecting to be paid in return. 
                                                                                                                                        
105 Hoekman, 2002, p. 42. 
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During the GATT negotiations the participation of developing countries was 
possible and guided by what was called relative reciprocity, according to which developing 
countries did not have to grant the same advantages or privileges received from developed 
countries, especially regarding tariff concessions. 
Nevertheless, under the WTO agreements the terms of bargain where altered by a 
demand of the develop countries that all the negotiated commitments be combined in a single-
undertaking, through which the countries had to decide to accept all the multilateral 
agreements or leave the GATT system. According to Hudec, “this new approach completely 
restructured the developed-developing country bargain, proposing to pay for all the new 
developing country concessions simply by agreeing not to destroy the market access they 
already had”107. 
 
• Transparency 
 
Transparency means that the rules imposed by countries relating to international 
trade must be published in government’s websites, in a clear and easily understandable way. 
The enforcement of commitments relating to trade requires access to the regimes that are 
maintained by members. 
The transparency principle is a legal obligation under the WTO embedded in 
Article X of the GATT and Article III of the GATS. Basically transparency defines that all 
regulations related to international trade must be published promptly, so as to enable 
governments and agents of foreign trade to be aware of what is going on in each country in 
matters of trade. Also, all members are required to respond to requests for information by 
other members and to notify the WTO of all changes in trade policy108. 
Among the benefits provided by transparency are, of course, the possibility for 
members and its citizens to be aware of what is going on with trade practices in their own 
country and of partners countries and, at the same time, the possibility of learning about the 
                                                                                                                                        
106 Hoekman, 2002, p. 43. 
107 Hudec, 1987, p. 107. 
108 Hoekman, 2002, p. 44. 
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WTO and its procedures. By giving transparency to what happens in the Organization, a 
higher legitimacy and reliability are also addressed to the WTO. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to say that there are many complaints about the 
WTO procedures and practices regarding the dispute settlement system and that is one of the 
reasons why the Doha negotiating mandate of 2001 recognized the need of improvements and 
clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
 
• Binding and Enforcement Commitments 
 
One of the most important achievements of the Uruguay Round was to enforce 
commitments between multilateral trade players. Agreements and commitments regarding 
trade have little (or no) value if they cannot be enforced. 
Differently from the GATT 1947, the WTO was established as an international 
treaty under the auspices of the public international law system. From there it is possible to 
perceive that its rules and agreements have a stronger binding effect than the ones accorded 
under the scope of the GATT. As previously mentioned in this dissertation, an international 
treaty produces international effects to its members, in other words, it produces rights and 
obligations to the subjects that sign the treaty. 
In the sphere of multilateral trade system, the tariff commitments and the 
commitments on accession made by the WTO members are enumerated in lists of concessions 
(schedule of concessions). As Hoekman explains, those schedules establish ceiling bindings, 
which mean that the member concerned is not allowed to raise tariffs above bound levels 
without previously negotiating compensations with the main supplier of the product 
concerned. Those compensations will be extended to all WTO members as a natural 
consequence of the process once all members are bound by the MFN treatment rule. 
Moreover, Hoekman emphasizes that “once tariff commitments are bound, it is 
important that there be no resort to other, nontariff, measures that have the effect of nullifying 
or impairing the value of the tariff concession” 109. 
                                            
109 Id., p. 43. 
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Regarding the crux of this research endeavour, namely, the dispute settlement 
system, it has been refined with the implementation of legal remedies to strengthen the 
mandatory rules of the multilateral trading system with the creation of the WTO. Actually the 
Uruguay Round negotiated and adopted a number of reforms intended to reinforce the effect 
of the WTO decisions and rulings. Indeed, Hudec states that “the primary remedy set forth in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is still the legally binding 
‘recommendation’ ordering the defendant to bring its conduct into compliance”110. 
 
• Exceptions 
 
Trade liberalization is the law that guides the GATT/WTO system. The general 
rules of the system are brought to the multilateral trading system with special attention to the 
principles of MFN, national treatment and transparency, apart from the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions111. 
Nevertheless there are exceptions to it that according to Barral can be found 
distributed in GATT’s text: (a) permanent exceptions; (b) contingency exceptions and; (c) 
exceptions in favor of developing countries112: 
 
- Permanent exceptions: Article XX of the GATT 1994 states 
general exceptions emphasizing that nothing in the Trade 
Agreement on Goods shall be constructed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement of measures regarding to public moral and to 
human, plan or animal’s health; trade in gold and silver, the 
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, artistic and 
historical treasures; exhaustible natural resources and guarantees of 
essential goods. Barral also includes among the permanent 
                                            
110 Hudec, 1987, p. 103. 
111 The prevision regarding quantitative restrictions was based on the prevision of GATT 1947 that once 
members have binding tariff limits, they would look for other mechanisms to protect domestic industries. 
Nowadays the prevision regarding general elimination of quantitative restrictions is expressed in Article XI of 
GATT 1994. 
112 Barral, 2007, p. 71-72. See also Jackson, 2000a, p. 54-57. 
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exceptions mentioning the waivers (Article IX, GATT), national 
security (Article XXI, GATT) and the renegotiation of 
concessions; 
- Contingencial exceptions: give members the possibility of 
restricting the amount or value of imported goods in order to 
safeguard its external financial position and its balance of 
payments (Articles XII to XV, GATT) and; the protection to the 
domestic industry in cases that an specific industry in rising and it 
is necessary to give it a temporary protection; 
- Exceptions to developing countries: dealing with trade and 
development, part IV of GATT 1994 points out a number of 
possibilities that are available to developing countries in order to 
promote growth through trade referred to as ‘special and 
differential treatment’, among which are the possibility of non-
reciprocity and the enabling clause113. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The present chapter aimed at situating the dissertation in the area of international 
law to where it belongs. With the first section the concepts and elements of international law 
and economic relations that influence the body and the final result of research were presented 
to prepare the ground for the discussions that follow. 
Unquestionably, the GATT/WTO system is the main responsible factor for the 
enormous growth and liberalization that international trade has experienced since 1947 
through rounds of negotiations and binding tariff commitments agreed in a nondiscrimination 
mood. 
                                            
113 According to the WTO, the Enabling Clause is the Organization legal basis for the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). Under the GSP, developed countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment (such as 
zero or low duties on imports) to products originating in developing countries. The Enabling Clause is also the 
legal basis for regional arrangements among developing countries and for the Global System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP). Published online at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm>. Accessed in: Jan. 
2011. 
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The emergence of the WTO and its dispute settlement system (which is going to 
be explained in more detail in the next chapter) brought predictability and legal security in 
multilateral trade relations making the WTO a unique Organization. Actually, it is possible to 
state that the dispute settlement mechanism is an essential pillar for the effectiveness of the 
agreements reached by WTO members.   
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3. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COMPLIANCE: strengths, weaknesses 
and cross-retaliation 
This chapter is dedicated to the explanation of the dispute settlement system, its 
legal remedies and the mechanism of cross-retaliation. The WTO system for the resolution of 
trade disputes is the result of over four decades of experience under the GATT 1947. 
Unlike the GATT 1947, which has a diplomatic approach, the WTO system is 
clearly rule-oriented. However, the understanding of the WTO dispute settlement system is 
only possible in the light of the experience with disputes resolution during the GATT period, 
before the establishment of the WTO. 
Argueably, the WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most important 
achievements of the Uruguay round. In 1995, the system added the security and predictability 
that was missing in the multilateral trade relations. 
As the dispute settlement is one of the core topics of the present research, it is 
important and necessary to clarify its jurisdiction, functions and, above all, the issues 
regarding the implementation of DSB decisions.  
WTO remedies are largely discussed among professionals, academics and WTO 
staff. Those remedies can be defended as great achievements of the organization as they, 
somehow, try to punish the violating member while compensating the victim. Despite these 
achievements, the remedies enforced by the WTO show their weaknesses when confronted 
with the real power of strong economies that make part of the multilateral trade system. 
The present chapter is dedicated to explore selected provisions of the DSU that are 
considered to be crucial for the reflection proposed in this dissertation. The aim is to promote 
an overview of the elements necessary to compose a further reflection on the topic; the 
analysis of details of the overall dispute settlement system is outside the scope of this work 
and thus will not be explored.  
The last section in this chapter is dedicated to the cross-retaliation mechanism. 
There is yet no explicit provision for that mechanism, but only suggestions in the body of the 
DSU – when traditional retaliation is considered neither practical nor effective. The analysis 
of the cross-retaliation is of extreme importance for progression to the next chapter, as the 
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cross-retaliation mechanism seems to have become popular weapon in the system for the use 
of the developing country members. 
 
3.1 Jurisdiction of WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
 
As mentioned before, the WTO dispute settlement system was designed in 
accordance with the pre-existing GATT regime. This is so true that despite being a rule-
oriented system, the consultations and negotiations – as they were made during GATT - are 
still a fundamental step before proceeding to the establishment of a panel at the DSB114. 
Before proceeding to an explanation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it 
is necessary to identify what is under the scope of application of the system. The competence 
of the system is highlighted in Article 1 of the DSU. According to the first paragraph, the 
DSU shall be applied to any consultations or disputes related to the agreements listed in 
Appendix 1115.  
According to Article 1.2 of the DSU, the rules of the Understanding shall be 
applied with the observance of specific rules present in any of the covered agreements. As 
way of reference, from the same paragraph it is possible to extract the information that the 
basic objective of the DSU is to avoid conflict116. This is important to notice because the DSU 
was not meant to be a mechanism of sanction, but instead a mechanism to avoid commercial 
conflicts so as to bring back the balance of trade relations among countries whenever an 
inconsistency exists. 
Indeed, several provisions of the DSU highlight the aim of the system to withdraw 
any inconsistency with WTO agreements as well as to secure a positive solution to a dispute. 
Moreover, from the interpretation of the understanding, there is a clear preference to a 
                                            
114 The consultation process is already in the text of Article XXII, GATT 1947: “Each contracting party shall 
accord sympathetic considerations to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such 
representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation 
of this agreement”. 
115 Article 1.1, DSU. The agreements listed in Appendix 1 are: (i) Agreement Establishing the WTO; (ii) 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and. (iii) Plurilateral Trade Agreements. Regarding the Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements, according to the text of Appendix 1, its application “shall be subject to the adoption of a decision 
by the parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application of the Understanding to the individual 
agreement”. Published online at: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm#appendix1>. 
Accessed in Feb. 2011. 
116 Article 1.2, DSU. 
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solution achieved between the parties, which are both positive and consistent with WTO 
agreements117. 
The general provisions of the DSU are set in the Article 3 of the understanding. In 
the first paragraph it establishes the adherence to the principles of Articles XXII and XXIII of 
the 1947 GATT. Then, there is the recognition that the dispute settlement is the cornerstone of 
the multilateral trade system, deploying security and predictability to members’ trade 
relations118. 
Yet pursuant Article 3, the understanding serves not only to preserve the rights 
and obligations of members, but also to clarify the existing provisions. The interpretation of 
WTO provisions shall be done in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, in a clear reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
It is remarkable that the DSU itself makes a reference to the principles of public 
international law to guide panels and the Appellate Body119. That is coherent and in line with 
what was previously defended in this dissertation. The WTO is an international organization, 
established under a public international law treaty. Therefore, the WTO is part of the Public 
International Law (hereon PIL) and finds its roots in it.  
Moreover, as an international organization, the WTO Secretariat should observe 
general principles of international public law and State responsibility, as should WTO 
Members. As it is, the WTO Law exceeds the sphere of PIL and establishes its own remedies 
and state responsibility for the breaches of its rules. This is permitted by PIL and, indeed, as 
defended by Barbara Oliveira, WTO Law “develops secondary rules which deviate from, and 
further refine and adapt, general international law”120. 
As pointed out by Luiz Olavo Baptista, the WTO dispute settlement system is a 
singular experience for International Law. The system established a compulsory jurisdiction 
to trade related matters and the possibility of applying sanctions to the members that insist in 
keeping an inconsistent measure with WTO rulings121.  
                                            
117 See also Jackson, 2002, p. 258. 
118 Article 3, DSU. 
119 See Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 23. 
120 Oliveira, 2006, p. 2. 
121 See Baptista, 2007, p. 16.  
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Despite the possible problems that could arise by the implementation of a 
legalistic system to replace the diplomatic character of GATT; a system that places more 
emphasis on adjudication than on negotiation has its advantages. First, it gives less space for 
the use of political and economic power in cases involving countries with a considerable 
market size difference. In this sense, a rule-oriented system instead of a negotiation orientated 
one is intended to be either fairer or more predictable122. 
Second, a legalistic system deploys a sense of security for relations, trade relations 
in this case. With clear rules for discipline relations, the WTO members have a map of the 
behavior they should adopt in their internal and external actions regarding trade. At the same 
time, to the members is given the possibility to complain about inconsistencies with WTO 
rules by other members before a legal body. 
Third, a strong argument in favor of a legalistic and adjudicative system is related 
to compliance with WTO rules. There is an inclination to believe that a more legalistic system 
results in a higher rate of compliance with WTO rulings and decisions. Indeed, as affirmed by 
Davey, an adjudicative system: (i) discourages rule violators because all the members have 
the knowledge that in violating WTO rules they will be called to account and; (ii) from the 
experience it can be concluded that panel and Appellate Body reports are normally 
implemented123. In fact, currently there is a rate of around 83% implementation of WTO 
recommendations and decisions124. 
The issue of the jurisdiction of the DSB is limited to the claims under the WTO 
covered agreements. That means that claims of violation of rules of international law that do 
not refer to WTO agreements should not be appreciated by the DSB. Notwithstanding, there is 
no connection between the jurisdictional limitation and the law applicable to cases brought 
                                            
122 Considering the possible problems of a legalistic system, William J. Davey mentions that critics claimed that 
it would promote conflict and contentiousness in the organization and that the wrong cases would be broken to 
the organization, undermining the GATT system. Davey, 2002, p. 247-251. Also, Robert Hudec indicates the 
possibility of wrong cases being presented before the DSB, diminishing the prestige of the GATT and its rules. 
Hudec, 1980. p. 159. 
123 Davey, 2003, p. 5. 
124 Davey, 2005, p. 12. The general high rate of compliance with WTO recommendations does not interfere in 
the importance of the presentations for three basic reasons: (1) in not guaranteeing 100% of implementation of 
its decisions, the WTO dispute settlement system has problems that must be reviewed; (ii) every decision not 
implemented might cause considerable economic and social trouble to members involved in the disputes – and 
perhaps to the multilateral trade system as a whole and; (iii) the rate of 83% is general and does not reflect the 
rate of compliance/implementation when the claimant is a much smaller economy than the defendant. 
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before the DSB. In the absence of a restriction, the panels as well as the Appellate Body have 
the freedom to recourse to various sources of international law to decide a dispute125. 
Joost Pauwelyn explains that panels also have incidental jurisdiction, with four 
basic objectives: (i) interpret the demand of the parties so as to isolate the real issue related to 
the case and identify the core of the claim; (ii) the principle of la competence de la 
competence, which refers to the determination of whether one has jurisdiction to decide a 
matter; (iii) decide whether or not one should refrain from exercising substantive jurisdiction 
that has been validly established and; (iv) incident jurisdiction to decide every matter related 
to the exercise of substantive jurisdiction and inherent to the judicial function126. 
Finally, the WTO dispute settlement system does not have an advisory 
jurisdiction, but only a contentious one127.  
 
3.2 Dispute Settlement Procedures 
 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is one of the most important instruments 
of the multilateral trade system, responsible for the effectiveness that is attributed to the 
Organization.  
Beyond the set of rules that aim to provide predictability and legal security 
concerning the organization of panel’s procedures, the WTO dispute settlement system 
presents the peculiar characteristic of applying sanctions to the breaches of its rulings. 
Although the DSU does not mention the word “sanction”, the possibility of compensation and 
retaliation implies the notion of sanction to deal with inconsistencies. 
In fact the possibility of applying sanctions is quite limited in other international 
organizations because of restrictions imposed by the states themselves, attached to the concept 
of Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, as Barral and Prazeres argue, that limitation of other 
international organizations ultimately leads to limited public international law128. 
                                            
125 See Bartels, 2001, p. 503; Pauwelyn, 2003, p. 456-471. 
126 Pauwelyn, 2003, p. 448. 
127 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 190. 
128 Barral; Prazeres, 2002, p. 28. 
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Yet the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is responsible for creating a space 
for negotiation within the Organization for the countries involved in disputes. Also, it 
contributes to the reduction of arbitrary market distortions as well as the reduction of 
unilateral economic measures by members.  
Basically the integrated dispute settlement system consists of a General Council 
and a Technical Council, besides the panels constituted by arbitrators and a permanent 
Appellate Body. The WTO dispute settlement is a unified system with a broader jurisdiction 
and less scope for rule shopping and forum shopping129. 
The procedures to access the system are explained in detail in the following 
sections. 
 
3.2.1 Consultations 
 
To activate the dispute settlement system of WTO the first mandatory step is to 
forward a formal request for consultation to the respondent State and notify the WTO General 
Council. 
The consultation is understood as an opportunity to consult members about 
measures affecting the operation of any of the covered agreements. According to Article 4.3, 
if a request for consultation is made, the member to which the request is made shall reply to 
the request within 10 days of its receipt, if not agreed otherwise. With a view to reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution, the member shall enter into consultations in good faith with no 
more than 30 days of the date of the receipt of the request130. 
Notwithstanding, if the member does not respond to the request of consultations 
within 10 days of the receipt of the request, or does not enter into consultations within a 
period of no more than 30 days – or a different period mutually agreed -, then the member that 
requested consultations may proceed to the request for the establishment of a panel131. 
During the consultations the parties involved try to learn more about the facts, the 
possible inconsistencies and the legal arguments of the member that is requested. The hope of 
                                            
129 Petersmann, 1997, p. 178. 
130 Article 4.3, DSU. 
131 Id. 
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the WTO is that the parties will reach a solution without having to invoke the formal process 
of dispute settlement. The DSU does not rule the manner parties should conduct consultation, 
which is up to the parties132. 
The member that requests a consultation shall include in it all relevant claims. 
That is so true that the Appellate Body noted in the case India – Patents (US) that “all parties 
engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming from the very 
beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute as to the facts relating to those 
claims”133.  
The consultations can be individual processes or joint processes. Individual 
consultation refers to consultations between two members, when one member requests 
consultations to another member. On the other hand, joint consultations are the consultations 
held by several members (individually or in groups) and another member. Still, there is the 
situation called joined consultations, which refers to cases in which members want to join a 
consultation process already in course134.  
The whole procedure of consultations shall be confidential, with the participation 
restricted to the members involved and the members that are allowed to join. If a mutual 
agreed solution is not achieved, all the relevant material collected during the consultations can 
be used as information to the panel.  
In this regard, the confidentiality required by Article 4.6 of the DSU establishes 
that the consulting parties not disclosure any information obtained in consultations to any 
parties not involved in those consultations. The panel of the case Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages confirmed that information and stated that the essence of consultations is to enable 
the parties to gather correct and relevant information, for purposes of assisting members in 
achieving a desirable mutually agreed solution, or, if failing in doing so, to assist members in 
presenting accurate information to the panel135. 
Moreover, one consideration that deserves to be given attention to is the special 
regulations for developing countries. To illustrate, in the context of consultations, Article 4.10 
                                            
132 See Davey; Jackson; Sykes, 2002, p. 259.  
133 Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products 
(US) – WT/DS50/AB/R (16 January 1998) para. 94. 
134 See Li; Mercurio; Yang, 2005, p. 44. 
135 Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (EC) – WT/DS75/R (17 September 1998) para. 10.23. 
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of the DSU demands that special attention shall be given to the particular problems of the 
developing countries136. Also, Article 12.10 states that in consultations involving a measure 
taken by a developing country, the parties may agree in extending periods established in 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4137. 
Beyond the consultation, the DSU states procedures that are undertaken 
voluntarily if the parties in the dispute so agree. Those procedures are in Article 5 and concern 
good offices, conciliation and mediation.  
These three procedures are referred to by the DSU as settlement techniques that 
are confidential and may begin or be terminated at any time. Basically, a good officer works 
as a channel of communication between parties. The conciliator usually makes a written 
proposal for the settlement of the dispute based on his or her own investigation. A mediator is 
a more active participant and brings the parties together making suggestions for resolution of 
the dispute138. 
 
3.2.2 Panels  
 
If the parties cannot reach a mutual agreed solution during the consultations, the 
Article 6 of the DSU rules a creation of an ad hoc three-person (exceptionally five) panel of 
judges. The complaining party is entitled to the establishment of a panel.  
According to Article 6.1, a panel shall be established at the second meeting at the 
DSB following the meeting at which the request for a panel first appears as an item on the 
DSB´s agenda139.  
At the first meeting at which the request for a panel is made, the respondent can 
deny the request, forcing another meeting with a new request at the next DSB meeting. From 
                                            
136 Article 4.10, DSU. 
137 Article 12.10, DSU. 
138 See Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 27. 
139 Article 6.1, DSU states that: “If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest 
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB´s agenda, unless at that 
meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel”. 
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the practice it is noted that the respondent generally blocks the first request for a panel with 
the intention of delaying the process140. 
It is important to highlight that a panel must be established at the next DSB 
meeting, unless it is decided by consensus to deny its establishment. The negative consensus 
is an important innovation in the multilateral dispute settlement system implemented by the 
WTO, in 1995. 
For the purpose of establishing a panel, Article 6.2 states basically four 
conditions: (i) the request has to be written; (ii) indications whether consultations were held 
may be present; (iii) there may be identifications of measures subject to the dispute and; (iv) 
the complainant has to deliver a summary of the legal basis for the claim141. 
Article 7 of the DSU determines that, unless agreed differently by the parties 
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel, panels shall refer to and follow what the 
Understanding calls Terms of Reference. Terms of reference fulfill a due process objective of 
WTO panels. They provide the necessary information for the parties involved (including third 
parties) to be aware of the claims and, at the same time, allow them to respond to the case142. 
The judges of the panel are chosen among well-qualified governmental or non-
governmental individuals from the lists maintained by the WTO Secretariat. Also, the 
members of the panel shall be selected in a way to ensure the independence of the members 
with diverse background and broad experience143. 
As can be found in other legal texts of the WTO, there is in the DSU some special 
notes regarding developing countries. In what concerns the panels, Article 8.10 allows, in a 
dispute involving a developed member and a developing country member, that at least one 
panelist shall be from a developing country member, if so requested144. 
                                            
140 See Li; Mercurio; Yang, 2005, p. 57. 
141 Article 6.2, DSU. Notice that consultations are not mandatory in every case. That is why Article 6.2 asks the 
members to indicate whether or not consultations were held. For detailed information please see Li; Mercurio; 
Yang, 2005, p. 59-60. 
142 See Li; Mercurio; Yang, 2005, p. 73-74. 
143 Article 8.1 and 8.2, DSU. 
144Article 12.10 (already mentioned) and 12.11 of the DSU also has especial provisions for developing countries. 
Article 12.11 states that: “Where one or more parties is a developing country Member, the panel’s report shall 
explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-
favorable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements which have 
been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures”. 
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The panels are present in the Dispute Settlement system to assist the DSB in 
complying with its responsibilities under the Understanding and the covered agreements. That 
is why panels shall make objective assessment of the facts as well as an objective assessment 
of the matter before it. In assisting the DSB, panels will make recommendations and give the 
rulings provided for in the covered agreements145. 
One last subject that is important to be pointed out in this research refers to the 
adoption of panel reports.  With the objective of providing sufficient time for members to 
consider the content of panel reports, the DSU gives 20 days from the day of circulation to the 
members to consider the adoption of panel report146.  
According to Article 16 of the DSU, a panel report shall be adopted at a DSB 
meeting after 60 days of the day of circulation unless the DSB decides by consensus not to 
adopt the report or a party of the dispute notifies the DSB its intention to appeal. 
 
3.2.3 Appellate Body 
 
The DSU created another innovation in 1994 - the Appellate Body -, which is the 
court of second instance of the WTO. Unlike the procedures for consultations, conciliation, 
good offices, mediation and arbitration panels, the possibility of an appellate review is 
something unique regarding the settlement of international trade disputes147. The DSU 
provides the possibility of either or both parties to appeal the panel decision.  
The Appellate Body is composed of seven members appointed for a four-year 
term. The members cannot be affiliated to any government and they work in groups of three 
members. The Appellate Body has the power to uphold, modify or reverse the legal 
interpretations adopted by the panel148. 
Also, the Appellate Body is authorized to draw upon its own procedures for the 
operation of the Body, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-
                                            
145 Article 11, DSU. 
146 Article 16, DSU. 
147 See Petersmann, 1997, p. 187. 
148 Article 17.13, DSU. 
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General.  The procedures of the Appellate Body are called “Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review” and are available at the WTO website149. 
The review of the Appellate Body is limited to issues of law and legal 
interpretation adopted by the panel report. Notwithstanding, because of the power given to the 
Appellate Body in Article 17.13, the review of panel decisions are being broadened. 
According to Article 17.5, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days after the party 
notifies its decision to appeal before the Appellate Body report. The opinion of the Appellate 
Body is final and, as with what happens with panel’s report, it shall be accepted within 30 
days following the circulation, or rejected by the DSB on the basis of negative consensus150. 
As pointed out by Petersmann, the strictly legal function of the Appellate Body 
was understood as a rule-oriented substitute for the political practice of GATT system. The 
panel reports during the GATT, especially during the Uruguay Round negotiations, were 
being increasingly abused151. 
Throughout the dissertation more details are going to be pointed out regarding the 
dispute settlement and Appellate Body procedures as the examination of WTO selected cases 
is developed in chapter 3.  
Following the present section, the implementation phase deserves careful 
attention. It is the moment when members confront their biggest difficulties. The 
implementation of decisions adopted by the DSB by the Members that are violating WTO 
rulings brings up issues related to the compliance and enforcement of decisions under the 
WTO system. 
  
3.3 Implementation 
 
The implementation phase of the decision is currently one of the most sensible 
subjects regarding the Dispute Settlement system. In fact, it is the most interesting subject of 
this chapter as it is closely connected to the discussion about enforcement and compliance at 
the WTO. 
                                            
149 WTO website: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_procedures_e.htm>. 
150 See Schefer, 2010, p. 136. 
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The problem involves not only the implementation difficulty itself in what 
concerns the claimed State, but also the probable non-accountability of the loser in order to 
enforce compliance. 
Next this section will deal with the implementation of recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB152. Here it is considered, on the one hand, the ultimate goal of the DSB of 
withdrawing the inconsistency in the system and re-balance trade relations among members, 
and on the other hand the case of noncompliance with the decision adopted. Also, this section 
is going to encompass the available resources for the winner to induce the withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measure or to request a proportional compensation. 
It is true that the prompt implementation of the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB is responsible - to a large extend - for the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. That is the main reason why careful attention to what happens during the 
implementation period is paid. 
It is convenient to reinforce that the main objective of the implementation phase 
of the decision of the DSB is to induce the State to comply with the decision taken by making 
its domestic law consistent with the obligations assumed under the WTO. According to the 
text of the DSU, the decision of the DSB has no punitive or reparative character. 
As aforementioned, once adopted the report of the panel and/or the Appellate 
Body, it gives start to the period of thirty days in which the responding member has to decide 
on its implementation intentions. This information shall be disclosed at the meeting of the 
DSB, where the member shall also indicate the difficulties it may have in implementing the 
decision in its national environment153. 
Also within this period of thirty days, the State may ask what is known as a 
reasonable period of time to comply with the decision. Considering the reasons of the 
responding member, the DSB may decide whether it is impracticable for the member to 
comply immediately and the reasonable period of time may be considered. 
                                                                                                                                        
151 See Petersmann, 1997, p. 186. 
152 Although the term recommendation may suggest that there is discretion to the party as to whether to follow a 
recommendation that is not the case according to the DSU. Recommendations and rulings are how the decisions 
of the DSB are referred to in the text of the DSU, and they are binding. This will be further discussed later on in 
this chapter. 
153 The responding Member that cannot immediately withdraw the measure declared inconsistent with the WTO 
agreements has the burden of proving why it becomes impossible to comply immediately with the DSB 
decision. 
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Pursuant Article 21.3 of the DSU, the reasonable period of time can be determined 
in three different ways: (i) a proposal from the affected part; (ii) by agreement between the 
parties within forty-five days - which can also be a possible extension by mutual agreement or 
(iii) by binding arbitration concluded within ninety days of adoption of the report154. The 
recourse to arbitration procedures (Article 21.3 (c)) normally takes place when the parties 
cannot achieve an agreement concerning the reasonable period of time.  
After the determination about whether the report will be implemented 
immediately or if it is necessary to establish a new deadline, the affected WTO Member 
normally starts the procedures for implementation bringing the measure into consistency 
within the covered agreements.  
Aiming to supervise the improvements made for the implementation of the DSB 
decision, Article 21.6 determines that the DSB shall keep under surveillance the 
implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings. Therefore, any WTO Member may 
raise the issue of implementation from six months of the establishment of the reasonable 
period of time155. 
Hereupon, regarding the enforcement of decisions, the procedure of the DSU then 
foresees two stages, which work in the following order: (i) it is expected the voluntary 
implementation of the decision, to which a reasonable period of time may be provided, if not 
possible immediate implementation, (ii) if there is no voluntary implementation of the 
decision of the panel or the Appellate Body report, there is the possibility of compensation or 
suspension of concessions with the State that refuses to comply with the decision, upon 
authorization of DSB156. 
                                            
154 See Article 23, DSU. The article further adds that this period should not exceed fifteen months after the 
adoption of the report issued by the OSC. This term is indicative and the same article notes that it can be 
extended or shortened, depending on the circumstances of the case. See Perez Gabilondo, 2004, p. 223. Jean-
Marc Sorel (2004, p. 114) adds that while there is a determination that there should be a final decision within 
ninety days following the adoption of the report, the parties may agree to an extension of this period. 
155 Article 21.6, of the DSU: “The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted 
recommendations or rulings.  The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at 
the DSB by any Member at any time following their adoption.  Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of 
implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six 
months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall 
remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved.  At least 10 days prior to each such DSB meeting, the 
Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing of its progress in the implementation 
of the recommendations or rulings”. 
156 See Article 22.1, DSU: “1. Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are 
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time.  However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other 
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Once the reasonable period of time expires, and if the measure has not been 
brought into consistency, technically speaking the generation of a quantification of the 
damage caused begins, which may give rise to a retaliation process. 
However, before entering into a retaliation procedure the DSB shall verify 
whether the actions taken by the member that lost the dispute have not reached a satisfactory 
level to remove the inconsistency from the system. Therefore, pursuant Article 21.5, where 
there is a disagreement regarding the consistency with a covered agreement the dispute shall 
be decided through recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of that Article157. 
It is valid to address the confusion that arises from the reading of Article 21.5 
combined with Article 22.2 of the DSU. While Article 21.5 provides for an expedited 
compliance procedure, Article 22.2 provides that the winning party may request authorization 
from the DSB to retaliate by suspension trade concessions within twenty days of the expiry of 
the reasonable period of time158. 
In any moment Article 22.2 mentions the procedure pursuant Article 21.5. 
Therefore, although the confusion may be questioned and while the text of the DSU is not 
modified in the direction of aligning the concepts and references of the two Articles, the 
current practice of the WTO is that arbitration under Article 22.2 will take place 
simultaneously with the proceeding for compliance or only after the compliance proceeding 
under Article 21.5 is finished159. 
Before carrying on with the discussion of retaliating measures, as the present 
research gives especial attention to the treatment given to developing countries under the 
DSU, it is suitable to address two paragraphs of article 21. 
                                                                                                                                        
obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with 
the covered agreements.  Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered 
agreements”. This subject is going to be discussed in the next section of the present chapter. 
157 Article 21.5 of the DSU states that: “Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a 
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be 
decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the 
original panel. The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it.  
When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in 
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its 
report”. 
158 See Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 31. 
159 The bibliography calls it sequencing problem. Currently it has become customary to the parties to reach an 
agreement of procedures under Articles 21 and 22.  There are cases in which the parties start the proceedings 
simultaneously and later, if that is the case, suspend the retaliation procedures under Article 22. For more 
detailed information, see UNCTAD, 2003, p. 22-23 and; Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 32.  
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First, according to Article 21.7, the DSB shall consider the condition of the 
developing country and take into consideration further actions that may be applicable to the 
circumstances. In the same sense, the next paragraph understands that if the case is brought by 
a developing country member, “the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of 
measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country 
Members concerned”160. 
 
3.3.1 WTO Remedies: Compensation Measures and Suspension of Concessions 
 
• Compensation Measures 
 
If the responding Member does not bring its inconsistent measures into 
conformity with WTO agreements within areas on a reasonable period of time, the prevailing 
Member has basically two options, namely: the Member can seek compensation for the 
damages caused to it or ask for an authorization of the DSB to suspend trade concessions or 
other WTO obligations regarding the respondent. 
Compensation measures and suspension of concessions (also called 
countermeasures), under Article 22:1 of the DSU, are measures available as a temporary 
option in the case of noncompliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB within 
a reasonable period of time.  
As highlighted by the DSU, neither compensation or suspension of concessions 
nor other obligations are the best alternatives. It is always preferred that the member fully 
implements DSB recommendations and rulings in order to bring its measures into compliance. 
Also, it is important to emphasize that the restriction of trade through countermeasures shall 
be the last resort provided by the DSU, and it is subject to DSB authorization161. 
Even though they are not the best option, compensation measures can be seen as a 
favorable instrument for the parties to achieve a temporary consensus until the full 
                                            
160 Article 21.8, DSU. 
161 See Article 3.7 and Article 22.1, DSU. 
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implementation of the recommendations of the DSB. Of course, the ways of compensation 
have to be consistent with the commitments agreed under WTO. 
As compensation measures have to be in accordance with the covered agreements, 
from time to time there are concerns regarding the Most Favored Nation principle - Article I, 
GATT 1947 -, and the compensation granted to a member. As this is one of the basic 
nondiscrimination principles of the Organization, it can be argued (and it was) that 
compensation should not be discriminatory and should benefit only the complaining 
member162. 
Notwithstanding, it is understood that although a compensation measure is 
normally going to establish a temporary more favorable treatment to a member, that does not 
leave the door open to other members to require the same treatment under the principle of 
Most Favored Nation. Indeed, Pérez Gabilondo explains that where countermeasures are 
concerned, a more flexible treatment regarding the Most Favorable Nation shall be applied.  
The author argues that the compensation is a trade alternative between complainant and 
respondent in an attempt to avoid retaliation163.  
If it is not possible to negotiate and agree on compensation between members in 
twenty days after the day of expiry of the reasonable period of time, the opportunity is given 
to the complainant to ask the DSB for authorization to retaliate and therefore, to apply 
countermeasures. 
 
• Suspension of Concessions 
 
Differently from bilateral negotiations in which members have freedom to achieve 
a consensus without the interference of the WTO during consultations, the countermeasures 
have to be approved by the DSB before they are applied. Bilateral negotiations are not 
permitted and it is mandatory that the Member obtains permission from the Organization to 
                                            
162 In a determined occasion, the Appellate Body recognized in the case European Communities – Poultry that 
there was “nothing in Article XXVIII to suggest that compensation negotiated within its framework may be 
exempt from compliance with the non-discrimination principle inscribed in Articles I and XIII of the GATT 
1994”.  See Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of Certain 
Poultry Products (WT/DS/ABR, adopted 23 July 1998, para. 100). 
163 See Pérez Gabilondo, 2004, p. 234. 
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retaliate. Then, after approved by the DSB, the complainant can apply the countermeasures 
unilaterally without the permission of the respondent.   
The countermeasures are normally translated into suspension of trade 
concessions164. Also, they are commonly referred to as retaliation. As Schefer explains, it 
basically refers to discriminatory subjection of the defendant member to worsening trading 
conditions offered by the complainant165.  
Thus, generally countermeasures correspond to the withdrawal of tariff 
advantages negotiated under the WTO. Therefore the countermeasures are the suspension of 
tariff concessions advantages applicable to the products from the territory of the respondent, 
but they can also mean disadvantages in reduced market share opportunities or other non-
tariff restrictions on liberalized trade.  
When the WTO refers to retaliation it is implicit that the two main goals of the 
countermeasures are to induce the respondent member to comply with the decision adopted by 
the DSB and, to reestablish the balance regarding the reciprocal concessions related to the 
dispute166. 
As the WTO does not interpret countermeasures as sanctions, these measures shall 
be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment in discussion167. That means that there 
is no room for punitive damages under the WTO, and the retaliation may occur to the extent 
that it imposes costs to the respondent equal to the would-be costs of compliance. 
Furthermore, the equivalence mentioned by Article 22.4 does not allow room for 
proportionate damages, as equivalence is defined from the level of nullification or 
impairment168. 
Article 22.3 of the DSU gives a map of how the members shall proceed with the 
retaliation. According to the principles of that Article, the complaining member should first 
seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector in which the 
violation was found. 
                                            
164 Article 22.2, DSU. 
165 Shefer, 2010, p. 147. 
166 See Barral, 2004, p. 43; Jackson, 2000b and; Hudec, 2000. 
167 Article 22.4, DSU. 
168 See Schefer, 2010, p. 149 and; Matsuchita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 87. 
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If the complainant understands that it is not practicable or effective to suspend 
concessions within the same sector, the DSU allows the member to seek suspension of 
concessions or other obligations in other sectors under de same agreement. Finally, Article 
22.3 (c) states that if the member (and the DSB) consider that the circumstances are serious 
enough and that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations 
with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, the complaining party may seek to 
suspend concessions or other obligation under another covered agreement169. 
Regarding the instrument of suspension of trade concessions, paragraph (c) of 
Article 22.3 is particularly important to this research. That paragraph upholds and allows the 
possibility of cross-retaliation under the WTO, which will be analyzed in the last item of this 
chapter. 
 
• Effectiveness of the Suspension of Concessions 
 
The effectiveness of the retaliation procedure is doubtful. It largely depends on the 
relative economic importance of the member adopting it, and it is more evident when the 
difference of economic power between members becomes clearer. 
Although it can be said that it is common sense that the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism has teeth to bite the members who do not comply with the decisions adopted, in 
reality the effectiveness of the suspension of trade concessions is challenged by the 
tremendous difference of market size that can be disputing in the playing field. 
As suggested by the game theory, players will always try to take actions that 
secure them the best outcome. In that sense, a threat is credible to the players if they know 
that it will be concretized. That is where the problem resides and it is one of the core issues of 
the present dissertation. 
The current 153 WTO Members have significant economic, social and political 
differences. Even though these aspects may help or hinder in the moment to suspend 
concessions, the economic and political aspects gain enormous emphasis at the moment of 
enforcing compliance with the decisions adopted by the DSB.  
                                            
169 Article 22.3, DSU. 
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The same is true when a retaliation proceeding is approved. The political 
influence and the threat of great economic loss might impede the majority of WTO members 
(developing countries) of put in force a trade retaliation action. 
Nowadays the developing countries represent the greater number of members of 
the multilateral trading system. Over the years, that group of countries has put forward several 
initiatives for the creation of agreements that could guarantee special treatment to them. For 
example, the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – 
UNCTAD -, that promotes a “development-friendly integration of developing countries into 
the world economy”170. 
The participation of developing economies during the GATT 1947 used to be 
considerably reduced. A substantial reason for that was the weak bargaining power of the 
countries as well as the lack of legal security of the system, as GATT had a purely diplomatic 
and/or negotiating environment. 
It is true that the situation has currently changed though. The developing countries 
are making use of the dispute settlement system with incomparable frequency, mainly as 
respondent. This is partially explained, according to Barral, by the increase of the 
competitiveness of that group of countries in the global market171. 
The dispute settlement system is critically evaluated, especially where the 
implementation and retaliation procedures are concerned. Problems of implementation of 
DSB decision in the national level and, beyond that, the lack of instruments to effectively 
retaliate the losing part play a big role among the DSU problems. 
Developing countries are specifically critical when it is necessary to induce 
compliance of a DSB decision against a developed and big market size economy.  That issue 
is going to be addressed in detail in the next section. 
The rate of compliance with DSB decisions is high172. Nevertheless, it is true that 
the high rate of implementation also takes into account implementations of decisions that 
were not fully implemented – because of an agreement or some kind of arrangement between 
                                            
170 See UNCTAD. Available at: <www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=1>. Last accessed 
in: 29 May 2011. 
171 Barral, 2004, p. 24. 
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the parties. Yet, the number reflects the overall rate of implementation, not the rate of 
implementation taking into account developing countries as complainants and developed 
countries as respondents only. The latter is going to be further addressed below. 
Since its establishment in 1995, the DSB dealt with 427 disputes (current number, 
January 2012) and from those, in eight disputes retaliation has been multilaterally approved. 
Namely, the disputes are: EC-Bananas, EC-Hormones, US – Gambling, US-Cotton Subsidies, 
US-FSC, US-Byrd Amendment, Brazil-Aircraft and Canada-Aircraft. 
Although the GATT system required consensus to approve a retaliation 
proceeding (including the necessary approval by the violating member), it was not a very 
popular instrument. Then, most probably because of the need of consensus, from 1947 until 
1995 retaliation was authorized only once during the GATT period173.  
However, the WTO system works with an opposite logic. Although the retaliation 
proceeding shall also be approved in a multilateral forum, it works with a negative consensus. 
That means that if suspensions of concessions are considered equivalent and appropriate at the 
multilateral forum, they can be automatically and unilaterally put in action by the 
complainant. 
There are different schools of thought regarding the effectiveness of the WTO 
retaliation proceedings. Even though authors like Alan Sykes defend that that system does not 
require fixing and works in a satisfactory mode, this position is not shared by most WTO 
researchers174. 
Trade retaliation implies restriction of trade. Less access to markets, exclusion of 
trade concessions and the imposition of protective measures are some of the prejudices that 
can be visualized by the use of suspension of concessions. Those results are in a completely 
reverse sense from what was desired by the WTO agreement.  
                                                                                                                                        
172 As mentioned before, in a paper regarding the first ten years of the dispute settlement system, Davey presents 
an analysis that shows 83% of successful implementation of WTO decisions. No doubt, that is an impressive 
record for an international dispute settlement system. Davey, 2005b, p. 46-48. 
173 See Bown; Pauwelyn, 2010, p. 2 and; Jackson, 2000c. p. 182. The GATT contracting parties authorized 
suspension of concessions under Article XXIII of GATT in a case brought by the Netherlands against the 
United States. The Netherlands alleged a GATT-inconsistent import restraint imposed by the United States on 
dairy products imported from the Netherlands. 
174 See Sykes, 2009. In this paper Sykes explains why he believes that the WTO system of dispute resolution has 
“evolved a reasonably defensible and satisfactory fashion in response to a number of competing pressures.” 
Sykes understands that the system is not broken and does not require fixing. Sykes, 2009, p. 1-2.  
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Due to the fact that restricting trade is not in accordance with WTO goals of trade 
liberalization and increasing access to foreign markets, trade retaliation is yet a controversial 
instrument. But that is not all. 
More than producing trade restrictions, the DSU suspension of concessions has 
proved to be an ineffective instrument as it is (i) optional and (ii) it does not produce a real 
threat when the disputes have a developing country as complainant. 
That fact is important not only because it is the central objective of the present 
research, but also because developing countries – as previously mentioned– are increasingly 
using the system as they possess a bigger share of the world market each day.  
The effectiveness or the lack of it needs to be interpreted in parallel with the 
possible goals of the retaliation in the WTO. For that matter, Joost Pauwelyn makes an 
interesting interpretation about the goals of the suspension of concessions, dividing then in 
two major goals: compensation and sanctions.  
The compensation goals, divided in withdrawal of the violating measure 
(rebalance) and/or compensation of damages are focused on the victim country. Differently, 
the sanction goal is focused on the violating country, and intends to induce rule compliance 
and/or to punish the violator175. 
The understanding of the goal of retaliation in each case matters because it might 
have a material impact. It will influence the way in which the calculation and the design of 
retaliation should be defined to achieve the expected result. In any case, note that the 
suspension of concessions in accordance with the DSU has to be, besides effective, equivalent 
and appropriate regarding the level of nullification or impairment in question. 
Notwithstanding, when there is an intention of sanctioning the violating Member, 
the DSB may be asked to consider a higher level of retaliation than the one established by 
Article 22.4 of the DSU. 
Indeed, when talking about sanctioning the violator and considering a higher level 
of retaliation it would imply that when the compliant intends to induce compliance, it should 
be considered to take actions against sectors of economy where the violating member will be 
                                            
175 Pauwelyn, 2010a, p. 37-38. 
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hurt the most. That includes politically sensitive products and/or the suspension of 
concessions in a different agreement (like intellectual property rights). 
Pauwelyn explains that if the goal of the retaliation is to compensate the injured 
countries, the most appropriate benchmark may be the consideration of the loss of profits or 
economic harm suffered by the victims. On the other hand, if it is understood that the goal of 
the retaliation is to restore the balance of trade concessions between the economies involved, 
a proper benchmark could be the value of loss considering the bilateral flow of trade or trade 
effects176. 
Yet, the same author explains that none of these are the goals of the 
countermeasures, but the rebalancing of trade between countries, an equivalent level of trade 
should be set through the establishment, for example, of a prohibitive tariff keeping out as 
much trade as the original violation. And, finally, if the goal of the retaliation is to 
compensate the countries that were victims of the original breach, then it is understood that 
the retaliating Member should retaliate against specific sectors of economy or products that 
actually compete with its domestic industry177. 
It is also worth commenting that all the remedies perceived under the DSU imply 
a prospective retaliation. That means that the remedies are only available after a long dispute 
process (which can take several years). The damages caused to the economy of the country 
affected by countermeasures / seeking countermeasures ??? can be, at the end of a dispute, 
irreversible.  
Indeed, in actual practice the States only get compensation or exercise their right 
to suspend concessions prospectively. This implies that the illegal charge is maintained 
throughout the dispute settlement procedure.  
In this regard, through a proposal by Mexico in order to clarify and improve the 
DSU, the country has put forth the possibility of adopting preventive measures in the event of 
serious injury, difficult to repair, the measure in question would be immediately suspended178. 
Actually, the possibility of adopting provisional measures already exists in the Anti-dumping 
Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. They are applied 
                                            
176 See Pauwelyn, 2010. 
177 Id., p. 39. 
178 WTO, 2002, TN/DS/W/23. 
 73 
when the authorities concerned with the case judge that provisional measures are necessary to 
prevent injury being caused during the investigation179.  
In possession of those measures, the members that would suffer damage which are 
difficult to repair would have the chance to have the contested measure suspended or to 
prevent a bigger damage otherwise. Also, it would eliminate the temptations of members to 
respond the contested measure by the imposition of further measures that could affect third 
parties. 
In any case, suspending trade concessions or the application of countermeasures, 
as preferred, always means exclusion from markets or, at least, a much more difficult access 
to it. Depending on the dispute in question, a WTO case can have its negative effects spread 
to a great part of the multilateral trade system and many countries will suffer. More than other 
members, a country strongly depending on international trade will be definitely hurt more if 
subjected to countermeasures. 
It is common sense that retaliation is, to a greater or lesser extent and depending 
on the market suspending the concessions, a shoot on one’s own foot. Both the domestic 
market and consumers will suffer its effects, and if the economy in question is a poorer one, 
the application of countermeasures is definitely not an option180. 
Although the rate of implementation of WTO decisions does not, at first, seem to 
be a big problem, the enforcement of decisions and the effectiveness of the mechanism of 
suspension of concessions are undoubtedly issues that concern Members. 
The countermeasures as currently presented by the DSU are bad policy. Their 
enforcement is considered to be an even bigger problem, as those WTO members that can 
afford to pay the price for the violation will not be held responsible for the damage caused to 
the victims of their actions. Indeed, in 2000 Pascal Lamy (at that moment the EC 
commissioner responsible for international trade issues) gave an interview where he declared: 
“As long as you pay the penalties, you can go as you are”181. 
                                            
179 See Proposal by Mexico, TN/DS/W/23, p. 4. Also see Article 7 of the Anti-dumping Agreement (Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994) and Article 17.1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
180 See Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 92-93. 
181 See Press and Communication Service Brussels, N. 3036, May 2000. See also Matsushita; Mavroids; 
Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 93. 
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The issue of State responsibility is also a reason for concern. Even though the 
WTO is recognized as a treaty under public international law, it seems that there is a tendency 
to forget that fact. If a member decides not to comply with a WTO decision and affords to pay 
the price for it, its violating measures will continue to cause harm to other Members 
economies. Unfortunately that is how the system works, despite the widely advertised feature 
of WTO dispute settlement system having teeth. 
International trade law – the WTO law – cannot be emancipated from general 
international law. International trade law is a department of international economic law which 
turns to be one of the branches of public international law. The specificities of WTO law do 
not justify a separated and different treatment of this branch of international law. That is so 
true that the WTO countermeasures, for example, reflect the general international law 
countermeasures182. 
Indeed, the countermeasures as they are presented by the DSU were designed 
from the customary practice of the countermeasures adopted under public international law. 
Still, the similarities between WTO countermeasures and public international law 
countermeasures, and the condition that the Organization actually recognizes countermeasures 
as a remedy makes it explicit that there is a correspondence and even a unit of the systems183.  
That is why it has been suggested from the first chapter that a breach of a WTO 
obligation is, indeed, a breach of international law obligation. That is one strong assumption 
defended in this research. Moreover, with that belief, reparation and international liability 
should be considered and respected under WTO agreements, as all WTO law is placed in the 
context of international law. 
Unfortunately, that does not correspond to the actual practice and that would be a 
theme for another doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless, State responsibility and its related 
matters will be addressed throughout the present research. 
Preliminary, then, it is understood in this work that the effectiveness of the 
instrument of suspension of concessions as a remedy to breach of WTO obligations has weak 
or no force. The retaliation procedure can only take place when the Members involved in the 
dispute have relatively the (1) same economic force and (2) political influence. Beyond that, 
                                            
182 See Perez-Aznar, 2005. 
183 Ibid. 
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the option to comply or not with the decisions adopted by the DSB, as it seems to be the 
understanding spread among members, does not encourage the obedience and enforcement of 
multilateral trade system rulings. 
 
3.3.2 Potential difficulties that should be considered in relation to implementation 
 
The implementation of WTO decisions brings to the discussion former notions of 
sovereignty and state jurisdiction. Members could be tempted to invoke State sovereignty as a 
shield of protection to avoid penalties of non-implementation of WTO decision.  
When talking about international law it is also important to bear in mind that 
nowadays there is no State absolutely independent and that the notion of an international 
society of globalized nations is dominant, more than ever. 
The States have the obligation with each other to repair the damage caused. That 
obligation is enshrined as a principle of Public International Law. As Ian Brownlie states, it is 
a principle of international law and even a general concept of law that any breach of an 
obligation requires reparation. Indeed, Brownlie states that the reparation of a violated 
obligation is an indispensable complement of a failure and for that matter there is no need for 
expressly convention184. 
The discussion of breach of international obligation and State sovereignty leads to 
knowledge of the notion of international responsibility that has been brought in the first 
chapter of the present research endeavor. In that sense, Lafer indicates that the relation of 
international responsibility within the dispute settlement system of the WTO transcends the 
parties involved in a dispute as it relates to all WTO members185. 
The author states that if the international responsibility is a response to a 
disruption of the balance of rights and obligations, and if the remedy to it excludes the 
obligation to compensate, that would be a strong diversification of international 
responsibility186. 
                                            
184 Brownlie, 1963, p. 437-438. 
185 Lafer, 1998, p. 134. 
186 Ibid. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the rate of compliance of WTO decisions is 
considerably high. Thus it would be normal to believe that there is no reason to worry about 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Nevertheless, that rate has “obscure” data, as it includes for example cases of non-
fully implementation, or agreement between States with a different solution than the one 
adopted by the DSB. Moreover, the rate number is general and does not focus on situations 
when the complainant is a developing country and the respondent a strong and developed 
economy. 
Still, talking about compliance, it is important to keep it clear that (i) each case of 
non-compliance necessarily involves a huge amount of money and international trade 
restriction and (ii) the WTO was launched in the multilateral scenario to deliver security, 
predictability and fair trade for all its members, so compliance with its decisions should not be 
a problem. Nevertheless, that is not the case. 
This section is going to address two issues that can be really problematic when the 
time arrives for enforcement of WTO adopted decisions: the acceptance of the binding effect 
of the recommendations and suggestions of the DSB and the economic asymmetry among 
Members in the playing field. 
 
3.3.2.1 Binding effect of DSB recommendations and rulings and Appellate Body 
reports 
 
The statement supported by WTO members - especially for those who lose the 
dispute - when implementing the decision is that the DSB recommendations and rulings are 
not binding. Thus, the violating Member would not be required to implement the decision 
within its jurisdiction nor would it have the obligation to harmonize their internal rules with a 
recommendation of a report adopted by the DSB. 
That is not the interpretation defended in the present research. The WTO members 
have a pacta sunt servanda obligation according to which members agree to compulsorily 
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award a third party to resolve their disputes related to trade, that is, the DSB187. Indeed, 
according to Davey, the obligations agreed by member States should be enforced by the 
WTO, without incurring in excess of power by this body188. 
Moreover, although the decision of the panel or Appellate Body is called a 
recommendation, which can be understood as a mild term, it is widely accepted as having full 
binding force. As it used to be during the GATT period – when the value of the negotiated 
solution was more important than the rigors of litigation -, the rule is that the organs of the 
WTO dispute settlement limit themselves to a demonstration or not of the legality of 
the conduct in question189. 
According to Hudec, the reforms resulted from the Uruguay Round were intended 
to strengthen the effect of the ruling of the dispute settlement. This author affirms that “the 
primary remedy set forth in the DSU is still the legally binding recommendation ordering the 
defendant to bring its conduct into compliance”190. 
Corroborating with that interpretation of WTO recommendations and rulings, 
Mavroidis argues that the recommendations are definitely binding to the ones they are 
addressed to. On the other hand, he understands that the suggestions of a panel might not be 
binding.  
However, Mavroidis states that the conclusion regarding the suggestions is not 
equivalent to a declaration that they are devoid of any legal consequence. In fact, if a WTO 
member follows a suggestion received, it will ipso facto fulfill its international obligations. 
Therefore, following the suggestions of the panels and the Appellate Body is a highly 
recommended legal strategy191. 
                                            
187 The pacta sunt servanda obligation can be found, for example, pursuant Article 23.2 of the DSU, that states: 
“not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through 
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall 
make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report 
adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding”. See also Mavroidis, 2003, p. 
263. 
188 See Davey, 2001. 
189 See Lawson, 2003, p. 358-359. 
190 Hudec, 2002, p. 83. 
191 Mavroids, 2003, p. 274. 
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 Once a panel or Appellate Body report has been adopted the DSB, its 
recommendations and rulings become binding to the parties in a dispute and the losing 
respondent is required to bring its trade regime into compliance with the WTO rules.  
 Indeed, Jackson explains that the panel and Appellate Body reports seem to 
reinforce the rule orientation of the current multilateral trade system. Indeed, the author 
defends that the reports also reinforce the fact that the general principles of international law 
are applicable to the WTO and its agreements192. 
Even though the DSU does not make it explicit that the content of the panel and 
Appellate Body reports have a binding effect, a number of clauses scattered in the text of the 
Understanding strongly imply, as Jackson states, the obligation to conform to a report in 
violation cases193. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the binding effect, a clarification must be 
made. From the interpretation of the DSU, there are three types of legal actions regarding the 
WTO dispute settlement system: the violation cases, the non-violation cases and the situation 
cases. Briefly, a violation case refers to a case in which the DSB concludes that there is a real 
violation against WTO rulings. Also, in this case there is a presumption of nullification and 
impairment by a violation of a WTO agreement.  
A non-violation complaint involves an internationally legal act. There is no breach 
of an international obligation and the attention is to a nullification or impairment, 
independently of trade damage. There is no requirement to withdraw the measure complained, 
rather the focus is on the effects of the measure, which shall be mitigated194. 
In its turn, the situation complaints are hard to understand in the WTO context and 
there was no case that reported such complaints. As explained by Matsuchita, Mavroidis and 
Schoenbaum, GATT/WTO context injured parties can attack illegal (violation complaints) 
and legal measures (non-violation complaints). For that reason, the authors state that it is 
almost impossible to imagine how WTO remedies in such cases can be different from those 
                                            
192 Jackson, 2000a, p.127. 
193 Id, p. 126. 
194 See Matsushita; Mavroidis; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 85-86. 
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applied to non-violation cases. Therefore, the forecast is that the situation complaints might 
disappear in the course of time195. 
Returning to the discussion about the binding effect of panels and Appellate Body 
reports, Peter van den Bossche affirms that the recommendations and rulings are not legally 
binding by themselves. The author defends that they become binding “only when they are 
adopted by the DSB and thus have become the recommendations and rulings of the DSB”196.  
Van den Bossche goes on to explain that in addition to making recommendations 
and rulings, the report of the panel may make suggestion concerning the ways the Member 
could implement the recommendations. The suggestions, according to this author, are also 
legally binding for the Member concerned197. 
It may be worth to make one last distinction regarding the DSB decisions. The 
recommendations will always come together with the adjudicating part of a dispute settlement 
decision referring to the illegality committed. Since the recommendations will always be an 
accompanying an adjudicating part of a decision regarding a breach of an international trade 
obligation, they will, as affirms Mavroidis, form an integral part of any adjudicating body 
decision198. 
 Although it can be argued that the DSU does not make the binding effect of 
recommendations and rulings of panels and Appellate Body reports explicit, several 
provisions of the Understanding clearly induce to conformity with what has been defended in 
this section. For example, pursuant Article 19, a panel or Appellate Body “shall recommend 
that the Member concerned bring the measures into conformity with that agreement”. Article 
21:1 states that “prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential 
in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members”. 
 As stated in Article 3:2 of the DSU and mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, the WTO dispute settlement system “is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system”. That is the strongest intention that guided 
the creation of the WTO rule oriented system: security and predictability of trade relations. 
                                            
195 Id., p. 84. 
196 Van den Bossche, 2005, p. 243. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Mavroidis, 2000, p. 781-782. 
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 Bearing that in mind, the binding effect of the recommendations and rulings also 
makes sense, even though it is not explicit in the body of the DSU. In accepting to make part 
of the multilateral trading system, members delivered a power of management and settlement 
of trade relations to the WTO. In believing that the system was built to favor and increase 
both trade relations and standards of life, members put their measures into conformity with 
WTO principles and agreed to respect its rulings and decisions.   
 Finally, the WTO enjoyed since its creation more power than GATT in enforcing 
bidding rules for all Members199. Therefore, the interpretation adopted in the present research 
is that the WTO binding rules are not only the agreements ones - valid to avoid problems such 
as free-riding -, but are also binding the rules translated into DSB recommendations and 
rulings. 
 
3.3.2.2 Economic asymmetry of WTO members: developing country sanctions harm 
themselves 
 
This section is going to discuss the most outward asymmetry related to trade 
relations, namely, the economic asymmetry. It will also discuss another disharmony that 
derives from or walks in tandem with the economic asymmetry: the political power. Both 
“power” asymmetries, implicitly or explicitly, significantly mark the differences (economic, 
cultural, social and political) of members in WTO discussions. And when the subject is the 
dispute settlement system and the implementation of decisions, these economic asymmetries 
play a bigger role. 
 One preliminary assumption of the present research endeavor is that the dispute 
settlement system does not solve the asymmetries among WTO members, and that problem 
becomes evident when the implementation of decisions adopted by the DSB takes place. 
 
● Asymmetric players 
 
                                            
199 See Mutlus; Önis, 2007, p. 59-60. 
 81 
The term asymmetry, at first glance, may betoken a negative connotation and may 
be used to refer to a differentiation, a disharmony or an imbalance. Nevertheless, it is 
important to bear in mind that it is due to these asymmetries – economic asymmetry lato 
sensu – that changes in the trade between countries started to take shape.  
With different products, different natural resources, different labor conditions and 
diverse specializations, countries are tempted to negotiate when they feel they are going to 
benefit from this negotiation. The international exchange of products, workers and knowledge 
supply the needs of a country, on the one hand, and promotes sales and income increase on 
the other200.  
Still, along with specialization, asymmetries contribute to promote 
competitiveness and an increase of the interdependence of countries. With the increase of 
international interaction sales also increase and countries can increment their production 
scale, lowering the prices of products in the market. Producers have an income growth and 
consumers can buy more and with more options. 
Moreover, besides economic power, asymmetries can originate from financial 
power, from international trade share or from technological innovations. As they are closely 
related, these categories of asymmetries are connected and may overlap. Also, more often 
than not they are a reflection of the wealth of a country.   
Thus, it is true that economic asymmetries between countries have a positive 
impact since they support the integration of economies in order to achieve an overall income 
increase, among other purposes. Indeed, the WTO estimates that the impact of trade deals 
resulting from the Uruguay Round – considering margins for error and depending on the 
assumptions of the calculations - were between $109 billion and $510 billion were added to 
world income201. 
Therefore there is strong evidence to support the claim that multilateral trade 
boosts economic growth for all the parties involved. Nevertheless that conclusion should not 
be reached hastily, without further analysis of the variables involved and impacted by 
multilateral trade.  
                                            
200 The specialization of products was defended by David Ricardo in his theory of comparative advantages. 
According to this theory, each country should specialize in the productions that have a comparative advantage 
in cost, thus providing benefits for all countries involved in international trade. See Ricardo, 1978. 
201 Available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b06_e.htm>.  
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It is noteworthy that in this section there is no ambition to delve into a deep 
economic analysis of asymmetries among WTO players. The intention is merely to shade 
light onto the benefits and problems that currently exist and which - to a greater or lesser 
extent -, influence the outcomes of the implementation of the dispute settlement decisions. 
Regarding economic asymmetries, the scenario around the world can be extremely 
controversial. If the mathematical explanation of increased sales, plus scale production, lower 
prices and consumers buying, resulting in an overall growth of income were true for every 
WTO Member, economic asymmetries would be ideal situation for multilateral trade.  
Nevertheless, there are significant differences among the economies of the 153 
members. One does not need to go very far to understand that phenomenon. Take, for 
instance, the example of, the US and Burundi (one of the richest against one of the 10th 
poorest economies of the world), both are WTO members, supposedly playing the same game 
in multilateral trade202.   
In a 2006 publication, the World Bank recognized that due to imperfect markets, 
the asymmetries of power and wealth result in diverse opportunities. This leads to wasted 
productive potential and inefficient allocation of resources. In addition, the report indicates 
that the leveling of the global economy and political fields of action requires more equitable 
rules for the functioning of global markets and more actions to help create and maintain the 
funding of poor countries203. 
Indeed, in what concerns the rules, although the legalization brought to 
international trade by the WTO helped (and still helps) to diminish the huge differences of 
WTO members once every country has to adapt its domestic rules to WTO standards, many 
elements remain unchanged. Forsooth, it can be argued that there is not much difference 
between GATT and WTO once the more powerful States are still the primary players in terms 
of drawing up and implementing multilateral trade rules204.  
                                            
202 It is true that the WTO and its Members provide special conditions for its least developed and developing 
Members, but these countries have to play in the same field of the richest Members, and that is where the 
economic asymmetries are evident. Here we can discuss an asymmetry of rules – such as the General System 
of Preferences and the different deadlines to implement WTO agreements - which can be an apparent 
advantage for the developing economies. 
203 See World Bank, 2006. 
204 See Mutlu; Önis, 2007, p. 57.  
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As aforementioned, the WTO is truly a member-driven Organization, so much so 
that the Members are the ones to decide the directions of negotiations and its agenda. The 
Secretariat is clearly much more institutionalized than GATT, but the Members are the ones 
who are really responsible for shaping the multilateral trade. 
In fact it should be clear that even though the decisions are made through 
multilateral negotiations in which all members are invited to participate, it is common place 
that informal negotiations (mainly among big players) are crucial for the decision-making 
process. Therefore, as stated by Mutlus and Önis, the multilateral character of the system is 
strongly undermined as the powerful developed and developing Members shape the rules in 
the name of other Members in the direction they wish205. 
However, it is also true that without powerful economies the multilateral trade 
system would not have such a strong frame as it has nowadays. It is only with their financial 
and technical support that the GATT - and more recently the WTO - could be shaped and 
brought to life. 
Surely because of the non-discrimination principles, the small economies that 
joined the WTO enjoy the benefits that all WTO members have. Likewise, small economies 
can form groups with similar or converging interests to improve their bargaining power 
during negotiations206.  As an example of those coalitions under the WTO are: the ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific countries); the African Group (all African WTO Members); 
the G-33 (also called “Friends of Special Products” in agriculture coalition of developing 
countries pressing for flexibility for developing countries to undertake limited market opening 
in agriculture); the G-90 (Coalition of African, ACP and least-developed countries) and; the 
Cotton-4 (Main African cotton producers)207. 
Thus from a general perspective and taking an overall approach, every member 
experiences growth of income and trade benefits in their own economies as a result of joining 
the multilateral system.  
                                            
205 Ibid., p. 61. Further in the same paper, the authors also claim that “the lack of commitment on the part of 
developed countries to provide aid related to trade raises serious questions and points towards one of the major 
weaknesses of the current global trading order from a developing country perspective”. Ibid, p. 64. 
206 It is important to notice that normally the least developed and the developing countries do not have an 
institutional and professional capacity to organize a strong bargaining opposition to defend their interests. 
Moreover, a recurrent problem is that they do not have converging interests to defend, making it difficult to 
find a consensus to negotiate together before the WTO meetings. 
207 More information available at: < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_brief08_e.doc>.  
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Notwithstanding the problems of economic and political asymmetries are really 
apparent when the focus comes to the dispute settlement system. A look at the two tables 
below leads to the conclusion that there is a correlation between the most frequent users of the 
dispute settlement system and the countries with the strongest economies.. 
Table 1 displays the data of the ten biggest economies of 2011, according to the 
World Bank data on gross domestic product. The US, Japan, the richer European countries 
and three of the BRICs208 countries appear on the data, reflecting their impact on (or strength 
in) the international economy. 
Also, according to WTO data, most of those countries in Table 1 are the current 
major multilateral traders. Indeed, the US, China, Germany and Japan are the leading 
importers and exporters, with a great market share of the international trade209.   
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Table 2 shows the ten major users of the WTO dispute settlement system and the 
number of cases in which they participate either as complainant or respondent (the 
participation as third parties was not considered relevant at this moment). Among the most 
                                            
208 The term BRICs refers to the group of emerging giant market countries formed by Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and more recently South Africa. It is a political organization intended to coordinate countries to work 
together on economic issues and global affairs. They had their first official summit in 2009. 
209 More information available at: < http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres11_e/pr628_e.htm>.  
210 Source: World Bank, 2011. Gross Domestic Product 2010. Available at: < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf>.  Last accessed in: 04 Aug. 
2011. 
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active members in disputes, seven of them appear in Table 1 leading us to suggest that it is no 
mere coincidence that the most active members are also the most powerful ones. 
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First, given the fact that the biggest economies are the ones that have the greatest 
market share concerning international trade, it is reasonable to expect those countries to 
appear in a high number of disputes before the DSB. The major economies normally have 
trade relations all around the world with a high rate of exports and imports. Therefore they 
also represent the biggest consumer markets, confirming the idea that those economies are 
very important for the functioning of the whole system. 
The dispute settlement system, despite its prominent status for the WTO, refers to 
a quite expensive procedure. For the majority of the developing members, litigating WTO 
cases may be prohibitively expensive do to their lack of institutional and financial means to 
pay the costs of representing their interests effectively212.  
Although the price of litigating before the DSB is not the main focus of discussion 
in the present study, it is worth putting in a few words in this respect.  As Busch and 
                                            
211 Source: World Trade Organization, 2011. Disputes by country/territory. Available at: < 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm>. Last accessed in: 04 Aug. 2011. For a 
complete statistical analysis on the WTO Dispute Settlement between 1995-2010, see Leitner; Lester, 2011. 
212 See Smith, 2004, p. 548-549. 
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Reinhardt previously stated, the legal capacity to litigate in the WTO dispute settlement is a 
thorny issue213. 
It is true that for WTO members to take full advantage of the system they have to 
be prepared to pursue their rights in a very competitive arena. For wealthy economies this is 
not a problem as they have financial means to expend in the procedure and well prepared 
professionals in the specific area of multilateral trade. 
Nevertheless and as stated by Busch and Reinhardt, the situation is not the same 
for developing countries and the small economies of the WTO. So as to have the capacity to 
litigate in the WTO, countries need both experienced trained lawyers in a very specific field 
and staff and domestic institutions to monitor and participate in the multilateral trade, 
politicians and bureaucrats to decide whether it is worth litigating and, finally, as it is required 
and preferable, a local staff in Geneva to follow the negotiations closely 214. 
Clearly not all governments are able to provide the necessary instruments of an 
ideal situation. Considering WTO members, there is a considerable asymmetry of legal 
expertise and resources to use the WTO dispute settlement system.  
Instead, in order to prepare and go forward with a case under the strict deadlines 
established by the DSU a country must have a high level of legal expertise and administrative 
capacity215. Normally that is unthinkable for many of the WTO members, especially for the 
least developed countries, which have a big list of other urgent priorities to see to in their 
domestic arena. Indeed, in many cases is not even possible to keep special staff of 
representatives for WTO issues in Geneva. 
Actually, in order to be capable to litigate, developing countries may sometimes 
rely on the direct financial and legal assistance of developed and powerful WTO members 
that obviously promote their own interests. This is not very common, but for example Shaffer 
reminds us that the EC “provided funds for fourteen ACP countries to hire lawyers in Brussels 
to defend their interests as a third party (and indirectly, the EC’s interests as a party) in the 
EC-Sugar case brought by Brazil and Thailand”216. 
                                            
213 See Busch; Reinhardt, 2003; Id., 2004.  
214 Busch; Reinhardt, 2004, p. 3. 
215 See Smith, 2004, p. 548. 
216 Shaffer, 2009, p. 177. EC-Sugar refers to the dispute DS266, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds266_e.htm>.  
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The fact that most of WTO members have neither the aforementioned legal 
expertise nor the administrative capacity to present a dispute corroborates the data shown in 
Tables 1 and 2 above. Wealthier economies are far more prepared to litigate under the DSU 
rulings whereas developing countries lato sensu do not progress in terms of experience 
regarding the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Nevertheless, developing countries such as Brazil, India and China are becoming 
active users of the system as their economies are progressively and promptly acquiring a 
bigger market share worldwide217.  
It is important to say that even though those countries are considered developed 
economies, they are in a different baseline from the majority of the developing members. 
Therefore, it is understood that the market size and the expertise acquired by Brazil, India and 
China in using the dispute settlement system is unique and represents a separate reality from 
the developing economies of the WTO. That is why, for instance, not only Brazil, India and 
China are able to comply with DSU rulings and deadlines, but they can also represent a real 
threat to the powerful economies during litigation and eventual retaliation procedures. 
Thus one can conclude that although the dispute settlement system works for all 
complainants, it surely works better to complainants who can take full advantage of the legal 
opportunities of the system with their expertise and administrative preparation218. That reality 
is also true regarding the work under all the other WTO agreements: the members who are 
better prepared are more likely to take full advantage of the opportunities that the multilateral 
trade can open. 
 
● Developing country sanctions harm themselves 
 
It is true that the lack of legal expertise and administrative capacity coupled with 
the lack of financial conditions to litigate under the DSU rulings represent one major problem 
for the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system. 
                                            
217 In the case of China, the country has participation in a great number of cases as third party, in order to gain 
legal expertise in the dispute settlement system of the Organization. 
218 See Busch; Reinhardt, 2004, p. 5. 
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Moreover, it can be claimed and was in fact suggested by Busch and Reinhardt, 
that this problem may harm the whole system. The deficiencies of developing countries 
undermine the well-functioning of the dispute settlement once it incites cheating in the system 
and a disincentive on the part of developing countries to negotiate219. 
The problems that appear in a more advanced stage when the dispute is already 
ongoing also bring strong worries to WTO scholars, staff and members. The aforementioned 
problems are at least as worrisome as the legal capacity. The implementation phase and WTO 
remedies are in the core of discussions about the reform of the dispute settlement system. 
In accordance with Hudec, developed countries are somehow privileged by the 
lack of an efficient mechanism that binds the compliance with DSB decisions. Therefore, 
developed countries normally argue that the disciplines to substantially change the mechanism 
of implementation of the WTO decisions are ineffective220.    
Indeed, since 1995 experience shows that the problem of lack of instruments to 
induce implementation of a decision adopted by the DSB currently remains one of the biggest 
challenges for the use of the system by modest economies221. 
Considering all the instruments available in the dispute settlement system, it can 
be affirmed that it is, in several ways, more favorable to the larger economies of the WTO. 
Important consumer markets such as the US and European countries represent a much higher 
and efficient pressure when considering remedies applied by those countries against 
developing countries. The other way around is also true. The impact of the remedies tried by 
developing country members is quite insignificant when the dispute is against a big market. 
Yet, the possible applicable remedies by the developing countries damage their 
domestic economy more than impact the defendant. It is easy to comprehend that since those 
countries are normally strongly dependent on developed markets to improve their own 
economies.  It can be claimed that powerful economies still abound222. 
Not only the economic impact is harmful to the developing countries, but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, they bring heavy problems and restrictions in other fields of 
                                            
219 Busch; Reinhardt, 2004, p. 7. 
220 See Hudec, 2000, p. 346-349. 
221 Amaral Júnior, 2006, p. 85. The author adds that until 2006 no African country had means to be represented 
in the dispute settlement system as a complainant. 
222 Id., p. 86. 
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international affairs once retaliations are essentially a political weapon. Indeed, as countries 
are increasingly interdependent, a political problem originated in a retaliation procedure can 
generate discomforts and multilateral reprisals regarding other issues. 
Preliminarily and as stated by Joost Pauwelyn, trade retaliation does not work 
when developing countries win a case. And although that affirmation is a result of the analysis 
of several aspects that influence the implementation (or not) of the DSB recommendations 
and rulings, the effectiveness of the countermeasures does depend on the relative economic 
importance of the member adopting them223.  
That claim is far from the statement that legal complaints by developing countries 
are not useful. Even if, as discussed here, the retaliation option is not available or not as 
appealing as desired, complaints presented by developing countries are effective policy 
tools224.  
Forsooth, the legalization of procedures that came with the creation of the WTO 
made legal complaints a bit more effective than they were during the GATT, and the 
usefulness of the system is not in question225. Moreover, the legalization of the system has the 
potential to operate in favor of developing countries, at least when compared to the 
unrestricted bargaining instruments used until 1994226. 
However, turning over to the last part of the dispute settlement procedure, the 
implementation phase and the current remedies under the DSU do have their effectiveness 
undermined in the specific situation when a developing country has the right to suspend 
concessions against a developed member.  
WTO system of retaliation is basically a political instrument of pressure and as 
such, to be effective, trade retaliation must be a credible threat (keeping in mind the game 
theory). The respondent must feel that in non-complying with a DSB or panel decision, it is 
going to suffer prejudicial trade restrictions on the part of the complainant. 
Now, considering the simple data that was presented above it is hard to imagine 
how an average developing country and/or small economy can ever present a threat to a 
                                            
223 See Pauwelyn, 2010 and; Matsushita; Mavroids; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 92-93. 
224 See Hudec, 2002 
225 Ibid. 
226 See Smith, 2004, p. 549. 
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developed market. Normally the developing members are highly dependent on developed 
members to feed their own domestic economy. 
Notice that the term average is used here to address to standard developing 
countries excluding international powers such as Brazil, India and China, which definitely 
belong to a separate category. Although they are evaluated as developing countries those 
countries occupy a respected position among the ten most powerful economies in the world227.  
Therefore, due to their differentiated position regarding industry, agriculture, 
innovation, knowledge and of course their important consumer markets, those countries have 
means of opposing a real threat to developed members and thus get better results in return. 
Thus, if the complainant developing members cannot expect compliance by a 
respondent developed country, there is a problem. Even though retaliation is allowed, it does 
not make any difference if the complainant harms itself by going forward with suspension of 
concessions and trade restrictions against a huge economy (which the developing country is 
probably dependent on).  
This is where the famous expression among WTO scholars which says that trade 
retaliation is ‘shooting yourself in the foot’ fits perfectly. It is also where the heaviest 
discussions about the effectiveness of DSU legal remedies take place. 
Although it is true that it is better to have a legalized framework as the WTO 
dispute settlement system than have no system at all, the lack of better remedies in the 
implementation phase does undermine the effectiveness of the dispute settlement. 
Yet, as suggested before, it does not mean that developing country members 
should feel discouraged to use the system (as they may understand that this is likely to reduce 
their welfare). Every dispute brought before the DSB has had at least a political effect. 
Likewise the disputes shade light onto problems and inconsistencies in the system that may be 
undermining the work of the WTO for several members, in several sectors. 
Still, an effectiveness problem exists regarding the implementation of the 
decisions adopted by the WTO. 
                                            
227 All three countries, although they have a high market value of their final goods and services (gross domestic 
product), they still have heavy domestic problems. For instance Brazil -  an upper midle income level 
according to the World Bank – has a high rate of poverty and unemployment. India, considered a lower middle 
income economy, has only 54% of urban development (sanitary facilities) and 63% of literacy rate. China, also 
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Although WTO disputes have a high rate of compliance by the respondents, every 
non-compliance case resulting from a non-implementation or a non-full implementation of 
WTO decisions is evidence that there exists an imperfection in the multilateral system.  
Moreover, as there is no remedy to make the non-compliant respondent liable – 
since the respondent can choose to pay the price to keep with its inconsistency measures – a 
red light must be signalized. 
It is true that the rate of compliance with WTO dispute settlement decisions when 
a developing country Members is the complainant and a developed country members he 
respondent is comparable to the overall rate of implementation of 83% to 85%. 
The study by a Counselor of the WTO Legal Affairs Division, Reto Malacrida, 
suggests that in cases where the complainant is a developing country or a small economy, the 
compliance estimate maintains the high rate228. Thus, the compliance with WTO decisions 
seems to be successful even when small economies are sitting in the complainant seat.   
Nevertheless, Malacrida calls the attention to the disputes of US-Gambling and 
EC-Bananas as two non-satisfactory implementation cases that made a huge noise in the 
WTO. Those cases will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Besides those disputes, 
there are clearly several examples of cases – also very important ones – involving the relation 
of a developing country as a complainant and a developed country as a respondent, where 
non-implementation was prolonged229. The postponement of implementation or the non-
implementation in the cases where it was observed appears to have been stimulated by the 
market share and economic importance of the complainant member. 
Even though the threat of retaliation has not played a central role in all cases in 
the decision of implementing or not a DSB or Appellate Body ruling, formal threats are 
important in the decision to comply230. The respondent will always take in consideration what 
he will gain or lose when complying with a decision. And even if the decision to comply does 
not have much to do with the complainant, the lack of power to present a credible threat by 
                                                                                                                                        
an upper midle income economy according to the World Bank data, has deep problems with labour protection. 
For more information please see: <http://data.worldbank.org/country>. 
228 Malacrida, 2008. 
229 Malacrida, 2008, p. 20. The disputes in which no compliance was achieved include for example US-Section 
110 of the US Copyright Act, EC-Hormones and US- Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel 
Products from Japan.  
230 Compliance and the elements that influence it will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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the complainant influences (a lot in some cases) the respondent’s decision to pay the price of 
keeping with inconsistent measures. 
Retaliation measures are distortions on trade relations normally translated into 
additional customs duties on goods originating in the territory of the responding member. 
Depending on the targeted goods and the tariff rate imposed on them, the importers of goods 
coming from the complainant member market can either charge higher prices or stop 
importing due to the elevated costs231.  
That partially explains the relative lack of enthusiasm among many WTO 
members regarding the procedure, since they are normally very reliant on imports from 
developed countries to push their own domestic economy. Holding on in a retaliation process 
may head to huge economic costs in the internal market and consequent detrimental effects on 
consumers welfare. 
Most WTO scholars would agree that “countermeasures are a more or less 
ineffective instrument in the hands of smaller players”232 and that “trade retaliation simply 
does not work when developing countries win a case”233. 
Since the aim of retaliation is to bite the respondent member and induce its 
compliance, most individual developing countries cannot achieve that goal. Normally 
developing countries have only a small share of the respondents’ market, which in turn is 
incapable of producing any harm in the economy of the latter.  
In sum, retaliation measures from developing countries will be counterproductive 
and most likely will not cause any pressure. Instead, they will probably result in even worse 
prejudice than the inconsistent measures that gave rise to the dispute. On the other hand and 
using the same logic, retaliation by larger members tends to be much more effective when 
used against small economies regarding their market size advantage234. 
                                            
231 See Malacrida, 2008, p. 11-13. Chad Bown and Joost Pauwelyn suggest ways of making retaliation more 
effective for developing countries by observing developed countries performance. The authors state that “the 
general guidelines for such ‘smart sanctions’ should be to (i) minimize the harm caused to the sanctioning 
country, while at the same time (ii) maximize the impact of the sanctions in the violating country. A crucial 
way to minimize harm at home is to conduct internal consultations with stakeholders (especially importers) 
before actually imposing sanctions. In this way, products sourced from the violating country which cannot be 
easily replaced by imports from other countries can be identified and avoided.” In: Bown; Pauwelyn, 2010, p. 
11. 
232 Bagwell; Mavroidis; Staiger, 2004, p. 14-15. 
233 Bown; Pauwelyn, 2010, p. 9. 
234 See Hudec, 2002, p. 83-84. 
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Indeed, as Malacrida states and as suggested before, the current retaliation 
measures in the form of additional tariff duties go in the opposite direction of raising 
standards of living. Instead they raise new barriers for the multilateral trade. This is exactly 
the inverse of what is intended by the preamble of the WTO agreement which proclaim “a 
view to raising standards of living, full employment and a large and steadily growing volume 
of real income and effective demand”235.  
Thus, considering the picture of small economies as complaints and developed 
countries as respondents, the detrimental effects of WTO retaliation system will normally 
cause much more harm to the retaliating member. Certainly, as stated by Charnovitz, “perhaps 
the biggest disadvantage of WTO sanctions is that they bite the country imposing the 
sanction”236. 
The case of Antigua and Barbuda (hereinafter Antigua) against the US provides a 
good example of the difficulties to retaliate. The market size asymmetry between the two 
WTO members is significant – Antigua is one of WTO smallest members –, a standard which 
would mean that retaliation of suspension of tariff concessions by the complaint would have 
no impact on the economy of the US. In practical terms, the US could easily shift the small 
volume of trade it has with Antigua elsewhere. The same approach was taken in the EC-
Bananas case, which will be deiscussed in the next chapter. 
As noted, it does seem that the traditional means of retaliation by suspending trade 
concession is not a practical (feasible) option for developing countries. The incapacity to offer 
a credible threat and/or the problems that they may cause to its own domestic economy by 
retaliating are enough reasons not to make use of retaliation. 
However, the WTO system is not structured to exclude Members taking full 
advantage of its instruments. The WTO system is meant to promote a fair multilateral trade 
with fair conditions for all players.  
Poorer countries are definitely less likely to get what they want from the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Indeed Busch and Reinhardt agree that the legalized system of the 
WTO has exaggerated the gap between developing and developed country members 
concerning the ability to get defendants to liberalize dispute policies. In short, the authors 
                                            
235 See WTO Agreement and; Malacrida, 2008, p. 13. 
236 Charnovitz, 2002, p. 621. 
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state that “wealthy complainants have become significantly more likely to secure their desired 
outcomes under the WTO, but poorer countries have not”237. 
The retaliation pursuant the DSU has imperfections that are clear to everybody 
when a developing country is playing as complainant. It is in the implementation phase that 
most of the reform proposals for the DSU rely on. Although it will not work for all members, 
a cross-retaliation option may be a solution in some cases as explained in what follows. 
 
3.4 Compliance at the WTO 
 
The first subsection introduces the role of compliance in the international 
scenario. With the aim of exploring the reason why states comply with international rulings, 
this section addresses basic issues explaining why states obey (or not) international law. As 
previously outlined in the opening sections of this study, the WTO is an international 
organization set by a treaty of international public law. Therefore, WTO law is a branch of 
international economic law, which in turn is a branch of international public law.  As such, 
concepts and principles of international law guide the function of the WTO.  
This section of the study deals more closely with compliance at the WTO. A fact 
that is well known and was addressed before in this research endeavor is the high compliance 
rate at the WTO, which is significantly higher than that of other international organizations. 
Notwithstanding the high compliance, there is still comfortable room for Members that do not 
wish to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings, which goes against the intention 
of the WTO. The Organization was created with the aim of structuring a legal and extensive 
framework for multilateral trade in order to promote the system security and predictability. At 
the same time, the Organization is thought to increase the standards of living of all of its 
members and promote a more balanced trade. Every decision not complied to represent losses 
(financial and social) for the affected) member (s). Also, every decision not complied to 
shows the WTO and its members that the system is not perfect and changes urge. 
Central issues of this study are addressed in order to verify the extent to which 
they are related to the decision to comply (or not) with DSB recommendations and rulings. 
Economic asymmetry seems to play a significant role in the bargaining power and threat 
                                            
237 Busch; Reinhardt, 2003, p. 728-729. 
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process in the retaliation phase. Whether the economic power of a country can really affect 
the decision of a respondent to comply or not in a dispute involves a discussion with 
arguments towards both streams, positive and negative.  
 
3.4.1 Compliance and International Law 
 
A general definition of compliance in international law could be the conformity of 
an action/behavior of a subject of international law and the specific rule. Indeed, as already 
stated, most theories of compliance with international law are normally underlying theories of 
the behavioral influence of legal rules238. 
Although the focus of this study is the legal rule, namely, WTO law, compliance 
in international law is not only applicable when a legal framework exists. It can be applicable, 
for example, to customary law, which is also a source of international law according to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Compliance is very closely connected to implementation of the rules of a system 
and, in consequence – one could think -, with the effectiveness of the system. Even though 
these are connected concepts, compliance and implementation do not depend on each other. 
Compliance can exist without implementation. As stated by Raustiala et.al, while 
implementation is the process of putting international commitments into practice, compliance 
can occur without any effort or action by a regulated entity239. In the same vein, the connection 
between compliance and effectiveness is not necessary. Rules and legal regimes can be 
effective even if compliance is low. The same authors still state that: 
 
And while high levels of compliance can indicate high levels of 
effectiveness, they can also indicate low, readily met and ineffective 
standards. Many international agreements reflect a lowest common 
denominator dynamic that makes compliance easy but results in a negligible 
influence on behavior. Here is the source of the vexing question of the 
significance of high observed levels of compliance.240. 
 
                                            
238 Raustiala; Slaughter, 2002, p. 539. 
239 Ibid. The authors give the example of the Soviet Union, where the collapse of its economic system has 
resulted in the compliance of the Union with many international environmental agreements. 
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Whether this is the case of WTO Members – easy compliance plus bad behavior –
, that is an issue to be questioned. It does not seem to be the case for easy compliance, since 
(i) the DSU is quite demanding and (ii) the issues dealt in the WTO disputes are normally not 
easy. Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that there exists a number of examples of bad 
behavior of Members, especially the ones which can abuse their power position in the 
multilateral trade such as is the case of the US. Even if WTO powerful members comply, the 
case of partial compliance or negotiated compliance is very often observed in the system, 
contributing to the overall high rate of compliance. 
Notwithstanding, considering general international law with all its organizations 
and institutions, it seems that Henkin was right when he wrote decades ago: “it is probably the 
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time”241.  If that was not true, governments and 
organizations would not spend so much time – sometimes years – and resources trying to 
agree on treaties and set rules for the behavior of States in the international environment. And 
that works in the same logic in the national level, as governments work with the assumption 
that the law created will be observed242.  
Since States started to form partnerships and groups or organizations in order to 
be more connected and then more interdependent, the culture of compliance appears to be 
following the process. Especially with the institutions created after the Second World War, 
and with the increasing flexibility it brought to national sovereignties, the compliance with 
international legal system has gained force. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that in considering compliance one could find 
a large number of variations depending on, for example, the time of agreement, the country 
concerned and the interests involved. Indeed, as rightly shown by Haas, not all States comply 
with the same instruments, the same State may vary in its own compliance according to 
different legal instruments across different sectors and different patterns243.  
According to Henkin, States comply because of internal motivations and external 
inducements. For him, internal motivations to comply are nowadays weaker than before, but 
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241 Henkin, 1979, p. 47. 
242 See Henkin, 1995. 
243 See Haas, 2000, p.44. 
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they still play an important role. States have – normally – a developed sense of commitment 
to the international order and stability in the international society. Indeed, it is true normally 
that States have the notion that “stability, law and order, reliability (and a warrant reputation 
for reliability) are in their national interest, and therefore they have a more-or-less enlightened 
self-interest in compliance”244. The basic understanding is that the international laws with 
which the States agree are in their self-interest and therefore it is somehow expected that the 
States will be willing to comply. 
Moreover, there is a strong belief that States keep commitments because they fear 
that if there is evidence of their unreliability, which might damage the cooperative 
relationships they are engaged in and, in consequence, that may reduce other States (partners) 
willingness to enter into future agreements. As Downs et.al. explain, once the opportunity 
costs resulting from the cooperation are normally substantial, most of the States are very 
much stimulated to behave cooperatively245.  
On external inducements, as according to Henkin, they are the principal stimulus 
to comply with international commitments. Therefore the main contributors to a culture of 
compliance are external factors. As international law is horizontal by definition – since States 
and sovereignty are theoretically equal – enforcement of international commitments are also 
horizontal. In fact, the possibility of horizontal enforcement exerts a powerful deterrent 
influence, which in many cases is reflected in a strong threat of retaliation246.  
Current and collective horizontal inducements to compliance shall be considered 
taking into account the great number of multilateral and regional treaties and understandings 
among countries. At the same time, international rulings gradually indicate more obligations 
that shall be applied erga omnes and the breach of these obligations may have its 
consequences reach more than one State. 
Peter Haas built a table i indicating the likelihood of a State compliance. 
Assuming that countries are capable of enforcement, Haas indicates that the willingness to 
                                            
244 Id., p. 49. 
245 See Downs; Jones, 2002, p. 96. In the same place the authors point out that there is “empirical evidence to 
suggest that the impact of reputation is either weaker or more complicated than much of the theoretical 
literature suggests. While compliance rates are relatively good in general, they are often considerably lower 
than one would expect them to be if every defection had important implications for every current and future 
agreement. This is true even if we allow for the effects of imperfect information”. Ibid. 
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comply may vary depending on the political costs of (non) compliance. The table is 
reproduced below. 
 
                                              costly compliance not costly compliance 
State is capable and willing Possible Most likely 
State is capable but unwilling Unlikely Unlikely 
State is Incapable and 
Unwilling 
State may try to comply and 
expect to fail in order to 
attract resources from 
international institutions to 
improve capacity 
State may try to comply 
State is incapable and 
unwilling 
Highly unlikely Unlikely 
Table III: Likelihood of State Compliance247. 
 
Probably, the key to understand variation in compliance decisions by States is 
related to the nature of the subject in discussion, the costs to the domestic society, domestic 
market, domestic industry and the political costs of the implementation of compliance or not 
in the view of the international society. Also, Haas highlights that compliance with 
international obligations depends on threats of sanctions for non-compliance levied by a 
powerful State248. 
Not surprisingly, there is a study made by Guzman, which explains compliance by 
States based on the (credible) threat of retaliation. This approach seems to be very adequate in 
what concerns the dispute settlement system of the WTO and the (non) compliance by its 
members of DSB decisions. The aforementioned author understands that a model of 
compliance with international law requires a system through which nations that breach 
international obligations are sanctioned249.  
                                                                                                                                        
246 See Henkin, 1995, p. 50.  In what concerns sovereignty of States in current international law, it shall be 
recognized that that the transformation of sovereignty has remade international law, so that international law 
rulings now seems to help to construct national identities and interests. See Koh, 1997, p. 2602. 
247 Source: Haas, 2000, p. 47. 
248 Id., p. 51. 
249 See Guzman, 2002. 
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With a simple prisoner’s dilemma it is possible to visualize - without the burden 
of considering all the variations that one single situation can present -, what can happen. 
Taking as inspiration Guzman’s work, one could assume that regarding WTO agreements (i) 
each country is better off if it violates the agreement while the other country complies; (ii) 
both are better off if they both comply rather than if they both violate and; (iii) the equilibrium 
is for both States to violate their international obligations. 
        
 Country 2 
 Comply Violate 
Comply 5,5 2,6 
 
Country 1 
Violate 6,2 3,3 
Table VI: Prisoner’s Dilemma250 
 
International law, as shown in the prisoner’s dilemma presented above, seems to 
play a minor role in States decisions. If that is true, Guzman is right (and this is also the 
understanding of this analysis) that a model in which international law does matter should 
identify effective mechanisms to sanction the violations committed.  To change the result of 
the game, a coercive compliance mechanism should exist. Even the WTO, and Organization 
well known for its teeth to bite violators, does not provide an effective mechanism of 
sanctions. And sanctions include all costs resulting from the breach, “including punishment or 
retaliation by other States, and reputational costs that affect a State’s ability to make 
commitments in the future” 251. As said before, international law affects the State self-interest, 
which, according to Guzman, may result in two different impacts on the decision to comply: 
 
First, it can lead to the imposition of direct sanctions such as trade, military, 
or diplomatic sanctions. Second, it can lead to a loss of reputational costs of 
violating international law are outweighed by the benefits thereof, a state 
will violate that law252. 
                                            
250 Source: Guzman, 2002, p. 1842. 
251 Id., p. 1845. 
252 Id., p. 1846. 
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As previously suggested in this section, reputation is an important element that is 
normally taken into account in the decision to comply. A decision to violate an international 
agreement may be beneficial to the violator in the present, but may reduce its payoff in the 
future. This also explains why States have incentives to comply in some situations and pay the 
price of noncompliance in others. Nevertheless, the statement that “by developing and 
preserving a good reputation, States are able to extract greater concessions for future 
promises”253  is completely right. 
Yet, there is evidence that States decision to comply is influenced by their 
enrollment in an international institution. Keohane defines international institutions as 
“persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain activity and shape expectations”254. Haas assumes that international institutions 
encourage States compliance and somehow deterred non-compliance by eliminating or 
diminishing barriers to self-interests of its members255. 
It cannot be forgotten that by assuming the obligations set out by signing the 
participation in an international organization, States are assuming pacta sunt servanda 
obligations, which are made in good faith and are binding. To be bound by international 
obligations voluntarily signed, at least gives the impression that States are willing to comply 
with whatever decision taken by the organization and its members.  
In that sense, Bilder states that the character of the international system, broadly understood 
as horizontal, and the firmly-held notions of State sovereignty leads to a belief that 
international rules are normally developed and implemented by consensus rather than through 
authoritative processes. The consequence referring to compliance is that in norms decided by 
a voluntary process, States shall be willing to conform their behavior to the rulings of the 
organization they are part of256. 
 
 
 
                                            
253 Id., p. 1886. 
254 Keohane, 1989, p. 3. 
255 See Haas, 2000, p. 53. 
256 See Bilder, 2000, p. 66. 
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3.4.2 Compliance at the WTO: is it an option? 
 
The title of this section was inspired by a conversation with the current Director of 
the Intellectual Property Division of the WTO, Anthony Taubman257. While discussing cross-
retaliation and compliance issues, Taubman commented that the present research endeavor 
should shed light on (i) the nature of compliance and (ii) whether there is an option available 
to members to comply with the DSB decisions.  
Given the aforementioned comment, it seems worth questioning if it really is just 
an option opened to the Members or that compliance must be observed. Moreover, one can 
question whether WTO law has a long-term impact on the behavior of Sates.  A reflection 
made by Peter van den Bossche - currently Member of the Appellate Body of the WTO -, 
poses the question of whether the culture of compliance is truly brought about by the legal 
structure of the WTO system258.  
In a first look conclusion, one could be tempted to answer yes, due to the high rate 
of 83-85% compliance with WTO decisions. Nevertheless, and as addressed before, these 
numbers do not indicate full compliance, nor prompt compliance in all cases, nor that the 15% 
of noncompliance shall be dismissed. Indeed, every instance of noncompliance with the DSB 
and/or Appellate Body recommendations is very problematic. 
What Davey calls “quality compliance actions” indicating the successful 
compliance cases at the WTO shall meet two requirements: (i) the implementation of DSB 
recommendations in accordance with the actual decision and (ii) the withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measure. Yet, when one looks at the quality and the timeliness of compliance 
actions, the scenario is anything but sound at the WTO259. 
Under the DSU, Article 21.1 defines that: “Prompt compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of 
disputes to the benefit of all Members”. From the reading of the Article it is quite clear that 
                                            
257 The interview with Anthony Taubman took place at the WTO Headquarters, Geneva, March 2011. 
258 Interview with Peter van den Bossche. WTO Headquarters, Geneva, March 2011. 
259 Davey, 2009, p. 119. 
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compliance is not an option, but an obligation that shall be observed in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the system260. 
One can observe that the WTO has its weak reed in those occasions in which the 
Members decided not to comply – or decided to comply without quality - with dispute 
settlement decisions. According to Coleman et.al. the noncompliance at the WTO has 
normally taken three forms, namely: (i) prior noncompliance; (ii) delay and; (iii) 
noncompliance, open and disguised261.  The authors use the termination prior noncompliance 
to indicate that many WTO members – and not only the big players - , have taken measures 
knowing these to be inconsistent with WTO law, based on the assumption that the worst that 
could happen is to be challenged. Leading to a dispute at the DSB. The delay on compliance 
is observed in the sense that Members delay the compliance with a recommendation from the 
DSB as much as they can, within the rules of the system. And finally the non-compliance, 
“open and disguised” is used by authors to address the increasing number of decisions where 
WTO Members have openly decided not to comply and accept risk retaliation262. 
The remark made by Coleman et.al addresses touches upon major concerns 
among WTO scholars and members. If members simply decide not to comply with a dispute 
settlement decision and pay the price to keep the breach of its multilateral obligations, there is 
hardly anything that can be done. Sanctions are weak –in fact they are not even called 
sanctions as indicated before -, and Members can opt to pay to maintain the inconsistent 
behavior.  
More than anything, the “compliance option” shows how power oriented is the 
multilateral trade system, despite the fact that WTO is in essence a rule oriented Organization. 
If that is the case, low-power States are more likely to play a passive role while high-power 
States model the system as they wish263.  
                                            
260 Although Article 21.3 of the DSU establishes the possibility of granting a reasonable period of time for the 
violator to comply if it is impracticable to promptly comply, the DSU does not leave the opportunity open for 
an option to comply or not. Article 21.3, DSU states that “If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the 
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to do 
so”. Robert Hudec highlights that - and this was mentioned before in this research -, “despite the softer 
connotation of the word recommendation, the traditional understanding of the word recommendation in 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence has been that, when approved by the plenary body acting for the full membership, 
it is a legally binding order”. Hudec, 2000, p. 10. 
261 Coleman; Horlick, 2007, p. 141. 
262 Id., p. 141-142. 
263 To read more on power orientation, see: Jackson, 1978 and; Dunne III, 2002.  
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Although the DSU establishes mechanisms to induce compliance, and even 
though the WTO is famous among international organizations, because of its provisions that 
allow to certain extent, the punishment of the noncompliant State, the system has clear limits 
when confronted with the power of the big players264. From the reading of the DSU 
provisions, it is clear that the WTO did not intend to leave open an option not to comply with 
its decisions. Instead, the compliance is intended to be mandatory, as a security rule to 
guarantee that the system works effectively.   
Notwithstanding, data and numerous papers have shown that the settlement of 
disputes at the WTO does not work in the way it should. It may be a little extreme to claim 
that Members comply with WTO decisions when and how they wish so - depending on their 
influence and participation in the multilateral trade -, but to a large extent, the facts seem to 
lead to this preliminary conclusion. And if that is true, it is also true that the asymmetry in the 
market size of the opponents in a dispute is also taken in consideration in the decision to 
comply or not. 
Moreover, the political influence of the members has a great importance 
especially in the directions that are taken by members in the implementation phase of the 
dispute settlement. In fact, and as suggested before in this study, the retaliation procedure is 
considered to be more political than economic265. Indeed, all things considered it is right what 
is stated by Ezeani: “the fact is that the key to enforcement of dispute findings rests more on 
the strength of political persuasion on the country in violations to redress the harm its 
domestic measures have occasioned”266. 
Therefore, it seems to be the case that both, economic and political asymmetries 
come to the playing field in the moment of implementation of DSB recommendations and 
rulings. Thus, as previously argued by Hudec, the threat of trade retaliation may influence 
political decision-making in the target member267.  
Moreover, if political interests and future relations can be threatened by trade 
retaliation, the respondent member may also take into account its own reputation in the 
                                            
264 This was said before, but in any moment the DSU mentions punishment or sanctioning in its text. The 
approach adopted by this study is that the retaliation available to members in the dispute settlement system is 
to induce compliance. 
265 In the conversation with Peter van den Bossche (Geneva, March 2011), he also suggested that retaliation and 
its developments is far more political than economic. 
266 Ezeani, 2010, p. 129. 
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multilateral scenario, as suggested by general internal law bibliography. Whether reputation 
or the threat of losing market access is more or less important is hard to say and shall be 
analyzed in on a case-by-case basis in each specific dispute.  
Following the stream adopted in this research endeavor, Princen states that 
compliance is encouraged to the extent that the position of domestic actors that favour 
compliance is strengthened in comparison to the political factors that favour 
noncompliance268. In being so, a dispute settlement system with more strength to enforce 
compliance or to sanction a violator may lead to a better behavior of States i.e. WTO 
Members. 
 
3.4.2.1 Economic Asymmetry and Compliance 
 
The approach adopted by the present study suggests that the economic asymmetry 
of WTO members has great importance in the implementation (or not) of DSB/Appellate 
Body recommendations and rulings. Nonetheless there is a different stream that follows the 
understanding that neither economic asymmetry nor any other type of differences among 
members influences the decision to comply with WTO law. The States comply (or not) 
regardless of the law or the threat imposed by others. 
In that sense, Bush and Reinhardt state that “a rich complainant has no special 
advantages over a poor but equal-sized complainant in securing compliance from a defendant 
found in violation of WTO obligations”269. In the same vein, but with a different approach, 
Nottage argues that: 
 
GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice demonstrates high rates of 
compliance with adverse dispute settlement rulings even when smaller and 
developing countries are complainants. This practice suggests that countries 
comply for a multitude of reasons of which the fear for retaliation is often 
not a necessary ingredient270. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
267 See Hudec, 2000 and; Charnovitz; Kearns, 2002. 
268 Princen, 2004, p. 557. 
269 Busch; Reinhardt, 2003, p. 732. 
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These authors suggest that there is no disincentive for compliance when a 
developing country i.e. a small economy is complaining against a powerful nation-State. 
Especially Nottage – by analyzing the high rates of compliance with DSB/Appellate Body 
recommendations -, defends the position that the decision to comply or not has nothing to do 
with the fact that a weak member is the complainant. 
The author presents an interesting approach arguing that retaliation is hardly ever 
the main ingredient in the various reasons why a government decides to comply (or not) with 
a WTO dispute settlement ruling. Moreover, the author proposes that the capacity to threat 
with an effective retaliation is often an insignificant factor for government compliance 
regarding WTO issues271.  
Therefore, Nottage assumes that the WTO system effectiveness is not undermined 
because of the asymmetries of WTO members and the lack of capacity of most developing 
members to impose a credible threat of retaliation. States comply or do not comply with WTO 
rulings because they want to keep the system functioning and, according to Nottage’s 
understanding, that explains the high rates of compliance. Thus, developing countries “should 
not be overly dissuaded from using WTO dispute settlement to achieve their trade objectives 
due to a lack of retaliation capacity”272. 
If Nottage is right, then the major driving force of compliance with WTO rulings 
is aligned with the care that States have with their own reputation in the international society, 
which was addressed in the first section of this chapter. With the aim to guarantee or at least 
prevent future decrease of negotiations in the international arena, States prefer to comply with 
the decisions of international organizations.  
To some extent, this research agrees with Nottage’s point of view. Of course 
States have concerns about future negotiations and partnerships, especially in the 
interdependent scenario that forms the current international society. Countries are increasing 
their partnership in many sectors of industries and trade. The flow of international 
investments and the transfer of technologies and knowledge are impressive. States need their 
international partners to improve their level of development. 
                                                                                                                                        
270 Nottage, 2010, p. 337. 
271 Id., p. 327. 
272 Id., p. 338. In the same line, Malacrida argues elsewhere that compliance with WTO rulings does not depend 
on the complainant. See Malacrida, 2008. 
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That is all true. And it is definitely true that the States want to – in most of the 
situations – keep their good reputation. Nevertheless, the massive inequalities of the members 
of multilateral trade system are astounding. It is not possible to dismiss the fact that these 
massive political, economic and social inequalities are taken in consideration by the violator 
in the decision to comply. 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO plays an important role in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trade exchanges. And the system is meant to 
work for all its Members. Even though statistics may indicate that the effectiveness of the 
system is not undermined by the member’s economic asymmetries that could be involved in a 
dispute, this is no reason to ignore the fact that the inequalities and the possible amount of 
loss (or not) of market access have a decisive character in a decision to comply with WTO 
rulings. Reputation and the aim to keep a cooperative behavior are both important in the final 
position of a government. 
Moreover, from comparing countries such as Antigua and the US confronting 
before the DSB, it is hardly impossible to avoid wondering that the insignificancy of 
Antigua’s market, economy and poor political influence in the international sphere are great 
incentives for the US not to comply with the WTO rulings. Paying the price of noncompliance 
may probably be a better deal for the US government.  
The arbitrator queried in the EC-Bananas III dispute on whether the inducement 
of compliance objective of the DSU “may ever be achieved where a great imbalance in the 
terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking 
suspension and the other party"273.  
Yet, and as Nottage himself states, “the arguments that the current WTO 
retaliation rules are skewed against developing countries have merit”274. Nonetheless, the 
arguments that even though the system is not shaped in a manner that could be more favorable 
to developing members is acceptable and its effectiveness to a large extent has to be 
recognized. The previously mentioned records of compliance, even when the complainant is a 
small economy comparing to the respondent, indicate that the system works. However, the 
DSU provisions deserve a careful review and claims to reform the DSU from developing 
countries shall be given attention, since they indicate where the system is defective and the 
                                            
273 WTO. WT/DS27 – Decision by the Arbitrators, 2000, para. 73. 
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options to further develop the retaliation procedure are needed. The propositions of reform are 
going to be addressed in section 3.5.2 of this chapter. 
 
3.4.2.2 Compliance and State Responsibility at the WTO 
 
The discussion about compliance or noncompliance with DSB recommendations 
and rulings and, therefore, with WTO law leads to a subject that according to the analysis in 
this study cannot be forgotten, namely: the responsibility of States. 
The WTO, as mentioned in the beginning of this study, refers to an international 
organization that was born and developed pursuant a treaty of International Public Law. The 
relations among WTO Members, the agreements signed, the negotiations agreed, the disputes 
settled, all that is secured by the general international law. 
The set of rules that constitute the current regime of countermeasures under 
international law states that the State injured by a breach of an international obligation – i.e. a 
wrongful act – may only take countermeasures against the defaulting State in order to induce 
the violator to comply with its international obligations. That is the understanding of Article 
49 (1) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Act: “An 
injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations”. 
The regime of countermeasures refers to the implementation of State 
responsibility in general, being virtually applicable to all wrongful acts and breach of 
international obligations. In that sense, Reuter has stressed that “[…] international 
responsibility relates to the breach of obligations and its general principles are the same, 
whatever the source of the obligation”275.  
The WTO law is a lex specialis under general international economic law, which 
is a branch of general international public law. Thus, WTO law is under the scope of 
international public law and its rules on countermeasures are understood to be part of the 
broader definition of countermeasures in international law. The creation of the WTO law and 
                                                                                                                                        
274 Id., p.325. 
275 Reuter, 1989, p. 193. 
 108 
its lex specialis did not suppress its provisions on countermeasures from international public 
law276. 
Thus, if the provisions of countermeasures of the WTO are indeed provisions of 
international law, the provisions on State responsibility are also applicable to breach of trade 
obligations under the multilateral trade system. And in conclusion, if a WTO member fails to 
comply or simply does not comply with a WTO ruling proceeding from the DSB and/or the 
Appellate Body, the provisions on State responsibility seem to be logically applicable. Indeed, 
Perez-Aznar states that: 
 
[…] trade countermeasures are one aspect of the game of unilateral acts of 
States that, before concretizing the GATT/WTO system, was an area 
regulated exclusively by general international law. The creation of the WTO 
implied a set of new rules concerning this type of countermeasures but this 
did not imply its total suppression from general international law277. 
  
 Most of DSU rules relating to the material aspects on countermeasures confirms 
and addresses the pre-existence of countermeasures rules of general international law. In the 
WTO law there are clear references to principles and provisions of international law, which 
corroborate this author’s, understanding that rules on State responsibility for international 
wrongful acts are applicable to WTO members when there is notable insistence in 
noncompliance with DSB decisions. 
 
3.5 Cross-Retaliation: an attractive option for developing countries 
 
As previously noted, it is in the area of compliance and implementation that most 
worries of the WTO members are (or should be) focused on. The traditional retaliation is an 
instrument that in reality is only efficient for powerful nations. For instance, the US and the 
EC can take full advantage of a suspension of trade concessions, but that is not the case for 
most of the WTO members. As a way of solution, cross-retaliation is becoming a popular 
weapon among developing countries. 
                                            
276 See Perez-Aznar, 2005, p. 35-36. 
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Initially, one should keep in mind that the often used terms retaliation and cross-
retaliation are not found in the text of the DSU. As aforementioned, the term retaliation refers 
to the suspension of trade concessions and obligations of the Article 22 of the DSU.  On the 
other hand, the term cross-retaliation refers to the possibility of retaliating a respondent under 
a trade agreement different from the one that has been originally claimed. This possibility is 
open pursuant Article 22:3 (c) of the DSU. 
Article 22:3 (a) states that the complainant should first seek suspension of trade 
concessions under the same sector as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a 
violation or other nullification or impairment. If that is not found effective or practicable, than 
two other options are available to the party: 
 
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to 
suspend concessions or other obligations  with respect to the 
same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other 
obligations in other sectors under the same agreement; 
 
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to 
suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to 
other sectors under the same agreement, and that the 
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend 
concessions or other obligations under another covered 
agreement (…)278. 
 
With the exception of larger economies in developing countries like Brazil, India 
and China, most of the developing countries have small economies incapable of producing 
any impact on the economies of developed countries. Since the former are more likely to have 
an insignificant market share than the latter, the threat of retaliatory measures by developing 
countries does not cause any tension in the economies of powerful WTO members. 
It is not too farfetched to claim that the traditional retaliatory proceeding pursuant 
the DSU is counterproductive. Whether it is a small developing economy or a powerful one, 
the retaliatory system based on raising trade barriers by suspending concessions and other 
obligations deploys a negative way of solving disputes.  
Abbott explains that the theory behind the suspension of concessions is that, by 
authorizing them, private operators in the country of the respondent will exercise their 
                                            
278 Article 22:3, DSU (emphasis added by the author). 
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influence on the government to bring the trade inconsistent measures into conformity in order 
to avoid harm to themselves279.  
That is why the complainant has to think very carefully in a suspension strategy 
and seek target goods or services in the respondent’s domestic market which have strong 
political voice so as to maximize the pressure. At the same time the complaining must seek to 
target goods or services in areas that will not cause much harm to its own domestic market.  
Certainly, for most of the developing countries, the economic damage perchance 
caused to manufactures, services providers and consumers from raising trade barriers by 
suspending concessions will overcome the economy harm intended to bite the respondent 
member. In fact, as Hudec suggests, raising trade barriers for manufactures may increase the 
costs of inputs that may raise the final price of products destined to the domestic or to the 
international market280. The domestic market loses. 
Although the losses of a developed economy may not represent a big problem for 
the domestic economy, the situation is not the same for a developing economy which is 
struggling for a better position and a bigger market share with its partners. 
The idea of the suspension of concessions is to induce compliance (regardless of 
whether they are effective in induce compliance or not). If that is so, inducing compliance by 
retaliatory measures may be very difficult where there exists a great imbalance in terms of 
trade volume and economic power of the members involved in the dispute. Indeed, especially 
regarding primary goods and investment goods the suspension of concessions is likely to be 
very counterproductive because of the increase of costs for manufactures and the consequent 
probable loss of competitiveness281. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the idea of inducing compliance, cross-retaliation is 
referred to as an option for smaller developing countries to retaliate in a more effective way. 
For example, not paying patent royalties for a patent holder from the respondent member 
may, on the one hand, increase the welfare in the complainant market and on the other employ 
heavy political pressure in the violating country282. 
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Normally retaliation will take place relating to the same sector and same 
agreement at issue in the dispute. Nevertheless, whenever a member considers that it is not 
effective or practicable to apply suspension of trade concessions under the same WTO 
agreement, the member can ask for cross-retaliation pursuant Article 22:3 (c). 
By effective and according to the Oxford Dictionary it means “successful in 
producing a desired or intended result” 283. The effectiveness should be understood as powerful 
in effect, achieving the result desired. On the other hand, practicable means “able to be done 
or put into practice successfully”284.  It implies the verification of the practicability of the 
suspension of concessions in a determined sector in real practice, considering all the 
conditions of the complainant and the respondent’s market. 
The verified intentions of cross-retaliation normally include suspensions on trade 
concessions under the GATS or TRIPS, the two new value areas introduced as consequence 
of the Uruguay Round negotiations. As this research has its focus on cross-retaliation 
regarding intellectual property rights, cross-retaliation on services will appear in the 
discussion as a reflection of the main subject only.  
Indeed, cross-retaliation under GATS does not seem as promising as cross-
retaliation under TRIPS Agreement obligations. Suspension on services has been authorized 
only one time – in the EC-Bananas case. One reason for that is the fact that developing 
countries are largely dependent upon service suppliers from developed countries. 
On a study on cross-retaliation under GATS supported by the International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Appleton affirms that cross-retaliation in 
services will not be sufficient to persuade a respondent to bring its inconsistent trade measure 
into conformity. The author believes that when developing members suspend GATS 
concessions and other obligations they will undoubtedly suffer. On the other hand, when the 
suspension of concessions is made under TRIPS, the developed world is more likely to 
suffer285. 
Notice that cross-retaliation is applied in a MFN basis, which means it is directed 
only to the member losing the dispute. The major obstacles of cross-retaliation are technical 
                                            
283 Effective according to the Oxford Dictionary means “successful in producing a desired or intended result”. 
repeated 
284 Ibid. 
285 See Appleton, 2009, p. 33-34. 
 112 
issues of implementation in the domestic market. Although this research will encompass the 
three cases in which cross-retaliation was approved, the mechanism was not put in practice till 
date. From the documents it is possible to imagine the technical challenges for the domestic 
market, but it is hard to estimate the real difficulties. 
Also, cross-retaliation is a purely political mechanism of pressure to induce 
compliance. That is, indeed, another challenge for developing complainant members, as they 
have to fight against the heavy pressure of powerful private sectors. In the specific case of 
intellectual property (IP) rights, the IP-dependent industries can make a big noise in the 
media, for example, and accuse the complainant suspending countries of pirate violation 
international IP rights. 
Article 22:3 (c) DSU also mentions that the circumstances should be serious 
enough to justify a cross-retaliation. The complainant must clarify to the WTO the reasons 
why a cross-retaliation is being asked showing the serious circumstances involved. For that 
matter, Article 22:3 (d) DSU specifies that the party shall take into account i) the trade in the 
sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation 
or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party” and ii) 
“the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader 
economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations”. 
Yet, Article 22:4 of the DSU reinforces the necessity of equivalence of the level 
of retaliation, which was previously mentioned in this research endeavor, in the section 
dedicated to the suspension of concessions. This could be a terrain of quicksand to the 
arbitrators. 
As there is no definition of what an equivalent measure shall take into account, 
arbitrators should make their own choices on how to access proportionality286. In any case, the 
first step to determine equivalence is to look at and calculate the harm that will be caused by 
cross-retaliation taking into account the level of nullification and impairment considered in 
the dispute, which is a very complex process as will be shown in the analysis of US-Gambling 
case, in the next chapter. 
Cross-retaliation is a proceeding positioned as an exception, a secondary option if 
traditional retaliation is proved by the complaining member to be impracticable or ineffective 
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in a certain dispute. Notwithstanding, in what concerns developing countries, cross-retaliation 
has been presented as a more effective remedy. Especially cross-retaliation under TRIPS is 
likely to impose the pressure in the right place, where it may cause more harm to the IP-
dependent industries from rich developed countries. 
 
3.5.1 Cross-Retaliation as a development vehicle to WTO members 
 
As state by the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, there are crucial links 
between trade and development287. That explains why the WTO has been working hard in the 
Development Agenda of 2001. The main purpose of the Agenda is to address the needs of 
developing countries – which totalize two thirds of the WTO membership. Indeed, the current 
Doha Round was launched specifically to work with development issues in connection with 
multilateral trade issues under the WTO.  
Regarding the dispute settlement system, according to the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, members agreed to negotiate on improvement and clarifications of the DSU. In 
the light of the Development Agenda, the negotiations should be grounded on the work done 
so far and any additional proposals by Members are welcome. 
 According to the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, the relations under the 
WTO shall basically:  
 
- be conducted with a view to raising standards of living for its 
members; 
- ensure full employment as well as a great and steadily growing 
volume of income and demand; 
- allow the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development and; 
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Trade and Development on 28 November 2005. Available online at: 
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- seek to protect and preserve the environment as well as enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development288. 
  
It is remarkable that the establishment of the WTO has contributed significantly to 
global economic growth, to overall development and the increase of employment since its 
creation. Unquestionably international trade can play a major role in the promotion of 
economic development. All members shall benefit from the opportunities that come along 
with trade liberalization and from join welfare gains generated by the multilateral trading 
system.  
In what concerns the mechanism of cross-retaliation, it is accepted that 
suspending concessions and other obligations on TRIPS Agreement shall benefit a certain 
level of development and increase of social welfare. For instance, suspending pharmaceutical 
patents can allow the production of generic medicines in a considerable lower price while a 
suspension of copyrights could allow free reproduction of DVDs. Also, the cross-retaliation in 
TRIPS, if well planned and executed, can contribute to innovation increase in the suspending 
country, by the display of information that would therefore be copied to the benefit of 
country’s industries. 
The WTO has the commitment of deploying positive efforts to ensure that 
developing members participate in the growth of world trade securing and addressing their 
needs of economic development. That is translated into enhanced market access, more 
balanced rules and sustainably financed capacity-building programmes. These elements shall 
be continuously promoted following the increase of world exchanges. 
 
3.5.2 Feasibility of proposals to reform the DSU on behalf of developing countries 
 
Stimulated by the discussions launched in the Doha Development Round in 2001, 
several developing countries started working on propositions with suggestions to the 
improvement and or amendment of the DSU text. The most famous proposal is the one 
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delivered by Mexico, which focuses mostly on the problem of retaliation as being only a 
prospective remedy. 
As previously addressed in section 3.3.1, in actual practice and following the 
current provisions of the DSU, members only get compensation or exercise their right to 
suspend concessions prospectively. This situation can seriously affect trade in many cases.  
WTO litigation takes long – usually more than one year -, and during the period there is no 
possibility for member States or private sectors to seek compliance or remedies289. 
In that regard, Mexico submitted a proposal on October 31, 2002 - TN/DS/W/23 - 
with some interesting claims. First, Mexico suggested the introduction of mechanisms within 
the system of dispute settlement, at an early stage of the panel, allowing the calculation of the 
level of impairment or nullification suffered by the complaining Member290. 
Currently, the DSU system makes the decision to judge the level of nullification 
or impairment after the reasonable period for the implementation of the decision expires, and 
in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU, presumably after termination of all procedures in 
Article 21.5. 
In the view of Mexico, this action would create incentives for prompt compliance 
of the decision or recommendation, to promote and facilitate the negotiations, as members 
would be aware of the amount of nullification or losses considered, reducing the time during 
which the measure declared inconsistent remains without consequences. 
Moreover, in an attempt to discourage members to keep up with measures 
declared inconsistent with the covered agreements, Mexico proposed the possible retroactive 
determination of damages suffered by the complaining Member. 
The advantages shown by Mexico in this regard would be: (i) a more equitable 
distribution of benefits, or to ensure that the balance of rights and concessions obtained in the 
Uruguay Round were fully respected -since the claimant would be entitled to recover 
compensation and negotiate all the losses that were incurred by the measure declared 
inconsistent, or to suspend benefits in an amount equal to such losses; (ii) to gain time, as the 
                                            
289 See Plasai, 2007, p. 6. The author also addresses the exception of Article 4.6 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. The Article indicates that when the measure at issue is found to be a prohibited 
subsidy, the panel must recommend that the subsidizing member withdraws the subsidy without delay. Ibid. 
290 WTO, TN/DS/W/23. 
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defending member would not have incentives to artificially delay the process and (iii) to 
facilitate the negotiations by eliminating the incentives to prolong the proceedings. 
Their worries are reflected not only in documents and proposals by Members, but 
also in several working papers and books as shown during this research endeavor. For 
example, parallel to the proposal made by Mexico to the reform of the DSU, the African 
group corroborates the position of Mexico.  
The countries agree with a retroactivity effect of retaliation, which should start to 
be accounted for from the date of imposition of the violating measure regarding the 
calculation of loss or damage caused by the measure declared inconsistent. The countries also 
suggest a monetary compensation especially to developing countries affected by illegal 
measures291. 
On the other hand, considering the issue of countermeasures, Ecuador292 and other 
the Least Developed Countries293 proposed the possibility of monetary compensation to 
developing countries for an unlimited period, if the responding party does not comply with 
the decision or recommendation within the reasonable period of time under the DSU. This 
proposal is quite interesting in the sense that the developed countries would be pressured to 
implement concrete decisions, and thus increase its power to pressure on the system. 
The African Group, Ecuador and the Least Developed Countries, along with 
Kenya294, Cuba, Honduras and other Members295 made the suggestion of collective retaliation. 
That proposal faced strong resistance from developed countries, and referred to the possibility 
to suspend concessions for more than one Member with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness 
of countermeasures. The proposal specifically addresses the disputes in which a developing 
country is allowed to retaliate against a developed one. 
As it is, a similar proposal had already been made in 1965, during GATT. The 
justification of the proposal is that small economies can form groups with similar or 
converging interests to improve their bargaining power during negotiations 296. 
                                            
291 WTO, TN/DS/W/15. 
292 WTO, TN/DS/W/9. 
293 WTO, TN/DS/W/33. 
294 WTO, TN/DS/W/42. 
295 WTO, TN/DS/W/19. 
296 See Hudec, 2002, p. 86. 
 117 
Finally, another proposal to give greater effectiveness to the system during the 
implementation phase and that could be used only when the plaintiff sued by a developing 
country and a developed country, is cross-retaliation, supported by Cuba, Honduras, India and 
some other members297. Note that even though cross-retaliation is accepted by the WTO when 
traditional retaliation in not practicable of effective, there is no specific provision in the DSU 
in this regard. 
Tackling retaliation and WTO remedy issues as a whole, Davey argues that there 
are several practical changes in this regard that offer hope for the improvement of WTO 
implementation system. According to the author, the WTO should incorporate: 
 
(i) The possibility of substituting fines or damages as a remedy in lieu of 
suspension of concessions; 
(ii) Some degree of retroactivity, so as to help encourage compliance 
within the reasonable period of time and; 
(iii) Some adjustment mechanism to increase the level of sanctions over 
time, so as to preclude non-compliance from becoming an acceptable status 
quo position298. 
 
Regarding the possibility of substituting fines or damages, it seems that it would 
be an interesting and feasible option. Most of all, the idea of this change is to tie the amount 
of fines or damages to the size of the member’s economy – or, put differently, to provide a 
sliding scale to diminish/minimize discrimination against small economies. Unquestionably, 
the system would have to be designed, according to Davey, in a way to avoid the possibility 
that powerful developed countries could effectively buy their way out of obligations within 
the multilateral trading system299. 
This idea is also supported by Matsuchita et.al., whom support that fines, in 
special, should play a center role. The authors understand that a system of fines could 
represent more incentive to induce compensation since the fines would increase over time and 
be based upon the size of the member’s economy300. 
                                            
297 WTO, TN/DS/W/47. 
298 Davey, 2009, p. 125-126. 
299 Id., p. 126. 
300 Matsuchita; Mavroidis; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 94. 
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The idea of introducing fines and/or damages to the dispute settlement system also 
encompasses the aforementioned suggestion of monetary compensation. Although it could be 
considered as a discrimination against developed members, the suggestion is that developing 
countries and small economies should be given the choice between suspension of concessions 
and receipt of a periodic monetary payment301. 
The system of prospective measures definitely does not help or encourage prompt 
compliance. That is the most critical flaw addressed by the Mexico proposal. Therefore, in 
order to minimize the problem and so as to stimulate prompt compliance with DSB/Appellate 
Body decisions, any remedy considered by the DSU should be calculated from the (i) date of 
establishment of the panel; (ii) date of adoption of the relevant report or, (iii) earlier date (e.g. 
date of the facts, if it is possible to define)302. 
The third suggestion addressed by Davey, considering the increase sanctions over 
time, also appears to be a feasible solution for improving the implementation system. The 
procedure of increasing sanctions would probably help to avoid the wrong perception that the 
payment of fines and/or damages is no more than an alternative to compliance303. 
Indeed, Matsuchita et.al. highlight the fact that compensation should be 
mandatory rather than voluntary. In that sense the authors argue that even though 
compensation as a practical matter cannot be forced – once it is conceded by the 
losing/respondent State -, it would probably become much more attractive to violators if other 
available sanctions are put into play304. 
Moreover, the same authors make a controversial but probably effective 
suggestion, i.e., to suspend a recalcitrant member’s right to participate into the WTO system. 
The idea is that the suspension could be gradual: (i) initially the suspension could take the 
form of denial of rights on certain committees and working parties; (ii) then it leads to greater 
denial of rights, it could lead to the suspension of the right to participate in WTO council 
meeting or to use the dispute settlement system305. 
                                            
301 See Davey, 2009, p. 126. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Matsuchita; Mavroidis; Schoenbaum, 2003, p. 94. 
305 Ibid. 
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From the discussion above, it is most likely that the introduction of retrospective 
remedies and the improvement and increase of DSU sanctions over time address the problems 
of timeliness and quality of implementation of the DSB/Appellate Body recommendations. 
The cost of noncompliance would increase. 
As stated in the very beginning of the present study, the WTO implementation 
phase is the most problematic part of the dispute settlement system. According to Article 3.3 
of the DSU, the purpose of the dispute settlement is to maintain a proper balance between the 
rights and obligations of WTO members306. However, the mechanism of retaliation appears to 
allow member’s behaviors that go against that purpose, since it allows the countries to buy out 
of their obligations by providing poor compensation or enduring the suspension of 
concessions and other obligations pursuant the DSU. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter aim to give an overview of the WTO dispute settlement system and 
the problems related to it relevant to the present study. Despite having constructed a legalized 
and quite successful framework to settle its disputes, the WTO has been facing problems, 
especially concerning compliance and implementation of its decisions and rulings.   
The problems involve not only the discussion of the binding effect of DSB 
recommendations and rulings but also, and perhaps more importantly, the economic 
asymmetry of WTO members. Asymmetries that can be translated into huge differences 
regarding GDP, market share, technological standards, innovations and political power play a 
key role considering dispute settlement issues. 
Problems relating to financial resources to improve the legal capacity of most 
developing countries to litigate are given especial attention in the chapter. Nevertheless, the 
worries are focused on the implementation phase of the DSU, notably when the dispute in the 
field has a developing country in the complainant seat and a developed wealthy economy in 
the respondent one. Although the WTO could be proud of the high level of compliance with 
                                            
306 Article 3.3, DSU: “The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by 
another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance 
between the rights and obligations of Members”. 
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its disputes, there are imperfections in the system, which has the power to cause huge losses 
of welfare to members. 
Also, the chapter intended to encompass the elements that incentive or 
disincentive compliance at the WTO. Implicitly, the chapter intended to tackle the celebrated 
high rate of compliance in the WTO and verify what underlies this rate and the reality of the 
facts. 
It dealt with definitions of compliance in general international law. As repeatedly 
mentioned in this dissertation, the multilateral trade system functions under international 
public law principles, and therefore there remains a strong connection between what happens 
in the WTO and the interpretations deriving from international law. 
Moreover, the chapter addressed the compliance at the WTO and whether 
compliance is an option available to members or whether it is an obligation that should be 
observed. Compliance with DSB recommendations is high. Nonetheless, there are intrinsic 
elements and situations that include a number of delayed compliance and non-fully 
compliance in that high rate. Still, close attention to shall be paid as every instance of 
noncompliance with WTO decisions is very problematic. 
Cross-retaliation seems to be an effective solution to some of the imperfections in 
the implementation system. Even though the approved cross-retaliation proceedings were not 
put into practice, and even though they are still considered secondary options to retaliate, 
cross-retaliation proceedings have been observed by WTO scholars and practitioners as 
effective tools for developing countries to induce compliance.  
Especially suspension on IP rights seems to be extremely interesting. It affects 
sensible and very powerful sectors of industries IP-dependent, mostly concentrated in 
developed countries. Whether this option of suspending IP rights is available and feasible to 
all developing countries it going to be further discussed in the next chapter. 
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4. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: cross-retaliation in TRIPS 
This chapter addresses the intellectual property rights and its suggested importance 
to the cross-retaliation mechanism. 
So as to discuss suspension on TRIPS obligations and its effectiveness as 
retaliatory weapon against developed countries, it is fundamental to understand and briefly 
analyze the intellectual property rights in general and their scope, in particular.  
Moreover, it is indispensable to study how the suspension of these rights works in 
terms of level of retaliation, proportionality and inconsistency issues addressed in the default 
dispute. 
Three cases are analyzed in detail for the purpose of this study, namely: the EC-
Bananas III, the US-Gambling and the US-Cotton. The rationale for selecting these cases is 
justified in that they are the only three disputes in the WTO where a cross-retaliation in IP 
rights was requested and approved. The specificities of the cases may shed light on the 
functioning and effectiveness of the suspension of concessions under TRIPS and whether this 
option is a solution to implementation problems in the WTO available to all developing 
members. 
The first section of the present study encompasses general issues of the TRIPS 
agreement. It will offer an overview on IP rights, discussing the typology and utility of each 
type of intellectual property right. This is important as it may select, on a preliminary basis, 
which types of rights might be available to promote a successful cross-retaliation. 
It is worth stressing that there is no intention to undergo a deep analysis regarding 
each intellectual property right. Instead, this chapter aims at providing a useful background 
and framework against which the research findings may be contrasted. 
The second section of this chapter elaborates on TRIPS as part of the WTO 
framework. It is intended to evaluate whether the suspension on TRIPS obligations is a 
feasible option. The calculation of the level of retaliation and the attention to the 
proportionality of the harm caused by the inconsistent measure will also be addressed in the 
second section. 
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The third section addresses the challenges and the costs of a retaliation procedure 
and the scope of cross-retaliation. Although cross-retaliation on intellectual property rights at 
the same time offer a more credible threat considering retaliation and raises opportunities for 
increasing the social welfare for the domestic market, it brings together some challenges and 
(high) costs for the suspending member.  
The fourth section discusses implementation issues related to suspension of 
concessions under TRIPS, focusing on economic feasibility and political issues. Then the fifth 
section complements the previous section, analyzing whether suspension of concessions under 
TRIPS addresses the basic issue of noncompliance at the WTO. 
Finally, the sixth section presents a review and discusses the three cases selected in 
context of TRIPS cross-retaliation. Although none of the cross-retaliation measures were put 
in practice, the cases selected provide detailed documents and represent a rich source of 
information for the upcoming conclusions. 
 
4.1 General Issues of the TRIPS Agreement and IP framework 
 
Intellectual property is a legal construct and as such refers to the protection of a 
creation of the mind. The types of creation can be allocated in different groups for which a 
different set of exclusive rights are recognized. Certainly the term property is used to imply 
the existence of rights related to intellectual products. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), intellectual 
property refers to inventions, literary and artistic works, as well as symbols, names, images, 
and designs used in commerce. Thus, in the broad sense, intellectual property is related to the 
protection of information, protection of intangibles assets. 
What makes an intellectual product somebody’s property in legal terms is the fact 
that no one can take or use it without the right holder permission. Indeed, the protection of 
intellectual property “is concerned with identifying and policing permissible and 
impermissible dealings with intellectual products, usually by reference to the consent of the 
right holder, at list in the first instance”307. 
                                            
307 Laurie; MacQueen; Waelde, 2008, p. 7. 
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Thus, intellectual property rights are legal rights that have the intention of 
safeguarding producers and creators of intellectual goods and services by granting them rights 
– with limited time – to control and profit from the use of those intellectual assets by other 
parties. 
By protecting intellectual property, the compromised interests of the private 
creator or producer are being safeguarded and, at the same time, others are being excluded 
from an unauthorized use and profit. Laurie et. al. divide the interests compromised by the 
protection of intellectual property in three categories: moral interests, social interests and 
economic interests308. In short, moral interests refer to personal interests of the creator who 
deployed labor, time and expenditure efforts in the intellectual product. Social interests are 
somewhat like a puzzle, since intellectual proportion protection can yield considerable social 
benefits, but also become a problem if protected too strongly. For instance, if a 
pharmaceutical company is given to a creator - with too much market control, it may interfere 
in the health competition of the market, which will, consequently, operate to the detriment of 
consumers’ welfare. Finally, the economic interests involved are not only the ones of the 
creator, but also the interests of competitors and customers. With the introduction of product 
protected by intellectual property, a monopoly309 is introduced and the overall balance of the 
market in that sector is affected, perhaps giving rise to a number of disputes in the affected 
areas. 
Concerning economic interests, it is important to bear in mind that every 
intellectual property right distorts competition and consequently distorts the market310. By 
granting a legal right upon an intellectual creation, a monopoly is created. Since it generates 
detriment to free competition, the justification relies on the positive purpose of the intellectual 
property rights. 
                                            
308 Id., p. 8-9. 
309 Monopoly is characterized by a lack of economic competition to produce a good or a service and it exists 
when a specific person or enterprise is the only supplier of a particular commodity. For more information see 
Friedman, 2002. 
310 For more information concerning competition law concerning intellectual property rights see Sanders, 1997. 
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As it is, intellectual property rights support and promote private interests at the 
same time as they incentive innovation by rewarding creators (see figure below)311. Also, IP 
rights contribute to the sum total of human knowledge.  
 
Figure 1. Source: Laurie, MacQueen, Waelde, 2008, p. 11. 
 
Reward and incentive can be understood as two symbiotic elements, since a 
reward can serve as an incentive and an incentive can be a reward. Regarding the intellectual 
property system, both elements are the core of the law and economics approach312. 
According to the WIPO, there are several compelling reasons to promote and 
protect intellectual property. First, the WIPO defends that the progress of the well-being of 
humanity relies on its capacity for new creations and productions in the areas of technology 
and culture. Second, in protecting the new creations, the intellectual property system is 
encouraging the expenditure of new resources, which in the end will lead to more innovation. 
Third, “the promotion and protection of intellectual property spurs economic growth, creates 
new jobs and industries, and enhances the quality and enjoyment of life”313. 
Therefore, it is common sense that intellectual property rights are a powerful tool 
for the economic development and the promotion of social welfare if an efficient, equitable 
and fair intellectual property system is established. In an ideal situation, intellectual property 
law may balance the interests of the inventor/innovator and the public interests.  
As stated by Sanders, the concerns for public interests and the development 
dimension are certainly key features in the search for balance of intellectual property rights 
                                            
311 It refers to rewarding the rewarding theory. To learn more about rewarding intellectual property theories, see 
Menell, 1999. 
312 See Landes and Posner, 2003. 
313 World Intellectual Property Organization, What is Intellectual Property? Published online at: 
<http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_450.pdf>. Last accessed on 30 Jul. 2011. 
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and the public domain314. In fact, there is a major trend studying the protection of intellectual 
property and its role as development promoter. 
Notably in developed nations the intellectual property system has presented great 
achievements. Among the reasons for the favorable results for developed economies, Correa 
points out some of them, which are relevant to this research endeavor315:  
 
- Technology has become a factor of growing importance in the 
international competition scenario. Not without reason, since the 
expenditures of industrialized countries have been steadily 
increasing since the 1970’s, with great participation in private 
sectors in research and development (R&D); 
- The elimination or reduction of trade barriers in developing 
countries facilitated the exports from the developed world to the 
developing economies. Together, it brought an increase in the 
pressure of multinational companies to get unrestricted access to 
those markets that made pressure also to freely exploit patents 
locally. 
 
Still, according to Correa, the legal framework that emerged regarding intellectual 
property rights universalizes standards of protection that are very suitable to developed 
economies. It is in the developed world where IP dependent industries are located, as it is in 
the wealthy countries where there is enough money to invest in research and development to 
support and provide incentive for the creation of intellectual assets. 
Normally the intellectual property rights are divided into two categories: (i) the 
group of industrial property, which includes patents for inventions, trademarks, industrial 
designs and geographical indications and; (ii) the group of copyright, which includes literary 
works – novels, poems, films, music - , artistic works, such as paintings, drawings, 
photographs and, a third category, the architectural designs.  
                                            
314 Sanders, 2005, p. 5. 
315 Correa, 2000, p. 3-4. 
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Since the intention of this research is not to exhaust all the intellectual property 
rights, the most important types are going to be briefly analyzed in the next section. 
Nevertheless, the rights selected to be described and explained will be discussed in the 
research paper because of their importance to the conclusions of this chapter concerning the 
utility of cross-retaliation for developing countries. 
A final comment is due before moving on with the intellectual property 
framework and concerns the characteristic of intellectual property to be inexhaustible. As an 
intangible subject matter, more than one person can possess or use the same intellectual asset 
without depriving any other of the same enjoyment. This makes intellectual property an 
inexhaustible resource316. 
 
• WIPO 
 
The World Intellectual Property Organization is a specialized agency within the 
system of the United Nations (UN). It was established by the WIPO Convention in 1967 with 
the intention to arrange a better understanding and cooperation among States and in order to 
encourage creative activity and promote protection of intellectual property through the 
world317. 
The last century was marked by an impressive increase in the adoption of 
conventions on IP. Indeed, intangible assets are the jewelry of the post-industrial era. The 
WIPO has an important role, as it is responsible for the administration of many of the 
conventions adopted (currently WIPO administers 24 treaties).  
In fact, WIPO also administers two of the most important intellectual property 
conventions which will be given some attention in the present study - the Paris Convention for 
Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. 
In general term we can say that among the main objectives of WIPO are the 
harmonization of national intellectual property legislation, the provision of services for 
                                            
316 See Dratler, 1991, p. 1-3. 
317 The Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization is published online at: 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/convention/pdf/trtdocs_wo029.pdf>.  
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international applications for industrial property and legal and technical assistance to 
developing countries as well as the facilitation of the resolution of private intellectual property 
disputes through its Arbitration and Mediation Center318. 
 It is worth mentioning that WIPO has a Development Agenda that aims to 
undermine the existing gap regarding wealthy and poor nations319. The Organization currently 
has 184 members, representing considerable differences in what concerns intellectual property 
protection and its use.  
The Development Agenda for WIPO was adopted in October 2007, and among its 
45 recommendations the following are highlighted: (i) technical assistance and capacity 
building shall be develop-oriented taking into account the priorities and the special needs of 
developing countries, especially least developed countries; (ii) assistance to member States 
“to strengthen national capacity for protection of domestic creations, innovations and 
inventions and to support development of national scientific and technological infrastructure”; 
(iii) encouragement of “member States, especially developed countries, to urge their research 
and scientific institutions to enhance cooperation and exchange with research and 
development institutions in developing countries, especially LDCs” and; (iv) assistance to 
member States “to develop and improve national intellectual property institutional capacity 
through further development of infrastructure and other facilities with a view to making 
national intellectual property institutions more efficient and promote fair balance between 
intellectual property protection and the public interest”320. 
The WIPO and the WTO work in close collaboration with each other. Both 
Organizations signed an Agreement for mutual supportive relationship between them, so as to 
establish appropriate arrangements for cooperation321.   
Therefore, under the Agreement, WIPO provides technical assistance to the 
developing country members of the WTO. By offering expertise in the area of intellectual 
property law, WIPO closely monitors and works to ensure a successful implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
                                            
318 Note that WIPO has a dispute resolution system to settle disputes regarding only domain names. 
319 The 45 Recommendations for the Development Agenda are published online at: <http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.html>. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization available 
at: < http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/trtdocs_wo030.html>.  
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• Paris Convention 
 
Signed in 1883, the Paris Convention was the first endeavor to multilaterally 
protect industrial property and it is still the most important convention on the subject322. That 
is so true that until very recently all the agreements related to industrial property were written 
in French. 
The Convention provides minimum protection standards for industrial intellectual 
property rights. According to Article 1.2, the Convention protects patents, trademarks, trade 
names, industrial designs, appellations of origin, and utility models.  
Article 2 defines one of the key principles of the convention –also present in the 
GATT 1947- , the national treatment. Guided by this principle, discrimination of nationals of 
Member states to the Conventions regarding the protection of industrial property offered 
domestically is not allowed323.   
By receiving a national treatment, foreigners were provided with a protection with 
domestic standard without prejudice to each nation’s sovereign right to determine the content 
of law324. The great benefit is that the foreign right-holder will always be as protected as the 
national right-holder. 
The other key provision of the agreement is the right of priority, with especial 
importance to the rights regarding patents. Article 4.1 of the Convention states that: 
 
Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, or for the 
registration of a utility model, or of an industrial design, or of a trademark, in 
one of the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the 
                                            
322 In fact, the motivation for the creation of a system of protection for industrial property came when in 1873 
foreign exhibitors refused to attend the International Exhibition of Inventions in Vienna as they feared that 
their inventions or ideas would be copied. Then, the International Congress on Industrial Property  of 1878 
established a framework for industrial property in response to the pleas of exhibitors. The result is the Paris 
Convention in 1883. 
323 Article 2.1 of the Paris Convention states that: “Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the 
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their 
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially 
provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same 
legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed 
upon nationals are complied with.” Paris Convention is available online at: < 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html#P77_5133>.  
324 See Claessens, 2009, p. 24-26.  
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purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods 
hereinafter fixed325. 
 
The right of priority status is attributed when corresponding applications – 
whether related to patens, designs or trademarks – have already been filled in another member 
country convention within the preceding six months. What the system does is to give some 
time for the registrant to file multiple applications simultaneously in other member countries 
of the Paris Convention. 
The Paris Convention together with the Berne Convention that will be addressed 
in the next sections, controlled the intellectual property scenario for almost a century.  
 
• Berne Convention  
 
Following the flow concerning the protection of intellectual property, the Berne 
Convention was signed three years after the Paris Convention, in 1886. The Berne Convention 
was adopted with the aim of protecting, “in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the 
rights of authors in their literary and artistic works”326. 
The Berne Convention constitutes a union for the protection of rights of authors in 
the field of literary and artistic works. It is the oldest international treaty concerned with 
copyrights. 
As the Paris Convention, the Berne treaty also has the national treatment as one of 
the corner stones of the system of protection established by it, so that: “Authors shall enjoy, in 
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union 
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may 
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.327. 
Together with the national treatment, the Berne Convention establishes two other especial 
principles. 
                                            
325 Article 4.1, Paris Convention. 
326 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is available online at: < 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html>.  
327 Article 5.1, of the Berne Convention: . 
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The Convention grants what it known as independence of protection, according to 
which the rights granted under this Convention shall not be subject to any formality for their 
enjoyment and exercise. That means that the enjoyment and exercise of the rights shall be 
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work328.  
A third singular principle brought by the Berne Convention is the automatic 
protection329. According to this principle, protection to authors’ right is granted automatically 
and it is not subject to registration or any similar procedure. The first publication shall be 
automatically recognized by all members of the Convention, meaning that national treatment 
shall not be dependent on any formality. 
In the explanation regarding the intellectual property rights below, other 
conventions on intellectual property protection will be addressed. Nevertheless, only the Paris 
and the Berne Conventions were contemplated more prominently due to their importance in 
launching the process of building a multilateral intellectual property protection system. 
 
4.1.1 The TRIPS Agreement 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights is the 
most comprehensive agreement on IP, due to its coverage. Daniel Gervais refers to the 
agreement as “the most significant milestone in the development of intellectual property in the 
twentieth century”330. As an integrative instrument of the preceding existing conventions on IP 
rights, the agreement establishes minimum standards of intellectual property protection on: 
- Copyright and related right; 
- Trademarks; 
- Geographical Indications; 
- Industrial Designs; 
- Patens; 
- Integrated Circuits and; 
- Undisclosed Information (trade secrets). 
                                            
328 Article 5.2, Berne Convention. 
329 Article 5.1, Berne Convention. 
330 Gervais, 2003, p. 3. See also UNCTAD, 2003. 
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 The TRIPS Agreement was brought to the table of negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round by the industrialized nations; to a great extent led by the US. The objective 
was to universalize standards on intellectual property rights protection, already incorporated 
in the legislation of industrialized countries, since at that moment they had acquired a high 
level of technological and industrial capacity.   
The argument of developed countries was that the traditional international legal 
framework concerning intellectual property rights (IPRs) was not properly adjusted to the 
changing needs of the intellectual property community. Also, industrialized countries argued 
that technological developments such as the advance of the information society facilitated and 
cooperated with the rapid copying and dissemination of material around the world, which 
demanded and required new forms of IPR protection331. 
The basic proposal from the part of developed countries was that they would 
liberalize trade in goods but in return all the countries had to recognize basic standards on 
intellectual property protection (including the Paris and Berne Convention, and further 
conventions on IP).  
Correa states that developing countries negotiated increased standards of 
protection of intellectual property rights against their will332. They acquiesced in making 
important concessions in terms of reforms of their intellectual property legislation, 
encouraged by the inclusion of policies to stimulate technology transfer, access to new 
technologies and pharmaceuticals and market access to their products. Notwithstanding, 
Correa points out that the developing countries did not obtain any compensating concession 
from industrialized countries333. 
Also note that since GATT and until today most developing countries - due to 
their limited resources for investments in research and development (R&D) and their lack of 
technological capacity - can only profit (to a limited extent) so much from an extensive 
intellectual property framework.  
Even though the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement states that it was established 
with the desire to reduce distortions on trade and impediments to it, the one-fits-all model of 
                                            
331 See Claessens, 2009, p. 45. The author also points out that the attempts to update the Paris and Berne 
Conventions and to improved enforcement mechanisms had failed over the years. Ibid. 
332 Correa, 2000, p. 3 
333 Ibid. 
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the agreement makes the situation considerably difficult for developing countries and LDCs. 
Moreover, the preamble highlights the need to promote effective and adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights and the necessity to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce IPRs do not become barriers to legitimate trade334. Although the standards of 
protection may not establish barriers to trade, they surely contribute to the gap between 
develop and developing countries, as the latter do not have the same level of technological 
advance, knowledge and economic conditions to invest in their own intellectual wealth. 
The standards of protection set forth in the TRIPS Agreement relate both to the 
availability of rights as well as to their enforcement335. That means that WTO members cannot 
establish levels of intellectual property protection lower than the one provide by the TRIPS 
Agreement concerning the IPRs coverage.  
WTO members were obliged to implement “baseline standards and minimum 
enforcement obligations in their respective national legal systems”336. The IPRs framework 
that emerged with TRIPS universalized standards of protection for certain sectors of 
industries that were sensitive for developed countries. 
Yet, although TRIPS is flexible in what concerns to the national level of 
protection, the Agreement limits the options that could be available for developing countries 
and – as a one fits all model – ignores the profound economic and technological asymmetries 
among members. 
Thus, the TRIPS Agreement was since the beginning much more favorable to 
developed economies (mainly the US, the EC and Japan) which had a prosper development 
since the GATT regarding intangible goods and services protected by intellectual property. 
Nevertheless, since 1999 – when Ecuador surprisingly proposed a cross-retaliation on IP 
rights – the scenario has changed. Suspending obligation under TRIPS and threatening to 
attack a very sensible sector of IP dependent-industries of developed economies turned out to 
be a great weapon in the dispute settlement system. 
Several considerations can be made regarding the use of suspending TRIPS 
obligation in a cross-retaliation procedure – always considering a developing member in the 
                                            
334 See TRIPS Agreement. 
335 See Correa, 2000, p. 2. The obligations referring to the implementation of the standards set out by TRIPS 
were phased over various transitional periods depending upon the level of development of the WTO member 
concerned.  
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complainant seat and a developed member as the respondent. Further on in this chapter an 
attempt to encompass all or at least the most important issues and concerns in this mechanism 
will be made. For now, it seems that cross-retaliating on IP rights do increase the harm for the 
retaliated member and, at the same time, results in an increase of welfare in the complainant 
developing member.  
 
4.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights  
 
An introduction to the typology of intellectual property rights is pertinent to this 
study, since each type of IP right has its peculiarities. The different characteristics influence 
the feasibility and effectiveness - or not - of applying cross-retaliation affecting one or other 
intellectual property right protection. 
The diverse IP rights are going to be briefly detailed in this section with the aim of 
building the necessary ground for a deeper discussion on the suspension of TRIPS 
obligations. In fact, during the explanation of each intellectual property right category, a 
preliminary reflection on its suspension under TRIPS will be offered. 
Broadly spread as an alternative for developing countries to induce first 
compliance and then re-balance trade conditions, this research raises some concerns about the 
effectiveness of the cross-retaliation on IP rights regarding developing members. 
Therefore, some of the IP rights seem to be particularly more interesting than 
others considering the possibility of cross-retaliation. Due to the fact that cross-retaliation is 
meant to be a temporary measure, the IP rights chosen for the purpose of cross-retaliation 
should be carefully studied in each dispute. Considering the specific situation and the 
peculiarities of each IP right, some are more feasible, practicable and effective than others to 
have their obligations suspended, depending on the impact caused in the specific situation as 
it is going to be further discussed in the following sections of this chapter. 
The categories of IP right that will be addressed below follow the structure of the 
TRIPS agreement. There may be different forms of dividing the categories of intellectual 
property rights, but so as to proceed straightforward to the main discussion aimed in this 
                                                                                                                                        
336 Abbott, 2009, p. 3. 
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chapter, the division proposed was considered to be appropriate. Also, greater emphasis is 
placed on trademarks, patents and copyrights, since they seem to be – at least for the sake of 
this research – much more interesting regarding the different possibilities for cross-retaliation. 
 
• Trademarks  
 
Trademarks are a type of industrial property that refers to signs or symbols that 
indicate an origin. They enable the public to distinguish between goods and services from 
different sources, playing a key role in a market economy as it is valuable to the consumer 
and to the owner of the brand. 
With trademarks, consumers can select products on the market and, by selecting, 
they can give the owner of the brand a feedback and an incentive to produce high-quality 
goods – considering, of course, that the consumer is primary interested in the quality of the 
product when he chooses a certain brand337.  Indeed, the quality of the goods or services sold 
in connection with a mark (brand) is also an important function or reason for a trademark to 
be protected. 
Following the organization of Laurie et.al., a trademark has four basic functions: 
it is a badge of origin, an indication of quality, a means of advertising and an investment 
vehicle338. The first and second functions were briefly outlined before in this study. The third 
function – means of advertising – refers to the advertising of the goods or services sold by the 
trade in connection with a mark (to bring to the attention of the public a particular mark). T 
\he last functions pointed out by the authors refer to the time and money that is normally spent 
on building consumer awareness of a particular mark339. 
Thus trademarks aim to assure that consumers make the right choice. They create 
a diverse and competitive market where the consumers are willing to pay different prices 
depending on the diversity/quality of the product. Therefore, one of the basic functions of a 
trademark is to identify an origin and avoid confusion.  
                                            
337 See Tritton, 2008, p. 225. 
338 See Laurie; MacQueen; Waelde, 2008, p. 537-547. 
339 Ibid., p. 544. The authors also explain that the advertisement, quality and investment functions are commonly 
referred to as ‘communicative functions’ of a trademark. 
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Certainly we can infer that confusion leads to a situation where a consumer cannot 
make a rational choice340. In fact, the trademark framework is designed to prevent competitors 
from confusing consumers into thinking that they are acquiring goods and services from a 
trusted and original source when they are not341. If that is the case, the trademark law can be 
used to prevent the competitor who is confusing the consumer from doing so. 
Note that in order to avoid confusion, no registration of the trademark is 
necessary. The registration is not necessary to identify an origin of a trademark. Nevertheless, 
nowadays all the countries have a trade system and a registration system, which can work in a 
very particular way. For example, in some countries the grant of a trademark can be based 
only in the registration while in others the trademark may arise from the use in commerce. 
Still, some trademarks are currently registered even before they are used. 
Also note that the registration is territorial, but the trademark is not to the extent 
that the same mark can be used and recognized in multiple jurisdictions. Trademark can be 
recognized from the use in commerce and they are of a potentially indefinite duration, as 
pointed out by Abbott342.   
As they also indicate an origin, geographical indications, trade names and domain 
names are studied together with trademarks343. Nevertheless, special attention will be given 
only to geographical indications (later on in this section), since they are more pertinent to the 
current discussion. 
 
o Suspension on trademarks under TRIPS 
 
                                            
340 Rational choice involves rational evaluation, investigation of what the consumers is going to buy. It requires 
transparency of the product and perfect conditions to distinguish the original from the fake. More about 
rational choice can be read online in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: < 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/#5 >.  
341 The international framework for trademark is composed by: the TRIPS Agreement (WTO), Paris Convention, 
Berne Convention, Madrid Agreement, Madrid Protocol, Trademark Law Treaty, Singapore Treaty and Nice 
Classification.  Except for the TRIPS, all the other agreements are administered by WIPO.  
342 See Abbott, 2009, p. 27-28. 
343 Trade names and domain names can also be classified as a subset category of trademarks. Trade names are 
used under commercial purposes. According to Article 8 of the Paris Convention: “A trade name shall be 
protected in all the countries of the Union without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms 
part of a trademark”.  Domain names are the addresses of web sites that are intended to be easily identifiable 
(such aswto.org or wipo.int). A lot of disputes arises in the WIPO regarding domain names. As aforementioned, 
the Organization has a system of arbitration and mediation specialized for settlement domain names disputes. 
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Regarding the suspension on TRIPS obligations concerning trademarks, it may be 
quite problematic. As trademark law is designed to protect the consumer, the suspension on 
its rights may lead to a complicate situation in the domestic market of the retaliator.  
First, during the period of suspension on trademark obligations under TRIPS, the 
consumers who are used to the real trademark and its originality and quality may not wish to 
purchase products from another source, once they could be of inferior quality. By adopting 
this measure, the government may cause consumer dissatisfaction. Second, the reputation of a 
trademark in the domestic country may be suffering irreparable damage for a long-term, and 
this may also be undesirable for the economy of the developing country applying cross-
retaliation measures344. 
However, as noted by Abbott, a decision on whether to suspend a protection on a 
trademark may be influenced by whether and where the retaliating country already maintains 
a significant counterfeit market related to the specific trademark. If the WTO member already 
has a significant counterfeit market and if the consumers normally do not expect to purchase 
original goods, then the risk of harming the domestic economy is undermined. On the other 
hand, if that is the situation, larger multinational enterprises – which invest heavily in 
advertising their own trademarks – may pressure the government of the respondent member to 
comply with the decision adopted by the WTO345. 
The preliminary conclusion is that, if the circumstances are the ones above 
indicated suspending trademarks as cross-retaliation mechanism could be a significant 
weapon of pressure to induce compliance. Notwithstanding, one last consideration shall be 
made in what follows.  
Abbott calls the attention to the fact that although suspension on trademarks is a 
possible option for cross-retaliation, it may face problems regarding foreign trade actions. A 
suspension of a trademark within a national territory will not suspend the same protection in 
other national territories - as trademarks are granted in a country-to-country basis. So if 
products produced under a suspension of trademark protection are exported, it may result in 
                                            
344 Ibid. 
345 Abbott, 2009, p. 28. 
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other problems to the retaliating country, as it would also affect the level of suspension of 
trademarks obligations346. 
 
• Geographical Indications 
 
Geographical indications (GI) also refer to a name or a sign that indicates the 
geographical location or origin of a certain product. Normally, due to the geographical origin, 
geographical indications are referred to as a certification of the qualities of the product, such 
as traditional methods and reputation. 
As Tritton states, originally, the geographical name was used only to indicate the 
precedence of the product – region or locality. As time went by, the GI helped customers in 
their purchasing choice347 for products, which were highly regarded by the consumers 
TRIPS gives a wide definition of GI referred to as indications for characterizing or 
identifying “a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin”348.  
The wide definition of geographical indications includes the appellation of origin. 
It means that the requirement of a link between the product reputation and the territory shall 
be higher349.  
With a rich history of local and especial agricultural production, geographical 
indications are particularly important to Europe350. With a great protection of its GIs, Europe 
protects its production methods, encourages its quality production and promotes a 
significantly rise of income for the region protected by a GI.  
                                            
346 Ibid. 
347 Tritton, 2008, p. 450. Note that geographical indications do not protect only agricultural products. For 
example: Murano glass produced in Venice and Waterford Crystal are protected with GI. See also O’Connor, 
2004, p. 18-19. 
348 Article 22.1, TRIPS. The TRIPS agreement discloses a separate article to rule on wines and spirits: Article 23, 
TRIPS. Beyond TRIPS, the significant international framework for GI includes; the Paris Convention, the 
Madrid Agreement on Indications of Source and the Madrid Agreement Concerning International Registration 
of Marks (1891) and the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin (1958). 
349 WIPO/GEO/BEI/07/15, p. 3. 
350 Some famous examples of Gis in Europe are: Roquefort cheese, Scotch whisky, Parmigiano Reggiano, Parma 
Ham and Champagne. 
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Not without reason the geographical indications are a central topic of discussion in 
the current Doha Round. Europe has been pushing for the enhancement of its protection, and 
at the same time has been more and more demanded on the topic in the DSB, and developing 
countries have been increasingly fighting to protect their own GI. 
Like trademarks, suspending GI obligations under TRIPS seems to be 
counterproductive. First, the consumers may not be interested in purchasing a product with 
inferior or different quality if they appreciate the original product protected by the GI. 
Second, as a geographical indication is protected in a country- to -country basis (as is a 
trademark) and it is entirely dependent on national legislation, its protection can widely vary. 
However, due to the variety on the legislation protection, Abbott points out that it may be 
“possible that some potential destinations for exports would not protect a given GI so that 
there would be no specific legal impediment to exportation and importation”351. 
 
• Patents 
 
 According to the definition of the WIPO, a patent is an exclusive right granted for 
an invention. The invention can be a product or a process that normally provides a new 
technical solution for a problem or offers a new way of doing something352. 
Patent is a territorial right that gives the inventor a monopoly excluding others 
from commercially exploiting the invention. The logic of the patents is to provide incentives 
to innovation, by offering inventors recognition and economic reward for their creativity and 
work.  
Patent right gives the owner of the patent a limited period of protection, which is 
normally of 20 years counting from the filling date of the patent application353. The 
commercial exploitation of the invention works as a reward or an exchange to disclose to the 
public.  
                                            
351 Abbott, 2009, p. 29.  
352 WIPO. Information available at: <http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents_faq.html#protection>. The first 
patent system is considered to be the Venetian one, around 1450. See David, 1992. 
353 See Article 33, TRIPS. 
 139 
Thus, patent protection means that no one but the patent owner can commercially 
make, use, distribute or sell it. Everyone else who intends to do something commercially with 
the patent, needs the patent owner’s consent. During the period that the patent is granted, the 
patent owner is the only one who can evaluate and give permission or license for the use of 
his invention354.  
In return for patent protection, the patent owners are obliged to disclose 
information on their invention to the public in order to enrich the knowledge in the world. 
According to WIPO: 
 
Such an ever-increasing body of public knowledge promotes further 
creativity and innovation in others. In this way, patents provide not only 
protection for the owner but valuable information and inspiration for future 
generations of researchers and inventors355.  
  
The national patent office(s) and/or the regional office are the institutions 
responsible for granting (or refusing) the patent356. The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
provides, for the designated countries the filling of a single international patent application – 
which has the effect of a national application357. The inventor-applicant may file one 
application and request for protection in as many signatory states as wanted. 
For industrial property, the Paris Convention established a priority right for 
granting the right of protection. According to its Article 4.1, any person “who has duly filed 
an application for a patent […] in one of the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, 
shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the 
                                            
354 The owner may also sell the right to the invention to someone who will then become the new owner of the 
patent. 
355 WIPO. Available at: <http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/patents_faq.html#protection>. The significant 
international framework for the patens system includes beside the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention, 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 and the Patent Law Treaty 2000 (all administered by WIPO). 
356 For example, the national patent office in Brazil is the National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI). 
Information available online at: <http://www.inpi.gov.br/>. Regarding the regional offices, the most famous 
and busy regional office is the European Patent Office (EPO). Information available online at: < 
http://www.epo.org/>. Note that under a regional system, the applicant can request protection for the invention 
in one or more countries that are part of the system, and each country decides individually as to whether to 
offer patent protection within its borders. See WIPO. 
357 The Patent Cooperation Treaty is administered by WIPO and it is available online at: < 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm>.  
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periods hereinafter fixed”358. The period of priority for patens is of 12 months, counting from 
the filling date359. 
Regarding the inventions that can be protected, the WIPO explains that the 
invention shall fulfill the following conditions: must be of practical use, must show an 
element of novelty - that is, some new characteristic which is not known in the body of 
existing knowledge in its technical field (prior art) -, and must show an inventive step. 
Although there is no real evidence that the patens contribute to innovation and/or to economic 
activity, the inventor only gets a patent if it contributes to society. 
Once the protection ends, the patent expires and the owner does not hold the 
exclusive rights anymore and the previously protected invent enters the public domain for the 
exploitation by others.  
 
o Suspension on patents under TRIPS 
 
The suspension of patents under TRIPS seems to be a very attractive option and 
might take a variety of forms. Although patents are subject to exceptions that cannot be 
dismissed under the TRIPS Agreement – such as the compulsory license and the limit 
exceptions that may be adopted by national authorities360 -, the suspension of these obligations 
are interesting to developing countries. 
According to Abbott, suspension on patent obligations could be applied to a 
specific patent or category of patents or, instead, it could be applied across the entire range of 
patents that have been granted by the suspending country. Also, the author points out that one 
good advantage of this option for cross-retaliation is that the patent holder is supposed to have 
already disclosed a great part of the technical information about the invention in a way that 
will allow third parties to practice the invention361.  
The suspending country might choose to suspend certain categories of patents or 
some patents of the patent holder and not others. That can lead to a discussion on whether 
                                            
358 Article 4.1, Paris Convention. 
359 Article 4, c (1), Paris Convention. 
360 See Article 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
361 See Abbott, 2009, p. 25. 
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electing some patent rights to suspend and not others would configure discrimination under 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS. Nevertheless, the suspending country can argue and justify that 
before a suspension situation, different categories of patens should be treated differently.  
As trademarks, patents are granted in a country-to-country basis. This raises the 
same issue previously mentioned when reflecting about trademarks, since the suspension of 
the patent right in country A does not mean the suspension in country B. If the export of a 
product manufactured with suspension of patent rights is considered from country A to 
country B – where the product is still patented -, this situation may raise trade problems. 
Notwithstanding, Abbott states that “it is quite likely that for any invention 
placed on the market in a suspending country there will be a significant number of potential 
export destinations where parallel patents will not be in force”362. Indeed, the availability of 
export markets shall be taken into account regarding the level of suspension of concessions in 
cross-retaliation. 
As a temporary measure, since the countermeasures are intended to be temporary 
either in retaliation or cross-retaliation procedure, the suspending country must reconsider the 
establishment of a new scenario when the suspension is terminated. The reintroduction of the 
patent right to the patent holder shall need to consider issues like the exemption from 
infringement claims for activities during the period when the suspension was valid; the right 
to sell off the remaining products/inventories and the continued use of products protected by 
patents sold during the suspension period363. 
The process of suspending patent rights can also be considered in a manner 
equivalent to a compulsory license, but without the payment of compensation. Considering 
social welfare, Abbott considers that a country might primarily considerer issuing compulsory 
licenses for the importation of generic pharmaceutical products that could be substitutes for 
the – normally expensive – patented pharmaceutical products in the market364. Because of the 
commonly available information about price of volume of trade on patented products, 
governments shall be capable of inferring the savings that might come out from the 
suspension on patent rights in the pharmaceutical sector. 
                                            
362 Id., p. 26. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Abbott, 2009, p. 37. 
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Interesting to mention the US-Cotton case, in which Brazil threatened to suspend 
the transfer of royalty payments to US pharmaceutical industries like Pfizer in a cross-
retaliation action to the country’s illegal cotton subsidies.  
The case was largely publicized through the media once if the threat was 
concretized it would generate an immediate reaction from strong pharmaceutical industries of 
the US. As mentioned ahead in this dissertation, cross-retaliation under TRIPS holds a great 
potential of creating lobbies in the noncompliant country member to pressure the government 
for a solution of the problem. 
In the US-Cotton, if Brazil had go on with its decision of retaliating 
pharmaceutical patents, industries such as Pfizer would normally end up lobbying the 
politicians in favour of an effective solution to the problem. Brazil had a real threatening 
weapon in its hands365. 
 
• Copyrights and Related Rights 
 
Copyrights are the rights for the protection of authors, performers, producers and 
broadcasters. It protects the expressions of authors and artists, including the works involved in 
businesses such as writing computer programs. According to Smits and Verlinden, “copyright 
arises from the simple fact of exteriorizing a creation, being it a literary, artistic or other type 
of work”366. 
Primary protected by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, one of the main principles established by the contracting parties is that no 
formality is required in order to protect a copyright under the Convention. Article 5 (2) states 
of the Berne Convention that: 
 
                                            
365 Basso, 2005, p. 19. 
366 Smits; Verlinden, 2009, p, 157. Only for historical purposes, it is interesting to know that in most European 
countries the origins of the copyright law “lie in the efforts of government to regulate and control the output of 
printers once the technology of printing had been invented and become established in the 15th and 16th 
centuries. […] this meant much more rapid and widespread circulation of ideas and information”. In: Laurie; 
MacQueen; Waelde, 2008, p. 34. Therefore, the prime term of protection was for the person who was making 
the economic investment to transform the manuscript into a printed book, for example. See also Tritton, 2008. 
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(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, 
apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as 
well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall 
be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed367. 
 
It is interesting to note that the Berne Convention adopts the French approach in 
the treatment of copyrights. That means that it actually refers to the author’s right, a definition 
that is embedded within the spirit of the French Revolution of 1789: freedom, liberty and 
brotherhood. Thus, the author’s right was considered the right of the creator of the work, such 
as a natural right. That is the approach used, for example, in Brazil. 
On the other hand, the term copyright refers to the English system, which has an 
economic approach of the subject. The most recent WIPO treaties – including the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty - follow the English system, which delivers a broad comprehension of 
copyrights and in which are included the author’s right368. 
More than economic rights, the Berne Convention highlights the protection of 
moral rights. Article 6 of the Convention establishes the protection of moral rights, which 
subsist independently of the author’s economic right and even after the transfer of the 
economic rights. The author has always the right to claim authorship and to object to any 
distortion that could be prejudicial to his honor or reputation369. 
Still, it is in Article 6 it is guaranteed that even after the author’s death, his rights 
can be exercised – at least until the expiry of the economic rights - by person or institutions 
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed370. The TRIPS 
Agreement established the minimum standards of term protection like the following: the term 
                                            
367 Article 5 (2), Berne Convention. 
368 See Sterling, 2008. 
369 Article 6 (1), Berne Convention: “(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation”. 
370 Article 6 (2), Berne Convention: “(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be 
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, do not 
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may 
provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained”. 
 144 
of protection shall be no less than 50 years from the date of publication for works (from the 
end of calendar year of authorized publication), or, the author’s life plus 50 years371. 
 
o Suspension on copyrights under TRIPS 
 
Suspension of copyrights protection under TRIPS could take several different 
avenues. For instance, instead of excluding the rights, the suspension could attack the way of 
acting, the use of copyrights. Abbott gives the example in which a suspension of copyrights 
could authorize film DVDs reproduction, but prohibit their broadcast on television or their 
public showing in theaters372. 
Also, suspension of copyrights can be applied attacking the royalties.  A limitation 
on the distribution of royalties received from licensees of works protected by copyrights. That 
would not affect the right of the copyright holder of excluding others from its use, but would 
prejudice the licensees’ owners. The nullification or impairment could be determined by the 
level of royalties’ payments.  Actually in the dispute US- Copyright, that was exactly what 
arbitrators suggested in the recourse to arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU: 
 
4.40 In their calculation, the Arbitrators have attempted to estimate the 
amount of royalties that EC right holders received, prior to the entry into 
force of the 1998 Amendment, for the use of broadcast music from the types 
of establishments that were newly exempted by that Amendment.  For that 
purpose, we have used the historical data available to us regarding the 
receipts of the two biggest US CMOs to whom EC right holders have 
entrusted the licensing of their rights – ASCAP and BMI.  As we have noted 
before, both parties consider that the amount of royalties paid to EC right 
holders by the third US CMO, SESAC, is insignificant. 
4.41 Relying on this historical data means that our calculation takes into 
account the licensing income from those establishments that used broadcast 
music at that time and had acquired a license from ASCAP or BMI.  Our 
calculation does not include any hypothetical amount of royalties from those 
establishments that did play broadcast music but had not acquired a license 
from the CMOs in question. [...]373. 
 
                                            
371 See Article 12, TRIPS. Note that these are minimum standards of term of protection. For that reason, the 
mentioned period can be extended in some jurisdictions. 
372 See Abbott, 2009, p. 23. 
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Considering the digital environment, Abbott also raises the concern about the 
difficulty of controlling the spread of information (also confidential information) through 
digitalization, electronic reproduction and transmission. Indeed, the suspension of copyrights 
related to digital material may expose the work retransmission and/or reproduction 
worldwide, which could be truly difficult to control374.    
As patents, copyrights are also independent rights, granted in a country-to-country 
basis. That means that issues involving export of products that are produced in a suspension 
of copyrights obligations basis can be problematic.  
 
• Industrial Design 
 
According to WIPO definition, “an industrial design constitutes the ornamental or 
aesthetic aspect of an article. A design may consist of three-dimensional features, such as the 
shape or surface of an article, or of two-dimensional features, such as patterns, lines or 
colors”375. It could be explained as a combination of applied art and applied science, which is 
interested in studying function and form of the objects. 
Industrial design can be understood as a particular type of work that might have 
been protected only by copyright but to which has been given a special regime since the 19th 
century. The reason for the special regime was the concern with the end results of mass 
production, different from the individual creative efforts (the essence of copyrights)376.    
The basic form of design protection is registered in a public register maintained 
by national governments and depends upon the registration. The Berne Convention 
established minimum substantive protection regarding copyright law. Nevertheless, there is 
no similar international treaty for industrial design protection. Only the Paris Convention, in 
its Article 5, states that “industrial design shall be protected in countries of the Union”, but 
does not provide further details about how the protection might work377.  
                                                                                                                                        
373 WT/DS160/ARB25/1, p. 28. 
374 See Abbott, 2009, p. 23-25. 
375 See WIPO. Available online at: <http://www.wipo.int/hague/en/general/>. 
376 See Laurie; MacQueen; Waelde, 2008, p. 251-252. 
377 Id., p. 254-255. 
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In 1995, TRIPS Agreement established a minimum standard of protection of 10 
years for industrial designs. Article 26.1 states that the owner of a protected industrial design, 
when commercial purposes are undertaken, “shall have the right to prevent third parties not 
having the owner’s consent from making, selling or importing articles bearing or embodying a 
design which is a copy, or substantially a copy, of the protected design”378. 
Abbott interprets the suspension of industrial designs as a possible useful tool for 
inducing compliance with DSB/Appellate Body decisions. This author gives as an example 
the sector of textiles/clothing. In the domestic market, consumers could take advantage of 
similar or identical textile products, from the original producer, if the suspending country 
authorizes manufactures to produce copies of designs from the respondent member379. 
 
• Integrated Circuits 
 
Integrated circuits are electronic circuits used virtually in all electronic equipment 
today, such as cell phones and computers. The protection of integrated circuits is established 
by the Article 38 of the TRIPS Agreement of a minimum of 10 years380. 
The suspension of an integrated circuit protection might imply the importing, 
selling or distributing a protected layout-design (as referred by TRIPS) for commercial 
purposes. 
Considering that only countries with expertise, knowledge and available 
resources to invest in integrated technologies circuits, it appears to be complicated to believe 
that this would be a good opportunity for developing countries with cross-retaliation purposes. 
Also, it seems difficult to believe that right holders of integrated circuit in import 
markets would like to approve the importation of integrated circuits produced under a 
suspension of intellectual property rights in the exporting country381. 
 
                                            
378 Article 26.1, TRIPS. 
379 See Abbott, 2009, .p. 29. 
380 The TRIPS Agreement refers to integrated circuit as layout-design. 
381 See Abbott, 2009, p. 30. 
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• Undisclosed Information (trade secrets) 
 
Undisclosed information (trade secrets) refers to information that is not available 
to the general public – as the name suggest, it is a secret. Normally these pieces of 
information confer some sort of economic benefit to its holder because of their secret. 
According the US Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 90: 
 
§ 1839 the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, 
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or 
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in 
writing if—  
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and  
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by, the public382.  
 
If compared with patents for example, trade secrets are quite complicated to be an 
effective mechanism for suspension under TRIPS considering a cross-retaliation. Abbott calls 
attention to the fact that little immediate information would be available to third parties from 
the suspension of undisclosed information protection. While in patents all the relevant 
technology is disclosed in the patent application – becoming publicly available to third parties 
-, additional important informational of trade secrets could become public only if the right 
holder wishes so383. 
An additional problem pointed by the author regarding the calculation of the level 
of suspension is that it would have to take into account the continuing nature of the effect of 
disclosing a trade secret, since once disclosed there is no way to put back upon the 
termination of the suspension regime384. 
                                            
382 US Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 90, § 1839. Available online at: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/1839.html>. 
383 See Abbott, 2009, p. 30. 
384 Ibid. 
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For the sake of closing the present section, please find below a reproduction of a 
useful table presented by Paul Flignor and David Orozco in a paper for WIPO that 
summarizes the main topics discussed above: 
 
IP Regime Origin of Rights Prerequisites to 
Protection 
Scope of Protection Life Test for 
Infringement 
Trademark Adoption & use in 
commerce 
Used in commerce 
to identify and 
distinguish business, 
goods and services, 
Federal registration 
required for federal 
enforcement. 
Words, names, 
symbols, and other 
devices. 
Unlimited as long 
as property is used 
in commerce. 
Likelihood of 
confusion, mistake 
or deception. 
Patent Granted by Fed. 
Govt. on application 
by inventor 
New, useful, and 
non-obvious subject 
matter 
Useful process, 
machine, article of 
manufacture, or 
composition of 
matter 
17 years from date 
of grant or 20 
years from date of 
application 
Manufacture, use, 
sale, offer for sale in 
U.S., or import of 
claimed invention. 
Copyright Creation of original 
“works” of 
authorship, fixed in 
tangible form 
Originality, 
registration and 
copyright notice 
required if publicly 
enforced 
Works of authorship Variable on the 
order of 100 years 
or longer; life of 
author plus 70 
years. 
Copying, 
Performing, 
Distributing 
Trade Secret Investment of time 
and money, guarded 
from others 
Recognition of 
value and utility 
Confidential 
Information 
Life of 
confidentiality 
Means of 
Derivation 
 
Table V – IP Regimes385 
 
4.2 TRIPS as part of the WTO: cross-retaliation 
 
Since the cross-retaliation mechanism was brought to the dispute settlement 
scene by a request of Ecuador, suspension on TRIPS obligation has been calling the attention 
of WTO scholars and practitioners. 
Normally, the idea of cross-retaliation attacking intellectual property rights of 
developed countries– although never put in practice – is understood as a good alternative for 
developing countries in order to promote the apparent three main objectives of retaliation: to 
induce compliance, to re-balance the trade relation between WTO members involved and to 
                                            
385 Flignor; Orozco, 2006, p. 6 
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promote a credible threat to developed countries. Since the traditional retaliation on tariffs 
appears to be ineffective when the economic asymmetry of the countries places the 
developing members in a delicate situation, cross-retaliation by the suspension on TRIPS 
obligations seems to do a much better job. Indeed, authors have argued in the past and present 
decade that "retaliation in TRIPS can be genuinely welfare enhancing in a way that 
conventional retaliation… is not"386. 
The present study proposes the reflection on two issues at this point. The first is 
whether suspending intellectual property rights from developed countries really promotes an 
effective instrument in inducing compliance with a DSB decision. This will be discussed in 
the present chapter. The second issue is going to be the main subject of the fifth chapter as it 
regards whether the compliance of the cross-retaliation in intellectual property rights 
addresses the basic issue of (non) compliance with DSB decisions. 
When countries wish to retaliate in a way different from the traditional 
retaliation, therefore requesting the suspension of obligations under a different WTO 
agreement from the one where the inconsistency was reclaimed, the suspending members 
have to provide details for their request. Complaining members have to show why the 
retaliation through classic imposition of tariff duties is neither practical nor effective and, at 
the same time, explain why cross-retaliation – under TRIPS obligations in the case of this 
research – is more effective in inducing compliance and producing a gain of social welfare to 
the complaining member. As is going to be demonstrated in section 4.3.2, Antigua was quite 
successful in doing so. 
At a first glance, explaining the reasons for the request of a cross-retaliation 
procedure may seem like a simple procedure. It is not. Among the many challenges of 
applying and justifying cross-retaliation in TRIPS obligations is the calculation of the level of 
suspension, as it has to be equivalent and proportional to the level of nullification and 
impairment discussed in the dispute. 
It should be clear at this point that once the panel determines the level of 
impairment, and considering cross-retaliation in intellectual property rights, the panel cannot 
decide which IP rights shall be suspended or decide which rights will result in an equivalent 
                                            
386 Subramanian; Watal, 2000, p. 405. 
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and proportional loss. The panel shall only pay attention to whether the suspension is not 
exceeding the level of nullification or impairment387. 
Differently from the imposition of tariff duties on goods, suspension on TRIPS 
obligations presents some difficulties for its calculation, given the fact that it is not very 
obvious. It can be easy to picture the gains from suspension on payment of royalties on 
copyrights, for example, but the calculation cannot be that logical regarding suspension on 
other IP rights (as it was briefly showed in the previous section, and as it is going to be further 
discussed in section 4.2.1) 
Also, implementing suspension in intellectual property rights in national legal 
systems may prove to be complex. Most of the WTO members do not have a proper judicial 
mechanism in their domestic legal system to allow the implementation of result from a cross-
retaliation procedure in a simple way.  
Yet, beyond the challenges of valuing IP and implementation in the domestic 
legal system, there are other issues that should be taken into account regarding the feasibility 
or not of the intellectual property rights for developing countries are, such as: the costs 
involved in a cross-retaliation procedure, the violation (or not) of international treaties, and 
the required basic knowledge to take advantage of a suspension in the rights of an IP right.  
For the sake of organization, this section is going to be subdivided into two 
subsections. The first will deal with basic issues of calculation on the level of retaliation 
concerning IP rights. The second will discuss issues related to the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and national legal systems. 
 
4.2.1 Basic rationale to calculate the level of retaliation 
 
The calculation on the level of retaliation when suspending obligation under 
TRIPS is one of the most critical issues related to cross-retaliation. As stated before, the major 
“challenge in any IP cross-retaliation model is the uncertainty inherent in valuing intellectual 
property rights and determining an optimal royalty rate that represents the true value of loss to 
the IP owner”388. As the rights involved are intangible assets with economic and moral values, 
                                            
387 See Basheer, 2009, p. 32. 
388 Basheer, 2009, p. 45. 
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the calculation is not as straightforward as in a traditional retaliation with the imposition of 
tariff duties389. 
The valuation of intellectual property rights is in itself a very critical area in 
finance, as it cannot be defined or specified by physical parameters. The level of protection of 
intellectual property rights can derive its value from parameters such as market share, legal 
protection, level of profitability, barriers to enter the market, technology and industrial 
factors. 
The difficulty of assessing IP rights is reflected in the challenging job of 
calculating an equivalent and proportional level of retaliation when it comes to suspension on 
TRIPS obligations. As already addressed in this chapter, the complainant member that 
requires the right to proceed with cross-retaliation in TRIPS has to clearly show why that is 
necessary and how the retaliation is going to be calculated taking into account the level of 
nullification and impairment of the original inconsistent measure in dispute.  
Note that pursuant Article 22.7, the arbitrator “shall not examine the nature of the 
concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such 
suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment”. That means that the DSU 
does not elaborate upon specific categories of intellectual property rights to be suspended. 
Thus, the complaining member wishing and allowed to cross-retaliate in TRIPS has 
considerable flexibility on the subject390. 
Since this study does not aim at exploring economic variables the elements that 
are considered fundamental for the study and the rationale for the calculation will be 
addressed from a legal point of view, without addressing mathematic models or calculations. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
389 Note that regarding moral rights, it is really complicated to find a plausible outcome, since the moral rights – 
pursuant Article 6bis of the Berne Convention – were not incorporated by the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, 
an order to cross-retaliate cannot take into account moral rights of authors from the respondent member. For 
more specific information on valuation of intellectual property rights, see Kamiyama; Martinex; Sheehan, 
2006. 
390 See Abbott, 2009, p. 25. 
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• Equivalence 
 
 According to Article 22.4 of the DSU, the level of suspension of concession or 
other obligations shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. Paragraph 4.1 
of the decision by the arbitrators in the EC-Bananas III in defining equivalence stated that: 
 
We note that the ordinary meaning of the word "equivalence" is "equal in 
value, significance or meaning", "having the same effect", "having the same 
relative position or function", "corresponding to", "something equal in value 
or worth", also "something tantamount or virtually identical".  Obviously, 
this meaning connotes a correspondence, identity or balance between two 
related levels, i.e. between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on 
the one hand, and the level of the nullification or impairment, on the other391. 
 
 When the calculation of the level of suspension has to regard a traditional 
retaliation of imposition of tariff duties, it is easier to calculate the equivalence in cross-
retaliation on IP rights, although it is never an easy job. As suspension of intellectual property 
rights might involve a number of other variables and costs – such as the rights of the IP 
holder, customer confusion concerning suspension on trademarks or the interest of making an 
undisclosed information available for the public -, the calculation of equivalence has to take 
into account details that do not come to the game in traditional retaliation. 
Indeed, in the US-Gambling the panel acknowledged the difficulty of calculating 
the suspension of concessions under TRIPS stating that in fact the retaliation under TRIPS 
Agreement “may involve more complex means of implementation than, for example, the 
imposition of higher duties on goods, and that the exact assessment of the value of the rights 
affected by the suspension is also likely to be more complex”392.    
 Basheer comments that in a context such as music and sound recording copyrights 
it may be relatively easy to calculate the level of suspension, since there are data from social 
rates established by collecting societies for instance. Nevertheless, in the context of 
suspension of patents and trademarks for example, it may be difficult to (i) value the patent or 
trademark in question and (ii) determine the value of loss by the suspension and consequent 
                                            
391 WT/DS27/ARB, p. 8. 
392 WT/DS285/ARB, p. 77. 
 153 
use and enjoyment of the intellectual property right by the complaining member government 
or entity393. 
Based on the approach made by the arbitrators in the EC-Bananas III, the 
understanding was to calculate the level of nullification or impairment by making a 
comparison between the trade value in an actual WTO-inconsistent situation with the trade 
value expected under a WTO-consistent situation. Thus, the arbitrators require the level of 
suspension of concessions to be identical to the calculated level of nullification or 
impairment. In doing so, the analysis of the equivalence is exclusively quantitative394. 
Some concerns may be raised as to whether the equivalent countermeasures are 
effective enough in inducing compliance with DSB decisions. That is where the requirements 
of improvement to strengthen the countermeasures of the multilateral trading system reside395. 
 
• Proportionality 
 
Proportionality is a principle/requirement of international public law, well 
recognized by jurisprudence, doctrine and practice. Indeed, it is suggested that the principle of 
proportionality “is one of the more basic principles underlying the multilateral trading 
system”396. Article 51 of the text adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on its 
fifty-third session on the draft articles of State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts 
states that: “countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into 
account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question”397. 
According to the theory of State responsibility, the requirement of proportionality 
provides a measure of assurance that the countermeasure applied will not be excessive and 
disproportionate to the injury caused (which then could give rise to international 
responsibility of the State applying the countermeasure).  
                                            
393 See Basheer, 2009, p. 20. 
394 WT/DS27/ARB, p. 41-43. 
395 See Fukunaga, 2006, p. 419-420. 
396 Hilf, 2001, p. 120. 
397 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Part II), 2001, p. 30. See also Kelsen, 2003, p. 21. 
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From the reading of Article 51 of the text adopted by the ILC above, there are two 
elements that shall be considered while determining the proportionality of the 
countermeasure: (i) the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and (ii) the rights in 
question. This implies not only a quantitative approach of the proportionality of the act, but 
also a qualitative dimension. The strictest view is to assess proportionality only through a 
correspondence between the concessions suspended and the injurious consequences of the 
breach of a WTO obligation, therefore considering only a quantitative dimension398. 
As it is, the WTO law does not consider the “gravity of the wrongful act”. The 
countermeasures are defined according to the level of nullification or impairment (injury) 
suffered as a result of a breach of a multilateral trade obligation. Thus, the gravity of the 
injury will not determine the level of suspension of concessions. The first consequence of this 
is that even when a member simply decides not to comply with a DSB recommendation, 
currently there are no instruments to extend the members’ responsibility taking into account 
the gravity of the inconsistent measure. That signals to the fact that in the DSU there is no 
punitive dimension of its available measures for retaliation, although the aim is indeed to 
induce compliance399. 
In the case of the WTO cross-retaliation, suspension of concession is more likely 
to achieve proportionality if they are taken under the same agreement, referring to the same 
nature of injury related to the reclaimed inconsistent measure. That might not be as obvious 
regarding suspension on TRIPs obligations as a cross-retaliation measure.  
Article 46 of the TRIPS agreement makes an explicit reference to the 
proportionality requirement: “[…] the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the 
infringement and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken 
into account […]”400. By looking at the amount of collective duties and the reduction of trade 
flows, the complaining members requiring suspension of concessions under TRIPS shall be 
able to calculate and demonstrate with reasonable accuracy the level of the injury resulting 
from the inconsistent measures of the respondent401.  
                                            
398 See Fukunaga, 2006, p. 420. 
399 See Desmedt, 2001, p. 448. 
400 Article 46, TRIPS Agreement. 
401 See Abbott, 2009, p. 19. 
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 Calculating the level of nullification and impairment and connecting the 
calculation with the equivalence and proportionality required by the DSU is not an easy task 
for the complaining members asking for cross-retaliation in TRIPS. 
 
• Social Welfare  
 
Pursuant Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, the enforcement and protection of 
intellectual property rights should: 
 
[…] contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations402. 
 
The increase of social welfare is one of the main reasons to justify suspension of 
concessions under TRIPS obligations. Most of the knowledge-based/intellectual property-
based industries belong to the developed world. This is explained by the fact that wealthy 
countries are the ones that possess financial resources to invest in research and development 
of new technologies and overall new intellectual property assets.  
As most trademarks and patents, trade secrets are property of rightholders from 
developed members, the developing countries normally have to pay a high price to the rights 
holder in order to have access to products protected by IP law. In a cross-retaliation scenario, 
the clearest benefit to the consumers resides in not having to pay the price of a protection of 
an IP right.  
For example, if the retaliating country considers addressing public health 
concerns, the member could choose to suspend patent protection of pharmaceutical products 
that are used in the treatment of a significant public health issue. The calculation of the level 
of suspension in valuing IP rights should not be very difficult for the suspending country 
                                            
402 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement. 
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since the volume of pharmaceutical patent products on the market is normally available in 
databases403. 
Not only an increase of the domestic welfare can be detected, but also the 
suspension in TRIPS concessions appears to be a good mechanism to stimulate IP rights 
holder lobbies to pressure the government to comply with DSB recommendations. Although, 
as previously stated, it is not easy to calculate the social welfare that results from a cross-
retaliation in TRIPS, this is an important element to be considered by the complainant-
member seeking compliance. 
 
• Export Markets  
 
When calculating the level of suspension of concessions in cross-retaliation it is 
important to consider the availability of export markets to where the products produced under 
a suspension of intellectual property regime can be destined. A reason for this is that the value 
of intellectual property rights in the retaliating country is based on the total volume of sales 
that can be achieved by the right holder as a result of an exclusive position on the market404. 
In an assessment of the level of suspension in cross-retaliation by the arbitrator in 
charge of a DSB recommendation, he/she should take into account the possibility of parallel 
exports – which would reduce the market share of IP right holders in countries to where they 
export their protected products. 
Not by chance the panel noted, in the EC-Bananas III that an authorization of 
retaliation does not entitle other WTO members to derogate from their obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement. So the temporary authorization granted to suspend concessions in TRIPS 
was just for Ecuador, and is not extendable to other members in order to reduce their TRIPS 
obligations405. 
Nevertheless, an export to a non-WTO member could be possible, since the 
intellectual property right in question is not protected in the destined market. The protection 
                                            
403 See Abbott, 2009, p. 37. Abbott also addresses the subject of compulsory license, since it could be considered 
that if a public health concern exists, the suspending country could issue a compulsory license for the 
importation of generic pharmaceutical products – substitutes of the patented ones. 
404 Id., p. 24. 
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(or not) in the importing market is always a concern that deserves attention, as intellectual 
property rights are territorial and the suspension in one territory does not mean suspension in 
another. 
Thus, any profits resulting from the sales by manufactures/producers from the 
suspending member would be used to compute the losses of the intellectual property holders 
from the retaliated member – regardless of whether those IP holders have captured all the 
markets considered. Also, it does not matter the exact value of the intellectual property to the 
overall value of the goods (or services) that enjoy the suspended intellectual property right406. 
One concern that crosses the present discussion is related to the exhaustion 
doctrine in intellectual property rights. According to this concept, the exhaustion of IP rights 
is triggered once a right holder sells or markets a good protected by its intellectual property 
rights. After the right holder has sold, it cannot prohibit the subsequent resale of the product, 
as his IP rights over the referred good are exhausted by the first sale. 
 Carvalho states that, in respect of industrial property - i.e. patents, trademarks, 
industrial designs and geographical indications -, the right is exhausted by the first 
introduction into the commercial circuit of the product incorporating the claimed invention, or 
bearing the protective distinctive signs. That is, of course, considering the right holder was the 
one to make available the product into the market (or with its consent)407. 
There is an issue in WTO law – which complicates the complexity of an eventual 
suspension of concessions for national legal systems, namely whether the exhaustion is 
applied only with respect to goods placed on the domestic market of the suspending country 
or whether legal actions of a government may also establish the ground for international 
exhaustion408.  
                                                                                                                                        
405 See WT/DS27/ARB. 
406 See Basheer, 2009, p. 50-51. Concerning this subject, the author states that (relating to the US-Gambling 
dispute): “Antigua cannot be expected to micro-monitor the situation and track each possible instance of 
export to determine whether or not such exports are legal. It must therefore place the onus of legal compliance 
on the Antiguan entities that wish to use the suspended IP belonging to the defaulting state. If at all is a 
transgression in this regard, then the IP owner has a claim against the concerned operator and/or against the 
importer who brings such goods/service to another country and not against Antigua”. Id., p. 51. 
407 See Carvalho, 2010, p. 176-183. 
408 See Abbott, 2009, p. 24. Abbott states that “if an importing country follows the ‘lawfully placed on the 
market’ theory of exhaustion that does not require the consent of the IP holder, then a parallel IP right in an 
importing country would be exhausted under a suspension regime”. Ibid. 
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Thus this issue shall be addressed the question whether an importing country can 
rely on the doctrine of international exhaustion of IP rights to import goods produced under a 
regime of intellectual property suspension in the retaliating/exporting country. If that is 
considered possible, then, Ruse-Khan states that this would allow “any WTO member 
wishing to benefit from the suspension regime in the retaliating member to legalize the resale 
in its own territory of goods produced under suspension abroad”409. 
Should legal actions, such as compulsory licensing, by a retaliating government 
indeed establish the ground for international exhaustion in relation to the goods brought on 
the market, then a spread of the potential welfare effects of the action would be significant. 
Lower prices and increasing availability of products to all the countries adopting such 
understand should be verified. On the other hand, the profits of the tight holder would be 
significantly undermined do to the consequent reduce in the sales of the original products410. 
This section intended to shed some light over the main elements that shall be 
considered in a suspension of concessions under TRIPS Agreement context. With the short 
comments on the topics above it is possible to get the notion of how complicated a cross-
retaliation in TRIPS can be for the suspending member. It is the suspending member who has 
the burden of showing the calculations, the elements and IPRs that are going to be considered 
in an eventual cross-retaliation, and the way of doing so. Yet, in calculating the losses to 
intellectual property owners, not only the actual losses but also the potential ones may have to 
be accounted for411.  Needless to say that for most WTO Members, carrying out all the details 
of the procedure maybe closely to impossible, either for the lack of legal and administrative 
capacity, or the lack of knowledge or economic/financial means to do so. 
 
4.3 Scope of Cross-Retaliation 
 
It is important to analyze whether the cross-retaliation in TRIPS may clarify the 
challenges and costs that are involved in such suspension of concessions. Although 
                                            
409 Ruse-Khan, 2008a, p. 355.  
410 Ibid. The author highlights that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement “leaves freedom to opt for national, 
regional or international exhaustion, the main issue at stake is whether TRIPS places any limitations on the 
type of acts in the exporting country which then allow the importing country to qualify the imports as legal 
under the doctrine of international exhaustion”. Ibid. 
411 Subramanian; Watal, 2000, p. 407. 
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suspension of concessions in TRIPS obligations can open opportunities for local industries to 
take advantage of possible suspensions of IP rights, cross-retaliating in TRIPS can also trigger 
complicated challenges to the suspending member. 
It is true that, as argued before, retaliation in TRIPS can empower developing 
countries by giving them serious retaliatory strength which in turn can be genuinely welfare 
enhancing in a way that conventional retaliation is not412. Indeed, the suspension of 
intellectual property rights seems to be a surprisingly good opportunity for developing 
countries after the adoption of TRIPS compulsory standards. 
As previously mentioned, countries with weak innovation sectors in general did 
not support or did not like the idea of adopting TRIPS during the Uruguay Round. On the 
other hand, countries with economies highly dependent on innovation were great supporters 
of a stronger enforcement system for intellectual property rights. Actually, as Howse et. al. 
explain, from a trade perspective, it is still not clear whether all countries shall be required to 
maintain the same level of intellectual property protection. At the same time that, for example, 
patent protection constitutes a form of monopoly to incentive innovation, it may also entail 
consumer welfare losses and may discourage diffusion of technology through imitation and 
adaptation by competitors, which are also valuable economic activities according to these 
authors413. 
Therefore, it seems that continuous strength of IP protection increases the gap of 
the comparative advantage of developed countries, reducing the welfare of the developing 
ones. Although a global harmonization of IP protection facilitates trade negotiations in 
goods/services protected, a multilateral regime for the protection of intellectual property such 
as TRIPS should allow enough policy space to address the asymmetric reality of its 
members414.  
Taking this scenario into consideration, the suspension of trade concessions on 
TRIPS obligations is broadly understood as an effective and sound mechanism to take 
advantage of developed countries’ protected intellectual work and create positive welfare 
effects for the domestic market of the suspending developing country Member. 
                                            
412 Id., p. 405. 
413 Trebilcock; Howse, 2005, p. 397. 
414 See Trebilcock; Howse, 2005, p. 397-401 and Ruse-Kahn, 2008a, p. 338-339. 
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Nevertheless, there are some challenges and costs that shall be considered in a 
cross-retaliation request. The present section is intended to address some clear detected issues 
that might complicate the job of the suspending country. 
 
4.3.1 Implementation under national law 
 
To enact a retaliatory action the suspending country has to have available 
mechanisms in its domestic legal system to enable it. So as not to infer in an illegal action, the 
domestic legal system shall be prepared to deal with a suspension on intellectual property 
rights in such a way as to promote the required flexibility that a cross-retaliation in TRIPS 
demands. 
Unlike traditional retaliation in goods, cross-retaliation in TRIPS affects private 
rights. Indeed, intellectual property rights are private rights justiciable domestically in the 
domestic jurisdiction of the country granting them. As explained by Subramanian and Watal, 
once IPRs are conferred pursuant an act of a parliament in the domestic legislation their 
withdrawal can be challenged by the affected parties in the national courts as illegal or 
unconstitutional415.  
Therefore, in order to make a suspension of intellectual property rights really 
possible (and more credible), the suspending Member needs to have a domestic legislation 
that covers such situation and granting it legal effect. Indeed, as stated by Salles: “the easier it 
is to run a given sanctions regime, the better – especially taking into account the temporary 
nature of such regime”416. 
For that reason, the US has enacted a section to rule actions such as 
implementation of retaliatory measures in the domestic legislation. Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 authorizes the President to take any necessary and appropriate measure regarding 
                                            
415 Subramanian; Watal, 2000, p. 408. The authors also note that in most countries the act of raising a tariff can 
be done just through an act from the executive while private IPRs are granted pursuant legislation and cannot 
be easily withdrawn. Ibid. Also, Abbott adds that “holders from IPRs from the country against which 
retaliation is proposed may object to ‘discriminatory’ changes to domestic IP rules on constitutional grounds”. 
Abbott, 2009, p. 33. Moreover, Basso et. al. state that to some extent “the suppression of IPRs can be 
interpreted as an expropriation of rights and may thus generate problems vis-à-vis other international 
agreement”. Basso; Beas, 2005, p. 19. 
416 Salles, 2010, p. 301. 
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international trade agreements to remove practices, acts or policies of a of a foreign 
government which might be discriminatory and restrictive to US trade417. 
In the same line, and with specifically the intention of making it easier to 
implement measures for cross-retaliation, a deputy of Brazilian government – Paulo Teixeira 
– has presented a bill project (hereinafter PL) 1893/2007 which provides measures for 
suspension and dilution or dissolution of temporary protection of IPRs in Brazil for the breach 
of multilateral trade obligations by a foreign government within the WTO418. 
In accordance with Article 3 of the project, the executive can suspend, in 
temporary terms, the compliance with obligations and other concessions referring to parts II, 
II and IV of the TRIPS Agreement and from the respective national legislation that deals with 
rights of intellectual property rights holders. More specifically it refers to the suspension of 
rights of IPRs holders, entrepreneurs, companies, natural people or residents in the country 
that does not comply with DSB recommendations in favor of Brazil419. 
An amendment in the law of WTO Members is a basic issue and should be 
designed in order to make the implementation of cross-retaliation measures domestically 
feasible. Nevertheless, the great majority of government’s members have not taken a first step 
in that direction and no developing country has provided measures for retaliation in the 
domestic IP legislation420. In fact, in the three cases when cross-retaliation was approved by 
the WTO, none of the suspending countries had a proper domestic legislation for that, and 
only Brazil presented a bill in order to facilitate and make the suspension of concessions in 
TRIPS more straightforward.  
Regarding the issue of national legislation, one possible solution for countries is 
to amend the already existing rules and/or the national constitution (if that is the case) in order 
                                            
417 Section 301 available online at: < http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode19/usc_sec_19_00002411--
--000-.html>. 
418 PL 1893/2007 was presented on August 28th, 2007. The project is available online at: 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=364818>. 
419 Article 3, PL 1893/2007: “Art. 3rd O Poder Executivo Federal poderá suspender, temporariamente, o 
cumprimento das obrigações e outras concessões das Partes II, III, e IV do Acordo TRIPS e da respectiva 
legislação nacional que trata da mesma matéria no que se refere à proteção de direitos de propriedade 
intelectual de titulares, pessoas naturais nacionais ou domiciliadas em determinado Estado, ou pessoas 
jurídicas domiciliadas ou com estabelecimento efetivo em determinado Estado, quando este tenha deixado de 
implementar decisões e recomendações do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC em detrimento de 
legítimos interesses comerciais do Estado brasileiro. Vais deixar a referencia toda em português? 
420 Subramanian and Watal refer to this situation as “voluntary unilateral disarmament”. Subramanian; Watal, 
2000, p. 415. 
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to allow the government to suspend trade IP provisions under specific circumstances where 
cross-retaliation in TRIPS is permitted. There is no provision in the TRIPS or WTO 
Agreement prohibiting members to do so, thus amending domestic legislation could be an 
easier solution421. 
Also, as Abbott reminds us, there are mechanisms for eliminating or minimizing 
the requirements for new legislative action based upon pre-existing intellectual property 
legislation. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement regulates the use of the IP without the license 
of the right holder. Pursuant this Article, a government seeking to suspend TRIPS obligations 
could make use of this provision to grant compulsory licenses under the terms of its patent 
legislation, for example422. 
 
• Suspension of Enforcement 
 
The suspension on TRIPS obligations walks hand in hand with the suspension of 
enforcement of IP obligations in a certain territory. That is why it was decided to address a 
few words on the subject before proceeding to the next topic. 
Considering the international scenario, and especially in the WTO environment, 
developed countries are normally the great demanders of the strongest intellectual property 
enforcement measures in foreign jurisdictions, whereas the developing countries normally 
take a defensive position423. That is a logical synergy, as developed countries concentrate the 
owners of the majority of the IP rights around the world and developed countries try to skip 
from further obligations concerning intellectual protection. 
At this point Article 7 can be recalled from the TRIPS Agreement, pursuant to 
which the enforcement of intellectual property rights is exposed as a policy tool to balance 
rights and obligations and to promote the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge. Although this Article mentioned–in the previous section – describes 
broad objectives for protection and enforcement of IP rights, it seems that TRIPS makes clear 
                                            
421 See Whiteman, 2010, p. 205. 
422 See Abbott, 2009, p. 34. 
423 See Ruse-Khan, 2009, p. 2. See also Correa, 2009. 
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that the exclusive rights granted to rights holders should, somehow, be combined with the 
promotion of social welfare. 
Enforcement is current – and again – an instrument of pressure on the multilateral 
trade system. Enforcement used to be one of the main driving forces behind the conclusion of 
the TRIPS Agreement. Nowadays enforcement is an important subject of debate, as some 
countries do not seem satisfied with the minimum level of protection granted by TRIPS, and 
want more. 
Pauwelyn highlights the fact that DSB panels have reached an understanding that 
TRIPS obligations in what refers to domestic intellectual property enforcement are generally 
limited to the existence of certain rules and procedures or providing enough legal ground to 
do things at the request of IP right holders. There is no requirement of substantive 
obligations424. 
The TRIPS Agreement covers general obligations and remedies for domestic 
intellectual property enforcement regime in its part III425. Therefore, Article 41.1 states the 
following: 
 
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part 
are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act 
of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be 
applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse426. 
 
In general, part III of the TRIPS Agreement proposes/obligates that all WTO 
members to make civil infringements, effective remedies and border measures available in the 
                                            
424 Pauwelyn, 2010b, p. 32. Note that the dispute China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS362/R), although it is not the first dispute focused on TRIPS enforcement 
rulings, it represents the first time a WTO panel focused primarily on the interpretation and implementation of 
the TRIPS enforcement provisions. About the dispute see Yu, 2011. 
425 See Ruse-Khan, 2010a, p. 3. 
426 Article 41.1, TRIPS Agreement. 
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domestic legal system. Also, according to Article 61 of TRIPS, criminal sanctions shall be 
available in certain cases427. 
Abbott suggests two possible and effective ways for the suspension of intellectual 
property rights regarding enforcement, which could be (i) to suspend the right of IRP holders 
to initiate enforcement proceedings during the period of suspension in TRIPS and (ii) the 
suspension by limiting intellectual property rights where suspension of enforcement could be 
prescribed with respect to patents and regulatory data protection428. Regarding the limitation 
of IPRs, the author suggests that the retaliating member could make sure in domestic 
legislation that no injunctions would be available during the term of the suspension, and also 
that no compensation could be claimed concerning the suspension of the activities429. 
 
4.3.2 International Commitments 
 
Regarding international commitments and intellectual property conventions prior 
to TRIPS, Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that: 
 
1.  In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall 
comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention 
(1967). 
2.    Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing 
obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris 
Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits430. 
 
                                            
427 Article 61 of TRIPS states that: “Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at 
least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies 
available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with 
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available 
shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and 
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide 
for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property 
rights, in particular where they are committed willfully and on a commercial scale”. See also Abbott, 2009, p. 
32. 
428 Abbott, 2009, p, 32. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Article 2, TRIPS. 
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When it comes to cross-retaliation on intellectual property rights, a fear that the 
actions of suspension of IPRs will implicate other international treaties on intellectual 
property can come into the discussion. However, most of the operative provisions of the Paris 
and Berne Conventions (WIPO administered conventions) have been incorporated by TRIPS. 
Also, in Article 2.2 it is understood that countries that are members of the Paris and/or the 
Berne Convention and of the WTO still continue to be bound by these instruments, 
separately431. Moreover, Pauwelyn explains that “any rights or obligations that WTO members 
may obtain under Parts V to VII do not necessarily have to give way to WIPO conventions, at 
least not pursuant to Art. 2.2”432.  
One issue that could bring some complication regarding the Paris and Berne 
Convention is that both have provisions of national treatment in order to prevent 
discrimination among rights holders of the member countries. A right holder could try to 
invoke this provision to claim his/her right of national treatment is being violated in the 
domestic legislation of the suspending country433.  
If there is a conflict between a WTO authorization to cross-retaliate and one of the 
WIPO conventions recourse shall be made to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention of the Law 
of the Treaties that establishes the following: 
 
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty is 
not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty 
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the 
later treaty434. 
 
Pauwelyn further explains that pursuant the Vienna Convention since there is no 
apparent or inherent hierarchy between the sources of law, the latest expression of the State 
intent must prevail, which in the present case is the DSB authorization to suspension of 
TRIPS obligations435. Indeed, if it is the case of a dispute before the ICJ, in examining the 
settings of obligations of countries involved in a WTO dispute, the Court would find that the 
                                            
431 See Basheer, 2009, p. 60-61. 
432 Pauwelyn, 2003, p. 346. 
433 Article 28 (1) of the Paris Convention and Article 33 (1) of the Berne Convention state that disputes between 
member nations shall be settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
434 Article 30, Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties. 
435 See Pauwelyn, 2003, p. 346. 
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complaining and respondent countries had both expressly accepted the suspension of 
concessions regime prescribed by the DSU436. 
A short comment is required to address the TRIPS-plus agreements, which refer 
to bilateral commitments that establish a higher standard of protection to intellectual property 
rights. Specially the US has negotiated and signed a number of free trade agreements with 
developing countries, which provide much stronger protection to IPRs437. The probable 
implication of a TRIPS-plus agreement is that developing countries may become unable to 
take advantage of a cross-retaliation proceeding against a WTO member with which the 
developing country has signed for stronger IP protection of the latter rights in its own 
domestic legislation438. 
 
4.4 Implementation Issues 
 
 
4.4.1 Economic Feasibility: basic knowledge, domestic market size, costs of 
implementation  
 
One core challenge of suspending concessions in TRIPS for the suspending 
country relies in its own domestic economic conditions. For the retaliation procedure to 
achieve inducement of compliance and the production of social welfare (which are the basic 
raison d'être of retaliation) it must be economically feasible in the domestic market of the 
member aiming to retaliate. 
The existence of three elements is considered to be important in the country that 
wishes to suspend concessions in TRIPS, namely: considerable domestic market size, basic 
know-how/knowledge and economic means to support the costs of implementing the 
retaliatory measures in its national context. 
 
                                            
436 See Abbott, 2009, p. 14. See also Basso; Beas, 2005, p. 20. 
437 Information about the US Free Trade Agreement is available online at: < http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements>. 
438 See Whiteman, 2010, p. 204-205. 
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• Domestic Market Size 
 
The size of the domestic market as well as the consumer demand in the national 
territory are important issues to be taken into account in the decision of cross-retaliating in 
intellectual property rights. These factors are indeed crucial in the analyses of whether 
suspension in TRIPS can have a significant impact in the respondent country. 
As previously mentioned, intellectual property rights are granted and protected on 
the basis of territoriality. That means that in order to be protected, these rights have to be 
claimed in the very country the rights holder wishes protection. Where cross-retaliation and 
domestic market size are concerned, the territoriality of IP rights are relevant in that the 
suspension of IP rights will only be worth for the retaliating country once there is significant 
consumer demand in its own territory. 
Moreover, once any withdrawal of TRIPS obligations is actually limited to the 
national territory of the suspending WTO member, imports of goods produced under a 
suspension condition into other market members where the same goods are still protected by 
IP rights are, in principle, infringing. In other words, as explained by Ruse-Khan, if 
intellectual property rights are suspended, “the suspension can naturally only extend to IP 
rights granted by the national law and thus can only legalize domestic actions to protect IP for 
which obligations are suspended”439. 
Therefore, considering the domestic market size, if it is a small market with no 
significant consumer demand, the potential economic loss by the retaliated country because of 
suspension on its IP rights on the suspending member market will be limited. Thus, neither 
the objectives of increasing social fare or induce compliance will be possibly accomplished. 
 
• Basic Knowledge 
 
A second element to be considered related to economic feasibility of cross-
retaliation if whether the suspending country has sufficient know-how and technical capability 
to take advantage of the period of suspension of concession.  
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As the period of suspension is temporary, so as to make cross-retaliation in TRIPS 
really worthwhile, the suspending country shall have a fast scale production focused in the 
intellectual assets of the suspension in force440. Certainly, according to Ruse-Khan cross-
retaliation in intellectual property rights might enable (i) “domestic research institutions and 
industry to access, experiment with, utilize, improve and disseminate so far protected 
technology from the non-complying state” and (ii) “foster technological learning and 
development as well as domestic innovation through imitation”441.  
When the suspension includes technology intensive goods (like patents of 
pharmaceutical drugs) many WTO members may not be technologically proficient. Basheer 
gives a good example where he assumes that a huge pharmaceutical company has a small 
suspending country (such as Antigua) patent covering on of its pharmaceutical products. Even 
if a patent suspension is allowed by the country (Antigua) and the invention can freely be 
used, virtually no entities in the country have the technical means and capability to produce 
generics of the drug442.  
If there is no basic local capacity and knowledge, local manufactures cannot 
respond to the gap created by the suspension of concessions in TRIPS. Given that the 
suspension is temporary, the scenario becomes worse and there is no way of taking advantage 
of a pharmaceutical patent protection, such as the one of the aforementioned example.  
Therefore basic knowledge and capability to produce goods in a suspension of IP 
rights regime are elements that directly impact the ability to “meet the rationale for IP cross-
retaliation” and the achievement of increase of social welfare443. Indeed, as stated by 
Subramanian and Watal, “to be credible, retaliatory action must be lead to quick alternative 
supplies of production and must not create undue uncertainty for these alternative 
suppliers”444. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
439 See Ruse-Khan, 2008a, p. 349. 
440 Id., p. 352. 
441 Id, p. 337. 
442 See Basheer, 2009, p. 57. The author states that “one needs to strike a distinction between developing 
countries and technology proficient developing countries”, as the “cross-retaliation tool may prove a stronger 
one in the hands of technologically proficient developing countries”. Ibid. 
443 Ruse-Khan, 2008a, p. 353. 
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• Costs of Implementation 
 
Once a cross-retaliation procedure is approved, the retaliating country may have 
to invest a considerable amount of money in order to profit from the suspension of intellectual 
property rights. The manufacture of the desired IP goods belonging to the respondent country 
may even require investing in a whole new infrastructure for this purpose445.  
Considering that the whole process is temporary, the costs shall gain a higher 
level of importance by the suspending country. Of course the costs depend on the type of 
intellectual asset that is going to be attacked. For example, making use of a suspension of a 
pharmaceutical patent suspension will cost much more investment than a ‘simple’ suspension 
of protection on copyrighted works, or the payment of royalties446. 
 One factor that could promote incentive for the suspending country to invest 
during the retaliation period is the prospect of a compulsory license. Indeed, although Article 
31 of TRIPS makes several requirements for the issuing of a compulsory license, the Article 
also leaves enough flexibility for the country to determine the grounds on which a compulsory 
license can be issue.  
Rightly, while Basheer states that “the prospect of a compulsory license at the end 
of the retaliation period offers a sufficient incentive to such entities to make investments in 
the first place”447, Subramanian and Watal agree that domestic legislation could specify that 
compulsory licenses will be granted in cases where foreign trade partners do not comply with 
WTO obligations affecting them448. 
 
4.4.2 Political Pressure 
 
Perhaps the main obstacle developing countries will have to actually implement a 
cross-retaliation measure is the political one. No doubt a suspending country wishing to 
                                                                                                                                        
444 Subramanian; Watal, 2000, p. 412. 
445 See Basheer, 2009, p. 51. The author refers to these costs as “sunk costs”. 
446 Id., p. 52. 
447 Id., p. 55. 
448 Subramanian; Watal, 2000, p. 412. 
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retaliate in TRIPS will have to face great pressure from the developed country government 
and other stakeholders449. 
As Abbott explains, powerful intellectual property dependent industries have been 
able to persuade governments and the media for decades that any interference with intellectual 
property rights is tantamount to criminal intent. Moreover, IP-dependent industries are 
normally willing to spend huge amounts of money to invest in government lobbying and 
media propaganda campaigns450. 
 Indeed, a strong counter pressure may arise from the intent of cross-retaliating by 
the suspension of intellectual property rights. The suspending government shall be ready to 
face international criticism and internal pressure from the multinationals affected451. 
 
4.5 Does Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS addresses the basic issue of non-compliance? 
 
As has been discussed throughout the present study, suspension of concessions or 
other obligations under the TRIPS agreement in form of a cross-retaliation is very much 
considered by WTO scholars and professionals as an interesting alternative available to 
developing countries. Theoretically, at the same time as it enables increase of social welfare 
of the suspending country, the cross-retaliation in TRIPS can be very successful in causing 
harm to sensible sectors of the violator’s industry. 
The incentive to comply though cross-retaliation in TRIPS comes from the 
protests and public motion that IP-dependent industries are able to promote especially by 
lobbying in the domestic area of the country affected. Powerful industries of entertainment, 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries and, among others, information technology industries 
may protest against countermeasures affecting their intellectual property rights.  The 
industries may stop receiving royalties from copyrighted works and/or patents for technology 
or pharmaceutical products implicating in loss of a great amount of money. Therefore it is 
logical that these industries may pressure the government violator and stimulate the 
withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measures. 
                                            
449 See Whiteman, 2010, p. 205. 
450 Abbott, 2009, p. 38. 
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The cross-retaliation systematic is very clear in the context of the DSU. Many 
factors can induce compliance in this regard, although the reason why States shall be induced 
to comply when confronted by a cross-retaliation in TRIPS is not very obvious.  In some 
cases the high amount of retaliation can be a compliance-inducing factor, while in other cases 
the limited value of countermeasures can be an incentive to compliance.  Still, in some 
disputes the nature of the retaliatory measures – such as suspension of concession in TRIPS -, 
or the sector affected or even a number of domestic reasons can be compliance-inducing452. 
Yet, to ensure a better result with the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement two elements seem to be very important. The 
suspending country has to be capable of identifying the sectors of IP-industry from which 
they can take better advantage in terms of increase of their domestic social welfare but also, 
the suspending country has to be capable of identifying the strong private operators that will 
mobilize great pressure on the government of the violator453.  
Regarding the aforementioned element, – the capability to identify the strong 
private IP operators -, it is submitted that the suspending State should have a minimum 
domestic building capacity and IP professionals that can guide the process of selecting the 
target intellectual property rights of the tight holders of the affected country. Not every WTO 
member can count on this expertise in their national body of professionals. 
For the success of cross-retaliation in TRIPS, it is important to ensure that the 
suspending country has means to afford the necessary expenditures with implementing the 
suspension of concessions of intellectual property rights in their national territory. The 
suspending country should have more than just an appropriate preparation in its domestic 
legislation to enforce suspension of IP rights (and avoid judicial problems with right holders), 
it should also have financial resources to afford the costs of implementation of a suspension 
system and take advantage of the cross-retaliation.  
As already discussed in the previous chapter, cross-retaliation is meant to be a 
temporary process. To take advantage of it, the suspending country should have means to 
                                                                                                                                        
451 Ibid. Abbott in the same place also states that “the government might well prepare press releases and 
diplomatic replies in advance”.  
452 See more on inducement of compliance in Shadikhodjaev, 2009, p 29-30. 
453 In that sense, Abbott reminds us that there are specific elements in the IP industry that may generate great 
political pressure in the affected country: “the principal proponents of the TRIPS Agreement were the 
originator pharmaceutical industry and the copyright/entertainment industry. These two sectors remain the 
most powerful political constituencies demanding strong IP protection”. Abbott, 2009, p. 37. 
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afford it. Taking as example the suspension of pharmaceutical patents, and highlighting that 
the suspension is temporary, the suspending country should have at least (i) basic prior 
knowhow in dealing with pharmaceutical patens and (ii) financial resources to expend on the 
research and production of the pharmaceutical product. The same is valid for copyrights. If, 
for instance, the suspension is based on not collecting royalties owed to a license owner, the 
suspending country should have structures already in place, such as legal or administrative 
control of a collecting righs society, to enforce the suspension and to control the possible 
massive spread of the information, in case digital information is affected. 
Moreover, not only the suspending country should have financial means to afford 
the costs of implementing suspension of intellectual property rights, but also a considerable 
level of domestic demand for the products with suspended rights. To justify all the effort that 
is involved in the cross-retaliation in TRIPS - i.e. legal, financial and political efforts -, the 
domestic market should be relatively significant for the suspending country to take such 
action under the WTO.  It should guarantee a level of financial return that would make the 
suspension of concessions and other TRIPS obligations worth it. 
Other elements that have to be considered in choosing cross-retaliation in TRIPS 
are the possible complications with international investors and the political problems that may 
emerge.  
International investors will be carefully monitoring a country carrying out a 
suspension on IP rights, and may look upon such a country with distrust for future 
investments. That could be especially serious for WTO Members heavily dependent on 
foreign investment. Therefore, it is an element that could considerably discourage a small 
economy member to carry on a cross-retaliation procedure.  
A remark must be made regarding the probable international political pressure of 
the process. Normally, industries that invest in intellectual assets, which would be target by a 
suspending country are strong entertainment, pharmaceutical or information technology 
industries. Current IP rights are the most valuable asset in the market which means that these 
rights are very much in the eyes of the media. A suspending WTO Member should be aware 
that in threatening the suspension of intellectual property rights of powerful industries, the 
country will have to be prepared to deal with a strong public lobbying in the international 
media. Accusation of violations of IP rights may arise in the international media in order to 
pressure and tarnish the image of the suspending State in the international society. 
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From all that was mentioned, it seems, then, that cross-retaliation in TRIPS would 
not work for every small and developing economy of the WTO. And, therefore, not every 
Member that eventually makes use of cross-retaliation in IP rights would be able to induce 
compliance of the defaulting country. 
The inducement compliance in terms of cross-retaliation (and also in traditional 
retaliation) is totally connected with a credible threat from the suspending country. Although -
as showed in the previous section -, there are academics who do not consider that the 
capability for presenting a credible threat, or the economic asymmetry of the opponents 
elements that would induce compliance, there is a strong belief that these factors play an 
important role in the decision of the violator to comply.  
As argued by Salles, this research concurs that “the very threat of sanctions is one 
factor that promotes compliance with WTO rules and rulings”454. Even though there are many 
other factors that could lead one country to breach with its WTO obligations to comply, it is 
not possible to dismiss the fact that the credible threat focuses mostly on the significant or 
insignificant loss of market access – depending on the complainant in the game – it will have 
its importance in the final decision of the defaulting country. 
Taking into account the market importance of the complainant in relation to the 
respondent, this author understands that cross-retaliation in TRIPS addresses the issue of 
noncompliance when and if the suspending country has a significant level of importance to 
the market of the defaulting country. Adding to that assumption, it seems reasonable to state 
that not only the relatively importance of one country to the other has to be observed, but also 
the domestic conditions of the complaining country to take cross-retaliation measures in 
intellectual property rights. 
 As aforementioned, there are domestic market demand issues, implementation 
costs and technological knowledge issues that cannot be dismissed by the retaliating country. 
Even more challenging – maybe – is the political pressure that the retaliating country is likely 
to face in suspending IP rights of powerful multinationals right holders. 
Thus, the answer to the question of whether cross-retaliation is a mechanism to 
induce compliance is ‘yes’. But, the answer is ‘yes’ in limited situations only. Among all the 
factors and variables that were discussed in this section and throughout the dissertation, cross-
                                            
454 Salles, 2010, p. 298. 
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retaliation in TRIPS should be very successful if applied by an upper level economy 
developing country, such as Brazil, China or India. Such countries, apart from having 
financial resources to spend in the implementation costs of a suspension of IP rights 
protection, probably have sufficient means in their industrial structure to take full advantage 
of a suspension on patents (for example) in a manner that they could rapidly reproduce the 
generic version of the product, profiting from it during the suspension period. Such countries 
are able to increase social welfare in the domestic sphere and promote innovation and 
research in their domestic industry. Finally, such countries surely have a sufficient domestic 
demand to purchase the products resulting from the suspension in IP rights. 
Cross-retaliation in TRIPS does not work for the small developing economies of the WTO 
and therefore is not a great instrument that would address and benefit all the developing 
members seeking compliance of powerful economies. 
 
4.6 Selected Cases: approved requests for IP cross-retaliation 
 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the three WTO disputes whose request 
for cross-retaliation was approved. The disputes presented have a developing country in the 
complainant seat and developed countries as respondent. The disputes were organized 
chronologically. 
 
4.6.1 EC - Bananas III455 
 
• Summary 
 
In this dispute several claims from different countries are involved, among which 
are Ecuador, the United States, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. All claimants, except for 
Ecuador had requested the conclusion of consultations with the EC regarding the bananas 
                                            
455 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Banana. 
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issues on September 28, 1995 (WT/DS16). After Ecuador's accession to the WTO, the 
previous complainants requested further consultations with the EC on February 5, 1996456.  
The plaintiffs informed that the regime of import, sale and distribution of bananas 
from the EC was inconsistent with Articles I, II, III, X, XI and XIII of GATT, and with the 
provisions of the Agreement on Procedures for the Import Licensing Procedures, the 
Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures - TRIMS 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS. 
On April 11, 1996 the above-mentioned plaintiffs requested the establishment of a 
special group (also referred to as Panel), which was then established on June 7, 1996 (which 
refers to the dispute EC-Bananas III). The special group concluded that the import regime for 
bananas from the EC, as well as the procedures for granting licenses for the importation of 
bananas in this regime, were incompatible with the GATT. The Panel further found that the 
exemption contained in the Lomé Convention457 is obviously inconsistent with Article XIII of 
the GATT - which is non-discriminatory treatment with regard to quantitative restrictions458 - 
but not the incompatibilities arising from the system for granting licenses459. 
On June 11, 1997, the EC notified its intention to appeal certain issues of law and 
legal interpretations developed by the Panel. The Appellate Body report was distributed to 
Members on 9 September 1997 confirming most of the conclusions of the Panel. Nonetheless 
the Appellate Body (AB) report revoked the conclusions of the Panel in regard to the 
incompatibility with Article XIII of GATT where the latter mention that it was clear by the 
exemption on the Lomé Convention. Still the AB report also revoked the panel conclusion in 
                                            
456 WTO. WT/DS27. Available online at: < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm>.  
457 The Lomé Convention governs trade and cooperation between the EU and countries of Asia, the Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP). The first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975 with the participation of 45 states in these 
regions and after the merger of the United Kingdom to the European Community. The Lomé Convention was 
signed in 1975 with the participation of 58 ACP countries. Following the first conventions, were signed the 
Lomé Convention III, 1984, attended by 65 ACP countries, and Lomé IV in 1989, the 68 countries which 
joined in 1989 and 70 countries in 1995. According to the latter, exports from CARICOM can join the 
European Union without paying taxes, the agreement also provides for special arrangements for bananas, rum, 
beef and cuckoo. The Cotonou Agreement (Cotonou, Benin, June 23, 2000) replaces the Lomé Convention 
and has a term of twenty years, during which it will be subject to review every five years. The agreement 
restructures the trade relations between the European Community and the countries of Asia, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific. More information available online at: <http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/9/10029/Por-
cap11-Globalizacion.pdf>. 
458 Article XIII.1, do GATT: “1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third 
countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted”. 
459 WTO. WT/DS27. 
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regard to certain aspects of the system of granting licenses, which were contrary to Article X 
of GATT, and the Agreement of Import of Licenses Procedures460. 
On 15 December 1998, the EC requested the establishment of a Panel, in 
accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 21 of the DSU, with the aim of determining that the 
application of the EC measures were deemed to be in compliance with the standards of WTO 
as that had not been questioned in accordance with appropriate procedures of the DSU. On 
December 18, 1998, Ecuador requested the re-establishment of the Panel that initially ruled on 
the dispute in order to examine whether the EC measures to implement the recommendations 
were compatible with the WTO461. 
The Panels were established on January 18, 1999, and their reports were 
distributed on April 12, 1999462. The Panel established at the request of the EC in accordance 
with paragraph 5 of Article 21 found that, since Ecuador was actually claiming on the 
compatibility with WTO rules of the measures adopted by the EC to implement the 
recommendations of the DSB, it could not agree with the EC that it could be assumed that EC 
was fulfilling the recommendations of the DSB. This report was never adopted by the DSB. 
On the other hand, the report distributed by the Panel established at the request of Ecuador, in 
accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU, found that the implementing measures adopted by 
the EC to implement the recommendations of the DSB were not fully compatible with the 
obligations of EC in the WTO framework. This report was adopted on May 6, 1999. 
On January 14, 1999 the US requested the DSB authorization to suspend the 
application of concessions to the EC value of 520 million dollars463. Before this request, the 
EC requested on January 29, 1999, the establishment of an arbitration procedure pursuant 
Article 22.6 of the DSU, questioning the level of suspension of concessions proposed by the 
US464. The arbitrators decided that the level of retaliation requested by the US was not 
                                            
460 WTO. WT/DS27. 
461 WTO. WT/DS27. 
462 At this stage, some members reserved their rights as third parties: Jamaica, Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Mauricio. Ecuador and India 
have expressed their interest to third parties only on the request of the EC. 
463 See Article 22.2, DSU. 
464 Article 22.6, DSU: “When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant 
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period 
of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.  However, if the Member concerned objects 
to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have 
not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other 
obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Such arbitration shall 
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equivalent to the amount of nullification or impairment of benefits that this country had 
suffered as a consequence of the EC regime for banana imports, determining that the level of 
nullification suffered by the US was 191, 4 million dollars. The US retaliation occurred, with 
the approval of the DSB, within the given amount of nullification465. 
On November 8, 1999, Ecuador requested authorization to suspend the application 
to the EC of concessions or other obligations - in accordance with Article 22:2 of the DSU - 
related under the following agreements: TRIPS, GATS and GATT 1994. Just as the US, the 
EC requested arbitration pursuant Article 22.6 of the DSU. The amount was of 450 million 
dollars. The arbitrators ruled, in the report distributed on March 24th 2000, that the level of 
nullification or impairment suffered by Ecuador amounted to 201.6 million dollars a year and 
that Ecuador could request the DSB authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations 
within the GATT 1994 framework466; within GATS framework with respect to commercial 
distribution; and to the extent that it was insufficient, within the framework of the TRIPS 
section of copyright and related rights (section 1), Article 14 - on protection of artists and 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, geographical 
indications and industrial designs. On May 18, 2000, Ecuador was authorized to suspend 
concessions to the EC, as determined by the DSB. 
On June 22, 2001, the EC notified an ‘Understanding on Bananas between the EC 
and the US’, and an ‘Understanding on Bananas between the EC and Ecuador’, which implied 
that the parties had reached an agreement - in the sense Article 3:6 of the DSU467 - and that 
both US and Ecuador to refrain from using their rights to suspend concessions. What 
happened is that both Ecuador and the US declared that the understandings were not mutually 
agreed solutions. 
It is remarkable that Ecuador maintained its independence through the whole 
dispute, and did not accept the lead of the US in the retaliation procedure.  
                                                                                                                                        
be carried out by the original panel, if members are available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the Director-
General and shall be completed within 60 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time.  
Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended during the course of the arbitration”. 
465 WTO. WT/DS27. 
466 Here the DSB excluded capital goods and primary products as inputs for manufacturing industries and 
development. WTO. WT/DS27. 
467 Article 3.6, DSU: “Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute 
settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and 
Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto”. 
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More recently, and following the development of the compliance proceedings, the 
EC informed the DSB that it intended to bring itself into compliance with its 
recommendations and rulings on 9 January 2009, by modifying its scheduled tariff 
commitments on bananas through an agreement on the level of the new EC bound tariff duty 
with Latin American banana supplying countries pursuant to negotiations under Article 
XXVIII of the GATT468. 
On 7 January 2010, the EC and Ecuador notified the DSB they had reached a 
mutually agreed solution so as to end the dispute. Previously, on 21 December 2009, the EC 
had reported in the DSB meeting it had initialed with Ecuador and a number of other 
Members the so-called Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas. 
  
• Cross-retaliation issues 
 
With regard to cross-retaliation proposed by Ecuador, the EC discussed the right 
of the member to request authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement, since there was no inconsistency of the regime for bananas within this 
Agreement according to the reports of the panel and the Appellate Body. Ecuador claimed 
that its request was justified by Article 22.3 (c) of the DSU, because it was not practical or 
effective for it to suspend concessions or other obligations in areas where violations were 
found by the Panel and the Appellate Body.  
Although the DSB accepted the arguments from Ecuador, the country had never 
exercised its right to apply countermeasures. This is explained by a very clear reason: it would 
be extremely detrimental to its domestic market and its international economic relations - 
especially with the EC – whereas it would cause little or no damage to the EC. 
Nonetheless, in this dispute the negotiators from Ecuador were original and the 
primary negotiators found room to promote such cross-retaliation under the DSU in order to, 
as stated by Smith, “maximize their leverage within the specific institutional framework of 
                                            
468 WTO. WT/DS27. 
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WTO rules”469. In fact, the DSU rules – some of which were being applied for the first time – 
did enable Ecuador to bargain above its own economic weight in the WTO. 
Rightly, Ecuador understood that suspending market-access concessions to the EC 
would be either useful or threatening. With relation to the world market, Ecuador imports 
small quantities considering a big variety of goods and its retaliation in tariff duties would not 
inflict political or economic pain on the EC. Moreover and maybe more concerning, the 
imports of Ecuador were conformed in a large extent of intermediate products vital to its own 
domestic industry470.   
In terms of persuasion of the arbitrators, Ecuador was very diligent in showing 
that it was neither practical nor effective for its domestic economy to suspend concessions 
against EC goods and/or services, and that the circumstances where serious enough to justify 
a cross-retaliation procedure471. 
Ecuador then focused its sanctions on EC members who impose more obstacles to 
liberalization i.e. France, Spain and United Kingdom. Also, Ecuador was very careful in 
choosing to restrict its targets to categories of intellectual property rights “which there was 
little or no technology transfer, so as not to jeopardize its access to valuable technologies”472. 
The chosen sectors of the TRIPS Agreement to have the rights suspended were the copyrights, 
geographical indications and industrial designs473. 
The suspending member also proposed a differentiated system of limited and 
revocable licenses that would only be granted to domestic firms from Ecuador to violate 
intellectual property rights up to a defined level and only for the advantage of the national 
market. In this sense, the arbitrators stated that: 
 
It is evident that an authorization by the DSB for Ecuador to suspend certain 
TRIPS obligations would concern Ecuador only.  Such authorization does 
not exonerate any other WTO Member from abiding by its WTO 
obligations, including those under the TRIPS Agreement474. 
 
                                            
469 Smith, 2003, p. 2. 
470 In this sense, see Ethier, 2004, p. 455. 
471 See Article 22.3, DSU. 
472 Smith, 2003, p. 15. 
473 WTO. WT/DS27/54. 
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It is said that, at the time, the threat from Ecuador was made concrete and the 
developing country was not bluffing. But the country did not go forward. According to Smith, 
officials from Ecuador could have considered the intrinsic risks of suspending concessions 
under TRIPS with a great concern that the action could discourage foreign investment475. 
   
4.6.2 US – Gambling476 
 
• Summary 
 
In 2003, the complainant Antigua and Barbuda requested consultations to the 
DSB regarding US measures applied by its authorities, which affect the cross-border supply 
of gambling and betting services. In accordance with Antigua findings, the cumulative impact 
of central, regional and local US authorities had the aim to prevent supply of the above-
mentioned services from another WTO member to the US domestic market. 
According to the complainant the US measures may be inconsistent with the US 
obligations under GATS – in particular Articles II, VI, VIII, XI, XVI and XVII. The panel 
was established on 21 July 2003477. 
Approximately fifteen years later, on 10 November 2004 the Panel report was 
circulated to WTO members. In sum and most interesting, the Panel found that:  
  
- Three US federal laws (the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act) and the provisions of four US state laws (those of 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah) on their face, prohibit 
one, several or all means of delivery included in mode 1 of GATS (i.e. cross-
border supply), contrary to the United States’ specific market access 
commitments for gambling and betting services for mode 1. Therefore, the 
United States failed to accord services and service suppliers of Antigua 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, 
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in the US Schedule, contrary 
                                                                                                                                        
474 WTO. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU. 
475 See Smith, 2003, p. 17. 
476 United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services. WTO. 
WT/DS285. Available online at: < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm>.  
477 At the opportunity, Canada, the EC, Mexico and Chinese Taipei reserved their third-party rights. On 23 July 
2003, Japan reserved its third-party rights. 
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to Article XVI:1 and Article XVI:2 of the GATS (i.e. concerning market 
access); 
 - The United States was not able to invoke successfully the GATS 
exceptions provisions. In this regard, the United States was not able to 
demonstrate that the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act are “necessary” under Articles XIV(a) and XIV(c) of the 
GATS (i.e. “exceptions” provisions, including for public morals) and are 
consistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV of the 
GATS478. 
  
On January 2005, both Antigua and the US decided to appeal on certain issues of 
law. On 7 April 2005 the report of the Appellate Body was circulated. For the purpose of this 
study it was relevant that the AB report (i) upheld the Panel’s finding that the United States 
acts inconsistently with Article XVI:1 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 by 
maintaining certain limitations on market access not specified in its Schedule and (ii) upheld 
the Panel’s finding, albeit for different reasons, that the United States’ Schedule includes a 
commitment to grant full market access in gambling and betting services. 
The DSB adopted the panel and the Appellate Body report on 20 April 2005.  
As the parties could not agree on what would be a reasonable period of time for 
implementation in accordance with Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, Antigua requested that the 
reasonable period of time be determined through binding arbitration pursuant to Article 
21.3(c) of the DSU. On 19 August 2005, the Arbitrator designated for the arbitration pursuant 
Article 21.3(c) circulated his award to the members, determining that the reasonable period of 
time for implementation was 11 months and 2 weeks from 20 April 2005, expiring on 3 April 
2006479.  
As the parties disagreed as to whether the US consistently complied with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, Antigua requested the establishment of a Panel 
under Article 21.5 of the Understanding, where China, EC and Japan reserved their rights as 
third parties. The panel was composed on 16 August 2006. On 30 March 2007, the panel 
report on Article 21.5 was circulated to WTO members and concluded that the US had failed 
to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The panel report was adopted 
by WTO members on 22 May 2007. 
                                            
478 WTO. WT/DS285. 
479 Ibid. 
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One month later, on 21 June 2007, the complainant requested authorization from 
the DSB to suspend the application of concessions and other obligations of Antigua to the US 
under the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement. On 21 December 2007 the arbitrator circulated 
its decision which determined that the annual level of nullification and impairments of 
benefits accruing to Antigua was US$21 million and that the complainant may request 
authorization from the DSB to cross-retaliate under TRIPS at a level equivalent to the level of 
nullification and impairment. 
 
• Cross-retaliation issues 
 
The arbitrators accepted that in considering the relative economic and trade 
position of Antigua compared to the US, it would be extremely difficult for the complainant 
to induce compliance by suspending concessions under GATS. The relative poor expression 
of Antigua’s market size and the probable imposition of extra costs on Antigua’s consumers 
were taken in consideration by the arbitrators to allow cross-retaliation in TRIPS480. 
As Antigua had to present facts to prove that the circumstances were serious 
enough - Article 22.3 (c) – the complainant showed basic figures in order to compare the 
disparity between population, size, exports and imports, and gross domestic product (GDP) of 
both countries. Also, Antigua demonstrated and argued about its limited natural resources, 
very limited arable land and the high dependence its economy has on tourism and associated 
services (hotels, retail trade, housing, transportation, restaurants and real estate). Finally, 
Antigua also highlighted its need to diversify the domestic economy and that is one reason 
why the country tries to develop trade in services, including trade in remote gambling481. 
In its request to suspend TRIPS obligations, Antigua indicated that it intended to 
apply countermeasure in form of suspension of concession on (i) copyright and related rights; 
(ii) trademarks; (iii) industrial designs; (iv) patents and; (v) protection of undisclosed 
information482. 
                                            
480 See Abbott, 2009, p. 7. 
481 World Trade Organization. WT/DS285/ARB, P. 74. 
482 Id, p. 77.  
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Although Antigua’s request resulted in the permission of the DSB to suspend 
concessions in TRIPS on 21 December 2007, the country has not yet – at the closure of this 
research in December 2011 – requested authorization to proceed with the suspension 
according to Article 22.7 of the DSU483.  
 Nevertheless, the first obstacle to Antigua in order to actually put in practice a 
cross-retaliation procedure is the fact that Antigua has not enacted a proper domestic 
legislation that would enable and legalize the DSB authorization. As previously mentioned, 
national legislation is a basic instrument to make cross-retaliation feasible (and more 
credible). Also, due to the enormous economic asymmetry between the members there are 
concerns whether Antigua would really have any meaningful compliance leverage over the 
US. Abbott believes that what might have some importance to the US is the “threat that 
causes the US to be concerned about the precedent of TRIPS cross-retaliation more than the 
direct economic consequences”484. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
483 Article 22.7, DSU states the following: “The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the 
nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such 
suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.  The arbitrator may also determine if the 
proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement.  However, if 
the matter referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 
have not been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim.  In the event the arbitrator determines that 
those principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining party shall apply them consistent 
with paragraph 3.  The parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties concerned shall not 
seek a second arbitration.  The DSB shall be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon 
request, grant authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with 
the decision of the arbitrator, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request”. 
484 Abbott, 2009, p. 8. About the US-Gambling dispute, see also Mendel, 2010, p. 310-316. It is also interesting 
to take a look at the memorandum prepared by students of the Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, which discusses different practical models of implementation of a 
cross-retaliation procedure for Antigua. Basically, the memorandum suggests: (i) the enactment of a domestic 
piece of legislation allowing for suspension of WTO obligations; (ii) the creation of a website with the server 
in Antigua; (iii) the suspension of the payments of the royalties to the IP rights holders and; (iv) grant of 
licenses on a free basis. IHEID, 2009. 
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4.6.3 US - Cotton485 
 
• Summary 
 
On 27 September 2002 Brazil went to the DSB to request consultations with the 
US regarding subsidies to US producers, users and/or exporters of upland cotton. The 
subsidies referred by Brazil were actionable and prohibited and the country also requested 
consultations regarding the legislation, regulations, statutory instruments and amendments 
which provide such subsidies, export credits, grants and any other prohibited assistance to US 
upland cotton industry486. 
Brazil asserted that US legislation (lato sensu) was not consistent with the 
following provisions of the WTO law: Articles 5(c), 6.3(b), (c) and (d), 3.1(a) (including item 
(j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I), 3.1(b), and 3.2 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement487; Articles 3.3, 7.1, 8, 9.1 and 10.1 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture488; and Article III:4 of GATT 1994489. 
The Panel was established on 18 March 2003490. On 8 September 2004 the Panel 
report was circulated to the members. The main findings of the report were:  
 
- agricultural export credit guarantees are subject to WTO export subsidy 
disciplines and three United States export credit guarantee programmes are 
prohibited export subsidies which have no Peace Clause protection and are 
in violation of those disciplines; 
- the United States also grants several other prohibited subsidies in respect of 
cotton; 
- United States’ domestic support programmes in respect of cotton are not 
protected by the Peace Clause, and certain of these programmes result in 
                                            
485Subsidies on Upland Cotton. Available online at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm>. 
486 WTO. WT/DS267. 
487 SCM Agreement is available at: < http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm>. 
488 Agreement on Agriculture is available at: < http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm>.  
489 Zimbabwe, India, Argentina and Canada requested to join the consultations.  
490 Argentina, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, the EC, India, Pakistan, Venezuela and later Australia, Benin, 
Chad, New Zealand and Paraguay reserved their rights as third parties. 
 185 
serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the form of price suppression in the 
world market491. 
 
On 18 December 2004 the US notified its intention to appeal. The Appellate Body 
Report was circulated to the member on 3 March 2005. The AB agreed with the panel report 
that two challenge measures – production flexibility contract and direct payments – are related 
to the type of production undertaken after the base period and then do not refer to green box492 
measures conforming fully to paragraph 6(b) of Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture; 
and, therefore, are not exempt, by virtue of Article 13(a) (ii), from actions under Article XVI 
of GATT 1994 and Part III of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. 
Also, the AB upheld the Panel’s findings in what refers to the challenged 
domestic support measures granted - between 1999 and 2002 - supported upland cotton in 
excess during the 1992 benchmark period and, therefore, these measures are not exempt, by 
virtue of Article 13(b) (ii), from actions under Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Part III 
of the SCM Agreement. Still, the Appellate Body Report in majority opinion upheld the 
panel’s finding that Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not exempt export 
credit guarantees from the export subsidy disciplines in Article 10.1 of that Agreement. 
Finally, the AB report agrees with the Panel’s finding in what concerns the US “export credit 
guarantee programmes at issue-GSM 102, GSM 103 and SCGP-constitute a per se export 
subsidy within the meaning of item (j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I 
of the SCM Agreement”493, upholding the Panel’s findings that these export programmes are 
indeed export subsidies pursuant Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and are inconsistent 
with Articles 3.1(a) of the same Agreement494. 
The DSB adopted both the Panel and the Appellate Body reports at its meeting on 
21 March 2005. By the requests of both parties, the Director-General composed a 
compliancePpanel on 25 October 2006, whose report was circulated to the WTO members on 
25 October 2006. Mainly, the report found that: 
 
                                            
491 WTO. WT/DS267. 
492 According to the WTO definition, green box refers to Domestic support for agriculture that is allowed without 
limits because it does not distort trade, or at most causes implies minimal distortion. 
493 For the US credit guarantee programmes for cotton, see < http://www.cottonusa.org/>.  
494 WTO. WT/DS267. 
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Regarding GSM 102 export credit guarantees issued after 1 July 2005 the 
United States acts inconsistently with Article 10.1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture by applying export subsidies in a manner which results in the 
circumvention of US export subsidy commitments with respect to certain 
unscheduled products and certain scheduled products, and as a result acts 
inconsistently with Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Regarding 
GSM 102 export credit guarantees issued after 1 July 2005 also acts 
inconsistently with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement by 
providing export subsidies to unscheduled products and by providing export 
subsidies to scheduled products in excess of the commitments of the United 
States under the Agreement on Agriculture. By acting inconsistently with 
Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Articles 3.1(a) and 
3.2 of the SCM Agreement the United States has failed to comply with the 
DSB recommendations and rulings. Specifically, the United States has failed 
to bring its measures into conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture and 
has failed “to withdraw the subsidy without delay”495. 
 
Both parties appealed in 2008, and on 2 June 2008, the Appellate Body report was 
circulated to Members. The AB report found that the compliance panel failed to make an 
objective assessment of the matter – export credit guarantee programme - , pursuant Article 
11 of the DSU, as it dismissed the import of the re-estimates data submitted by the US on the 
basis of internally inconsistent reasoning. On the other hand, the AB upheld the compliance 
Panel finding that the GSM 102 programme is not designed with the intention to cover its 
long term operating costs and losses and that the programme consists in an export subsidy 
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement and Article 10.1 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
 Furthermore, the Appellate Body found that acting inconsistently with the SCM 
Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, the US had failed to comply with the DSB 
recommendations and rulings and had failed to take the appropriated steps to remove the 
adverse effects or to withdraw the subsidy in the reasonable period of time496. 
Therefore, the AB recommended that the DSB request the US to bring the 
measures found to be inconsistent with the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM 
Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under those Agreements. 
                                            
495 Ibid. The compliance panel also found that once the measures taken by the US to comply with 
recommendations and rulings originally adopted by the DSB are inconsistent with the objections of the US 
under the covered agreement, the original recommendation and rulings remain valid. 
496 Article 7.8, SCM Agreement: Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is 
determined that any subsidy which has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within 
the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to 
remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy”. 
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The DSB adopted the compliance panel and the Appellate Body reports on 20 
June 2008.   
Thus on 4 July 2005 Brazil requested authorization to suspend concessions or 
other obligations (i) under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU;  
(ii) with regard to the actionable subsidies –whose reasonable period of time expired on 21 
September 2005 –, Brazil requested for authorization to suspend concessions under Article 
7.09 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU; (iii) with regard to the prohibited 
subsidies, on 5 July 2005 the parties jointly notified the DSB that they had agreed on the 
Agreed Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU and Article 4 of the SCM 
Agreement497. 
Regarding the dispute, the arbitrator decided that the complainant could: (i) with 
regard to the prohibited subsidies Brazil could request authorization to suspend concessions or 
other obligations under the Agreement on Trade in goods – Annex 1A – at the level not to 
exceed the value of US$ 147.7 million for year 2006 or, for other years, the amount to be 
determined by the calculation methodology described in the arbitrator’s decision; (ii) with 
respect to the actionable subsidies, Brazil could request authorization to suspend concessions 
or other obligations under the Agreement on Trade in goods – Annex 1A – at the level not to 
exceed the value of US$ 147.3 million annually498. On 6 November 2009, Brazil requested 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the US of concessions or other 
obligations in conformity with the arbitrators’ decisions. The authorization was granted on 19 
November 2009. 
In 2010, on March 8th, the complainant notified the DSB informing that it would 
suspend the application to the US of concessions or other obligations under the GATT 1994. 
Also, the member informed that it would also suspend concessions or other obligations under 
the TRIPS and/or the GATS Agreements499.  
                                            
497 WTO. WT/DS267. 
498 Ibid. Note that the arbitrators also determined that, “in the event that the total level of countermeasures that 
Brazil would be entitled to in a given year should increase to a level that would exceed a threshold described in 
the decisions, updated to account for the change in Brazil's total imports from the United States, then, Brazil 
would also be entitled to seek to suspend certain obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and/or the GATS 
with respect to any amount of permissible countermeasures applied in excess of that figure”. Ibid. 
499 WTO. WT/DS267/43. 
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Shortly after, as the parties engaged into negotiations with a view to reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution, on 30 April 2010 Brazil informed the DSB that it would 
postpone the imposition of the countermeasures notified on March 2010. 
 Approximately four months later, on 25 August 2010, Brazil and the United States 
informed the DSB that they had concluded a Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution for 
the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization, setting out parameters for discussion on 
a solution with respect to domestic support programmes of the US to cotton upland500. 
According to the agreement of the countries, as long as the Framework is in force, Brazil will 
not retaliate against the US, as approved by the DSB. 
 
• Cross-retaliation issues 
 
Since the Brazilian government announced the intention to cross-retaliate in 
TRIPS the dispute gained a tremendous attention from the media all around the world. Not 
only because of the interest of several WTO members-cotton producers but also because 
unlike the previous cross-retaliation procedures approved by the DSB, this time the threat to 
retaliate came from a big and increasingly developing economy. 
Even though the Brazilian government always tried to sustain the position that it 
did not wish to initiate a trade war, the country showed strength and ability in the WTO 
negotiations and affirmed that their only desire was to make the US respect the DSB and 
Appellate Body recommendations and rulings.  
The first preliminary list of retaliation published by the Brazilian government – 
Resolution 74/2009 - for public consultation of the domestic industries is from 6 November 
2009. Although it does not mention cross-retaliation procedures, the list was enacted in case 
of an eventual need to apply countermeasures to US in case of non-compliance. In Article 3 of 
this Resolution, the Brazilian government stated that the countermeasures subject to the 
consultation would consist of the imposition of additional duty of up 100 percentage points 
above the rate of import duty applied to products to be be selected by the Brazilian Foreign 
                                            
500 See WT/DS267/45. 
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Trade Chamber – in Portuguese Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX)501 -, originating and 
proceeding from the US, without prejudice to the adoption of other modalities or the 
inclusions of other tariff codes, by the decision of CAMEX502. 
After the public consultation, the list for the suspension of concessions under 
GATT 1994 was published by CAMEX through Resolution 15/2010, on 5 March 2010503. The 
government fixed the rate of import duty for a number of products with the term of 365 
days504. 
One week later, on 12 March 2010, the Brazilian government presented the list for 
cross-retaliation for consultation in TRIPS (CAMEX Resolution 16/2010), which – definitely 
– made the US government pay more attention to the Brazilian move505. And Brazil prepared 
itself well enough to publish this list. 
As previously mentioned, since 2007 Brazil has a bill – PL1893/2007 –, which 
seeks to establish a legislative framework for the suspension of TRIPS obligations and allow 
the executive power of the government to apply measures for suspension and dilution or 
dissolution of the temporary protection of intellectual property rights in Brazil for the breach 
of multilateral obligations by a foreign country within the WTO506. 
When Brazil realized that the US did not intend to comply with DSB and AB 
recommendations and rulings, President Lula on 10 February 2010, moved forward with the 
domestic legislation for suspension of concessions in TRIPS and enacted a Provisional 
                                            
501 The CAMEX was created by Decree 4.732/2003. Pursuant its Article 1, CAMEX is aimed at the formulation, 
adoption, implementation and coordination of policies and activities related to foreign trade in goods and 
services, including tourism. Decree 4.732/2003 is available online at: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2003/D4732.htm>.  
502 CAMEX Resolution 74/2009, with the first preliminary list of retaliation for public consultation is available 
online in Portuguese at: < http://www.mdic.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1257771150.pdf>. The list includes 222 
products from the US that could suffer retaliation with tariff rates of more than 100 percent of the value when 
imported to Brazil. 
503 The list of goods corresponds to an amount of retaliation of USD 591 million. The remaining annual amount 
of retaliation to which Brazil is entitled – USD 238 million, which adds up to the total authorized value of 
USD 829 million – will be applied in the sectors of intellectual property and services. 
504 CAMEX Resolution 15/2010 is available online in Portuguese at: 
<http://www.mdic.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1268063292.pdf>. 
505 CAMEX Resolution 16/2010 is available online in Portuguese at: 
<http://www.mdic.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1268663608.pdf>.  
506 See the preamble of PL 1893/2007. Moreover, the project also envisages the suspension of TRIPS-plus rights. 
See also Salles, 2010. 
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Measure – in Portuguese Medida Provisória 482/2011507. The Medida Provisória 482/2011 
provides for measures to suspend concessions or other obligations of the country on 
intellectual property rights and others, in cases of noncompliance with the obligations of the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO. This Provisional Measure was then converted in a Federal 
Legislation on 24 June 2010 – Law 12.270/2010508. 
Among other interesting provisions, Article 6 presents a list of actions that shall 
be applied individually or cumulatively, through a CAMEX Resolution in relation to 
intellectual property rights:  
 
- (i) postponement of protection from the date to be set by the 
executive power thereby reducing the term of protection, requests 
for ongoing protection of intellectual property;  
- (ii) subtracting the term of protection for a specified period at any 
time of its duration;  
- (iii) licensing of non-commercial public use, without authorization 
of the owner;  
- (iv) suspension of the exclusive right to prevent imports and the 
domestic market of goods that incorporate patent rights even if the 
imported good has not been placed in the external market directly 
by the holder of intellectual property rights or with his consent;  
- (v) increase or introduction of additional amounts due on the 
bodies or public entities for the execution of intellectual property 
rights, including their acquisition and maintenance; 
- (vi) temporarily blocking remittance of royalties or compensation 
on the exercise of intellectual property rights of national licensed 
or authorized within the national territory; 
                                            
507 In Brazilian Constitutional Law, a provisional measure is an act of proprietorship of the President, with the 
force of law without the participation of the legislative power, which will only be called to discuss it and 
approve it at a later date. The assumption of the Medida Provisória is urgency and importance, cumulatively. 
508 Lei 12.270/2010 available online in Portuguese at: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-
2010/2010/Lei/L12270.htm>. 
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- (vii) the application of commercial rights to be deducted from the 
remuneration that you entitled the holder of intellectual property 
rights, or; 
- (viii) the creation of mandatory registration for obtaining and 
maintaining intellectual property rights509. 
 
Thus unlike the other WTO members which received the right to cross-retaliate 
under TRIPS but did not have a domestic legislation to support the suspension of intellectual 
property rights of IPRs holders, in legal terms Brazil is currently prepared for such an action, 
if necessary. 
The list of suspension in intellectual property rights is contained in the CAMEX 
Resolution 16/2010, which established suspension on several kinds of patents, copyrights and 
trademarks. 
A simulation made by Lakatos et.al. shows the welfare impacts of the retaliation 
plan of Brazil, isolating the trade retaliation effects from the IP cross-retaliation effects. The 
table of these authors is reproduced below and it estimates the welfare gain/loss from private 
consumption considering both types of proposed retaliation510. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
509 Article 6, Lei 12.270/2010. 
510 See Lakatos; Walmsley, 2011. 
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Volume Changes in Private Consumption ($mil) 
 Trade Retaliation IP Retaliation 
 US Brazil US Brazil 
Agriculture  0.05 - 0.45 -1.06 1.38 
Vegetables, 
fruits and nuts 
0.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.15 
Plant-Based 
Fibers 
0.61 -2.71 -0.05 0.15 
Mining -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Food products -0.39 -0.72 -3.34 4.75 
Vegetable, oils 
and fats 
-0.06 -0.25 -0.13 1.16 
Dairy products -0.17 -0.55 -1.43 2.17 
Other 
Agricultural 
Products  
-3.10 .4.03 -5.84 9.20 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
products 
-1.53 -0.38 -2.70 2.36 
Textiles -1.28 -1.21 -1.67 1.20 
Wearing apparel -4.71 -1.73 -4.59 3.10 
Manufactures -8.65 -0.39 -10.00 5.97 
Chemical, 
rubber, plastic 
products 
-6.05 -3.47 -7.05 7.54 
Metal products -0.48 -0.13 -0.55 0.67 
Motor vehicles 
and parts 
-8.68 -1.71 -8.93 8.63 
Transport 
equipment nec 
-0.81 -0.06 -1.12 0.51 
Electronic 
equipment 
-3.78 -1.18 -3.18 4.24 
Machinery and 
equipment nec. 
-4.44 -0.86 -4.87 2.50 
Manufactures 
nec. 
-4.84 -0.68 -4.28 2.81 
Royalty services -0.06 0.01 -0.05 5.12 
Other business 
services 
-1.03 -0.78 -3.19 19.97 
Services -52.98 -3.20 -171.53 88.03 
Total -102.39 -24.59 -235.59 171.63 
Table VI – Source: Lakatos; Walmsley, 2011. 
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If private consumption is considered, Brazil has a negative impact if the country 
utilizes only trade retaliation – tariff duties – and a considerable positive impact in IP 
retaliation. The authors made other comparisons besides the private consumption. They also 
considered the volume changes in output and welfare decomposition of WTO members and 
overall multilateral trade511.  The negative impact of trade retaliation and the positive impact of 
suspension of concession in intellectual property rights appear in every simulation. Therefore, 
Brazil cross-retaliating in TRIPS would be fundamental to produce a welfare impact in the 
domestic economy. 
The threat of sanctions led to intense negotiations between Brazil and the US in 
the first semester of 2010 in order to find a mutual agreement and try to avoid the Brazilian 
cross-retaliation. In April 2010 both members presented a preliminary memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) regarding a fund for technical assistance and capacity building with 
respect to the cotton dispute identifying certain measures and actions that if respected by the 
US, would lead to the suspension of Brazil’s threatened retaliation512.  
Two months later, on 25 June 2010, Brazil and the US concluded the “Framework 
for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization 
(WT/DS267)”513. Basically, the Framework “sets out parameters for discussions on a solution 
with respect to domestic support programs for upland cotton in the United States, as well as a 
process of joint operation reviews as regards export credit guarantees under the program 
GSM-10”514. As a consequence of the Framework, Brazil had to suspend trade 
retaliation/cross-retaliation against the US.  
In reality, neither Brazil nor the US really wished to enter into a trade war. Both 
countries would lose, and Brazil could even risk losing its access to the US market under the 
                                            
511 Id., p. 24-25. 
512 The “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding a Fund for Technical Assistance and Capacity 
Building with respect to the Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267) in the World Trade Organization” is available online 
at: < http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/files/MOUonaFundforTAandCB-Apr202010.pdf>.  
513 The “Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization 
(WT/DS267)” is available online at: 
<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS267%FC%2
A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F267%2D45%2EDOC%2EHTM&cur
doc=3&popTitle=WT%2FDS267%2F45>. 
514 Id., p. 1. About the US-Cotton see also Schnepf, 2011. 
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General System of Preferences515. Nevertheless, it has to be said that the threat from Brazil 
made the US government move. Probably more for political than for economic reasons, the 
two WTO members stepped back on the dispute and are trying to reach a reasonable solution 
for both sides. Currently, the US is paying Brazil to avoid retaliation. Following the DSU, that 
solution is not really the preferred outcome to settle a dispute, since the real aim of retaliation 
is to induce compliance. 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter was intended to give an overall explanation about the intellectual 
property world, and how it interacts with the dispute settlement issues here discussed. 
Mainly, the intention was to guide the research to what type of intellectual 
property rights promote a feasible possibility to an eventual cross-retaliation and to clarify the 
rationale of how to valuate these rights when the calculation is necessary considering the level 
of nullification and impairment. 
Also, the research wishes to show some of the important challenges developing 
countries might confront if they opt for the suspension in TRIPS obligations. National 
implementation, international commitments, economic feasibility - i.e. basic knowledge, 
domestic market size, costs of implementation -, and the political pressure the countries may 
face are some of these issues. 
 As the mechanism of retaliation is an essential political instrument, it is believed 
that the above-mentioned elements do play a significant role in a successful cross-retaliation 
and/or in a credible threat of cross-retaliation. Indeed, that leads to the understanding that the 
suspension of concessions in TRIPS is not for every developing country. Only countries with 
sufficient domestic market size with a considerable consumer demand, with basic technology 
to take advantage of a suspension of patents (for example), and with strength to confront the 
lobbies from powerful IP-dependent industries are capable of taking advantage of a 
suspension of concessions in TRIPS. 
                                            
515 The General System of Preferences (GSP) is a system of exemption from the MFN principle that imposes that 
WTO member countries treat the imports of all other WTO member countries no worse than they treat the 
imports of their "most favored" trading partner. More information on the GSP of the US is available online at: 
<http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2880>. 
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The three cases in which cross-retaliation was requested and approved by the 
DSB, despite the fact that none of them was put in practice, show the difficulty of the 
mechanism and the asymmetries of the two first complainants – Ecuador and Antigua – and 
Brazil. Brazil is by far more prepared to confront a strong potency like the US. Although the 
three threats made the respondents move forward in the direction of an agreement, probably 
Brazil was the only of the complainants that could really – economically speaking - put in 
force a cross-retaliation procedure in the domestic environment and take advantage of an 
increase of its social welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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International trade is one of the founding reasons of foreign relations among 
States. For centuries countries have been exchanging goods in order to export their own 
products and supply domestic demands importing from partners. More than ever before, 
multilateral trade is a key element of international connections among countries worldwide, 
and an indispensable factor for global economic growth. 
In that sense, the establishment of the WTO is a remarkable historic event. Since 
1995 multilateral trade has boosted economic growth. The WTO data estimates that between 
$109 billion and $510 billion were added to the world income as impact of the Uruguay 
Round finished in 1994. Empirical evidence is often amassed and demonstrates that lower 
trade barriers are good for all members of national economies. It allows a freer movement of 
goods, incentive of investment flows and permits a rapid transfer of technology and 
information across the world, promoting a great incentive to innovation. 
The WTO rule-based system is a major contributor to the well-functioning of the 
multilateral trade.  By submitting all the Members to the same rules, it truly reduces some 
inequalities. Relying on nondiscrimination-based principles, the WTO system constrains 
unilateral actions – especially from powerful members – and helps in the process of correcting 
the imbalances among countries.  
This study addresses the question whether: taking into account the large economic 
imbalances of WTO Members and the difficulty of developing country members to induce 
compliance with WTO decisions, does cross-retaliation in TRIPS obligations contribute to a 
better effectiveness of the dispute settlement system where developing country Members are 
concerned? 
In order to introduce the research theme – the multilateral trading system -, 
chapter two dealt with aspects and peculiarities of the multilateral trading system. Elements of 
international public law and international economic law used throughout the dissertation were 
presented in this section.  A basic background of international economic law is provided in 
this chapter.  Given the fact that the WTO is an international organization established by an 
international public law treaty, it was important to provide an overview of issues of State 
responsibility and the notion of what is currently understood by sovereignty of States in that 
chapter. Especially the principles of State responsibility are found to be important to explain 
the levels of noncompliance with WTO decisions, as indicated in the chapter four. 
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In that context, this study pays special attention to the dispute settlement system 
with its strengths and weaknesses. There is no doubt that the DSU provisions succeeded – to a 
great extent - in promoting security and predictability in global trade relations. The 
considerable number of disputes dealt with by the WTO to date reveals, both the faith that 
member States have in the system, and the increase of its credibility. However, the dispute 
settlement system has inconsistencies and gaps that cannot be ignored provide the motivation 
for the present dissertation.  
In chapter three the jurisdiction and procedures of the system was analyzed, with 
especial attention to the implementation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In that 
regard, the chapter describes the functioning of the WTO remedies, i.e. compensation and 
suspension of concessions and other obligations.  
More specifically, the procedure of suspension of concessions and other 
obligations – such as retaliation in relation to goods or services other than those subject to the 
dispute, hence cross-retaliation – of intellectual property rights pursuant the TRIPS 
Agreement were analyzed in this study. Retaliation in this context refers to a mechanism 
normally available only when the complainant is a developing country, while the respondent 
is a powerful and developed member. Given the fact that retaliation is typically allowed only 
when traditional compensatory measures are thought to be neither practical nor effective, the 
analysis demonstrated that cross-retaliation is indeed an interesting option for some 
developing countries.  
Preliminarily, in response to the problem posed by this dissertation, the analysis 
concluded that cross-retaliation in TRIPS can in fact contribute to a greater effectiveness of 
the dispute settlement system. Nevertheless, that conclusion has several caveats and should be 
approached with caution, as  elaborated in chapter four. 
Still, chapter three already addresses the potential difficulties that should be 
considered regarding the implementation phase of the DSU. In the implementation of WTO 
decisions, the concept of State sovereignty may come into play. Losing Members affected by 
DSB recommendations and rulings may be tempted to invoke State sovereignty as a shield of 
protection in order to circumvent compliance with the decisions. Notwithstanding, following 
the concepts of international public law, it is argued that (i) with the current interdependence 
among States there is no space for former concepts of absolute sovereignty of States; (ii) the 
WTO members voluntarily signed their participation and submission to the WTO laws and 
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rulings, which shall be compulsorily respected: and (iii) Members shall be held responsible 
for the breaches of their international obligations and therefore shall be made to repair the 
damages caused by their violations. 
Also worth noting is that in the same chapter the binding effect of the DSB 
recommendations and rulings is addressed. WTO Members have a pacta sunt servanda 
obligation according to which Members voluntarily agreed to compulsorily award a third 
party to settle their trade disputes. There seems to be a tendency to water-down the binding 
effect of the recommendations given by both the DSB and the Appellate Body. Although the 
term ‘recommendation’ can be understood to have a permissive connotation, the analysis of 
the present study support giving a full binding effect to the term ‘recommendation’. 
Moreover, in chapter three findings related to the asymmetry of WTO Members 
were presented, such as economic, political and social asymmetries that are direct and 
indirectly involved in the discussion. Even though multilateral trade does boost global 
economic growth, the differences that separate WTO players are considerable.  
The study concludes that limited economic leverage and the lack of legal capacity 
to litigate in the WTO may be strong reasons constraining the use of the system by developing 
countries, especially where small economies are concerned. Those reasons, therefore, limit 
the Members concerned to take full advantage of the dispute settlement system.  
However, even if these developing countries find means to circumvent the 
difficulties associated with entry to the system, other problems appear. In a later stage of the 
dispute, the economic and political asymmetries play an important role when it comes to the 
inducement of compliance with the recommendations and decision in the implementation 
phase. In considering a traditional compensatory measures, such as imposition of tariff duties, 
imposed by developing countries are usually counterproductive and will not cause any 
pressure to induce compliance. On the contrary, they will often bite the country imposing the 
sanction. In that scenario the possibility of cross-retaliation emerges as an attractive option for 
developing countries. Especially cross-retaliation in TRIPS obligations is found to be very 
effective in producing a credible threat to induce compliance by a recalcitrant Member. 
This study concludes that compliance is not optional for WTO Members. Instead, 
compliance with WTO law and therefore with DSB recommendations and rulings is 
mandatory. 
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With regards to the question of whether the economic asymmetry of members 
contributes to the noncompliance with recommendations and decisions, the study concluded 
that yes, it does. Although WTO Members can choose to comply with their obligations for 
many other reasons, this study assumes that a credible threat of retaliation does promote 
great level of incentive for compliance. 
Finally the analysis in chapter three leads to the conclusion that a traditional 
compensatory mechanism pursuant the DSU goes in the opposite direction of raising 
standards of living and improving social welfare of WTO Members. Instead, retaliation 
resulting into additional tariff duties can produce extremely detrimental effects to 
international trade. 
Chapter four focuses on intellectual property in order to test the central hypothesis 
of the research. In order to understand and analyze the effectiveness of suspension of 
concessions and other obligations pursuant the TRIPS Agreement as a retaliatory weapon, 
general concept of intellectual property were addressed. The first section offered an overview 
of the intellectual property world: agreements and types of IP rights. The study was extremely 
important in order to clarify each IP right singularities and functions and to preliminary select 
which intellectual property rights would be more suitable to promote a successful cross-
retaliation in TRIPS. After writing this section of the research, it was understood that in the 
case of an eventual cross-retaliation, the suspension on patents and copyrights may be the best 
and most practical option to stimulate both inducement of compliance and increase social 
welfare. 
The first section offers an overview of the intellectual property world: 
international agreements and types of IP rights. This overview is necessary in order to clarify 
intellectual property right singularities and functions allowing the author to visualize and map 
the subject. This enables the selection of which intellectual property rights would be more 
suitable to promote a successful cross-retaliation in TRIPS. After testing IP rights as to their 
suitability as cross-retaliatory instruments, it is submitted that in the case of an eventual cross-
retaliation, the suspension on patents and copyrights could be the best and most feasible 
options in addressing both inducement of compliance and increase of social welfare. 
Thus, it was logical to explore in this chapter how to establish the suspension on 
TRIPS obligations and to describe the basic rationale to calculate the level of retaliation. The 
level of cross-retaliation in TRIPS, according to DSU provisions, has to be equivalent and 
 200 
proportional to the level of nullification and impairment resulting from the issue at the center 
of the dispute before the DSB. Accordingly, the present study details four elements that have 
to be considered in the valuation of the cross-retaliation in IP, namely: equivalence, 
proportionality, social welfare and export markets. Although the arbitrators have the final 
world in matters of level of retaliation calculation, the suspending country has to be diligent in 
showing how to address equivalence and proportionality and, at the same time, indicate the 
increase of social welfare that the cross-retaliation may proportionately (provide) besides 
identifying the possible export markets.  
Indeed, the retaliation in TRIPS presents challenges to be put in practice. This 
research tackles the ones that are most relevant to the suspending country. Therefore, the third 
section of chapter four set out to chart the challenges and costs – for the complainant - of 
suspending concessions and other obligations in TRIPS.  
It can be concluded that the primary and most basic element that should be 
provided by the suspending country government is a national legislation on the topic.  
In order to make cross-retaliation feasible, the suspending country has to provide 
for the enactment of a domestic legislation that enables the procedure. That is necessary so as 
not to infer an illegal action in the domestic jurisdiction. Unlike traditional compensatory 
measures, which deal with public rights – i.e. tariff duties -, cross-retaliation in TRIPS affects 
private rights that are subject to proprietary claims before national courts. Addressing the 
same nature of challenge, the dissertation also tackles the international commitments that may 
come into play.  
The study concludes that the fear that actions of suspensions in TRIPS would be 
incompatible with other international treaties is quite unfounded. On the one hand, because 
TRIPS incorporated Paris and Berne Conventions, and on the other because undertaking 
WTO obligations does not necessarily imply the exclusion of WIPO conventions and 
commitments. The systems work together (as a whole or incrementally).   
In addressing the economic feasibility of suspending concessions in TRIPS, the 
study covers the key challenges to the procedural requirement. Most of the WTO Members do 
not have economic conditions to proceed with a cross-retaliation. And for cross-retaliation to 
achieve the goals of inducement of compliance and social welfare increase, the developing 
country suspending concessions in TRIPS has to have considerable economic means to make 
the procedure feasible.  
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Basically, this dissertation concludes that the suspending country has to have (i) a 
considerable domestic market size; (ii) basic knowledge; and (iii) sufficient means to afford 
the costs of retaliation. 
 First, the size of the domestic market matters since the country has to have 
sufficient product or service-related demand to justify and pay for the investments to 
implement the benefits of suspending IP rights. Second, if the suspending country does not 
pursue enough know-how and means to take advantage of the suspension of a patent (for 
example) the cross-retaliation produces no effect. Third, implementing the measures of cross-
retaliation in the suspending country may represent considerably high investments in the 
domestic structure in order to profit from the suspension of intellectual property rights. 
Further challenges of a more political nature are covered in the third section of 
chapter four. It is argued that the main obstacle to implement cross-retaliatory measures for 
developing countries may be the political pressure from governments and stakeholders of 
developed countries. Powerful IP-dependent industries can be expected to lobby intensively to 
tarnish the reputation of the developing country trying to put in force cross-retaliatory 
measures. 
In order to see how all the elements work in practice, the last section of chapter 
four reviews the three cases where requests for cross-retaliation were made and approved by 
the WTO, namely: the EC-Bananas III, the US-Gambling and the US-Upland Cotton 
decisions. The section shows the procedural difficulties of putting the measures into practices 
as evidenced by the fact that these disputes did not yield practical approval. Also, the analysis 
in this section confirmed the assumptions made in relation to the challenges and difficulties 
aforementioned and showed that within the group of developing country complainants 
(Ecuador, Antigua and Brazil) only Brazil could really put in force a credible threat of the 
proposed cross-retaliation in TRIPS. 
In light of the ambition to strive towards a more balanced multilateral trade, the 
study nevertheless concludes that: 
The mandatory observation of trade rules is the primary requirement for fair play. 
Cross-retaliation in TRIPS can function as a development instrument through the promotion 
of the dissemination of information, the incentive of innovation and therefore, through the 
promotion of social welfare increase. 
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In view of the above, the final conclusions of this study on the cross-retaliation in 
TRIPS and compliance issues at the WTO, specially focusing on the situation of Member 
asymmetries in the implementation phase can be summarized as follows: 
 
(i) The emergence of the WTO and its dispute settlement system delivered 
predictability and legal security in the multilateral trade arena; 
(ii) As members of an international organization, States (and Members) are liable 
pursuant International Public Law rules for their attitudes and breach of obligations regarding 
the WTO. This includes the breach of the obligation to comply with the DSB and Appellate 
Body decisions; 
(iii) Adopted DSB rulings and recommendations are binding and must be observed by 
WTO Members; 
(iv) The asymmetries of WTO Members as described in the dissertation can be 
translated into huge differences regarding GDP, market share, technological means, 
innovation and political power; 
(v) Many WTO Members do not enjoy the benefits of the dispute settlement system 
as they cannot gather financial resources to improve their own legal capacity to ligate; 
(vi) Although the WTO presents a high percentage of compliance within its dispute 
settlement decisions, the number does not indicate only cases of full compliance as it 
considers partial compliance of decisions and negotiations among Members instead of 
compliance. However, every instance of noncompliance is very problematic to the multilateral 
trade system; 
(vii) The mechanism of retaliation is a political instrument and as such, being capable 
of posing a credible threat to the violator, is essential for the system to work; 
(viii) In considering cross-retaliation, the suspension on IP rights is interesting, because 
it affects sensible and powerful sectors of IP-dependent industries, mostly concentrated in 
developed countries; 
(ix) National implementation, international commitments, economic feasibility - i.e. 
domestic market size, basic knowledge, costs of implementation -, and the political pressure 
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are elements that should be taken in consideration by the developing country wishing to cross-
retaliate; 
(x) The suspension of concessions in TRIPS is not suitable for every developing 
country. Only countries with sufficient domestic market size with a considerable consumer 
demand, with a developed technology base, and with strength to confront the lobbies from 
powerful IP-dependent industries are capable of taking advantage of cross-retaliation in 
TRIPS; 
(xi) As not all the developing members are capable of delivering a credible threat of 
cross-retaliation, collective retaliation could be a solution for the lack of bargaining power of 
smaller economies; 
(xii) A credible threat of cross-retaliation in TRIPS does instill in the WTO Members a 
certain level of persuasion for compliance with decisions and recommendations of the DSB 
and AB. 
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6. SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIES 
Internationale handel staat onder andere aan de basis van internationale betrekkingen tussen 
landen. Over de eeuwen heen hebben landen goederen verhandeld door eigen producten te 
exporteren en van handelspartners te importeren om the kunnen voldoen aan interne vraag. 
Meer dan ooit tevoren is multilaterale handel een onmisbare schakel in internationale 
contacten, en vormt het een belangrijke factor voor internationale economische groei. 
In dit kader is het ontstaan van de Wereld Handelsorganisatie (WTO) van historische 
betekenis. Sinds 1995 heeft het de multilaterale handel doen toenemen. De WTO schat dat als 
gevolg van de in 1994 afgesloten Uruguay ronde van onderhandelingen wereldwijd het 
inkomen tussen de 109 en 510 biljoen Amerikaanse dollars is toegenomen. Onderzoek toont 
aan dat lagere douanetarieven positief zijn voor de nationale economieën van alle WTO leden. 
Reductie van handelsbarrières draagt bij aan vrijer verkeer van goederen, het doen van 
investeringen en aan snelle overdracht van technologie en informatie. 
De WTO wet- en regelgeving levert een substantiële bijdrage aan het functioneren van de 
multilaterale handel. Door alle Lidstaten aan dezelfde regels te onderwerpen, wordt een aantal 
ongelijkheden gereduceerd. Door uit te gaan van een non-discriminatie principes, beperkt het 
WTO systeem eenzijdig handelen – vooral van machtige Lidstaten – en helpt in het herstel 
van disbalans tussen landen. 
• Deze studie behandelt de vraag of: met in acht neming van het feit dat er grote 
economische verschillen tussen WTO Lidstaten bestaan en dat het afdwingen van 
nakoming van WTO uitspraken en normen voor ontwikkelingslanden problemen 
oplevert, kruislingse vergelding met betrekking tot opschorting van TRIPS 
verplichtingen bij draagt aan een verhoogde efficiency van het conflict-
beslechtingssysteem wanneer ontwikkelingslanden betrokken zijn. 
Ter introductie van dit onderzoeksthema worden in hoofdstuk twee aspecten en bijzondere 
eigenschappen van het multilaterale handelssysteem behandeld. Onderdelen van het 
internationaal publiekrecht en internationaal economisch recht, waaraan in het gehele werk 
aan gerefereerd wordt, worden hier geïntroduceerd. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een basale 
introductie in het internationaal economisch recht gepresenteerd. Gezien het feit dat de WTO 
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als internationale organisatie is gevestigd bij internationaal publiekrechtelijk verdrag, was het 
belangrijk in dit hoofdstuk een overzicht te verschaffen van principes van statelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid en datgene wat heden ten dage wordt verstaan onder soevereiniteit van 
staten. Met name het begrip statelijke verantwoordelijkheid blijkt, zoals later aangegeven in 
hoofdstuk vier, belangrijk te zijn voor de verklaring van de niveaus van niet nakoming met 
WTO uitspraken. 
In deze context besteedt deze studie bijzondere aandacht aan de sterkten en zwakten van het 
geschillenbeslechtingssysteem. Het staat buiten kijf dat de bepalingen van het ‘Dispute 
Settlement Understanding’ (DSU) in grote mate bepalend zijn voor het bewerkstelligen van 
de veiligheid en voorspelbaarheid in globale handelsrelaties. Het aanzienlijk aantal geschillen 
dat door de WTO tot op heden is behandeld toont zowel het vertrouwen van de Lidstaten in 
het system, en anderzijds de toenemende geloofwaardig erin aan. Het systeem ken echter ook 
onmiskenbare tegenstrijdigheden en lacunes welke niet terzijde kunnen worden geschoven en 
die de aanleiding zijn voor de huidige studie. 
In hoofdstuk drie zij de jurisdictie en procedures van het systeem geanalyseerd, waarbij met 
name aandacht is besteed aan de implementatie van het DSU. In dit opzicht beschrijft het 
hoofdstuk het functioneren van WTO remedies, zoals compensatie en het opschorten van 
concessies of andere verplichtingen. Meer bepaald, de procedure van het opschorten van 
concessies en andere verplichtingen -zoals vergelding met betrekking tot andere goederen of 
diensten dan die onderdeel uitmaken van het geschil, dus kruislingse vergelding- van 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten voortvloeiend uit het TRIPS Verdrag zijn in deze studie 
geanalyseerd. In deze context is kruislingse vergelding een mechanisme dat  normalerwijze 
alleen beschikbaar is wanneer de eiser een ontwikkelingsland is, terwijl de gedaagde een 
machtig en ontwikkeld land is. Gezien het feit dat kruislingse vergelding alleen dan 
beschikbaar is wanneer traditionele compensatoire maatregelen niet als praktisch of effectief 
worden gezien, kan uit de analyse worden opgemaakt dat kruislingse vergelding inderdaad 
een interessante optie is voor ontwikkelingslanden.  
• In licht van de onderzoeksvraag die ten grondslag ligt aan deze studie, leidt de 
analyse dan ook tot de primaire conclusie dat kruislingse vergelding ten aanzien van 
TRIPS verplichtingen bij kan dragen tot een grotere effectiviteit van het 
geschillenbeslechtingssysteem. De conclusie moet echter voorzien worden van een 
aantal kwalificaties en caveats, zoals in hoofdstuk vier verder uitgewerkt. 
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Nochtans worden in hoofdstuk drie reeds de mogelijke moeilijkheden behandeld welke van 
belang zijn in de implementatie fase van de DSU. Bij het implementeren van WTO 
beslissingen komt het concept van soevereiniteit van naties om de hoek kijken. Verliezende 
Leden die door de aanbevelingen en uitspraken van de Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) 
worden getroffen zouden soevereiniteit van naties kunnen inroepen om onder hun 
nakomingsverplichting uit te komen. Desalniettemin moet op basis van het internationaal 
publiekrecht worden aangenomen dat: (i) in het kader van de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van 
Staten geen plaats meer is voor het oude concept van absolute soevereiniteit van Naties; (ii) 
de WTO Leden zich vrijwillig door toetreding onderwerpen aan het WTO recht en uitspraken, 
welke binden zijn en moeten worden nagekomen; en (iii) Leden verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
het niet nakomen van hun internationale verplichtingen, waardoor zij ook verplicht zijn in 
geval van niet-nakoming schade te vergoeden. 
Het moet ook worden gezegd dat in hetzelfde hoofdstuk het bindend karakter van de DSB 
aanbevelingen en uitspraken wordt behandeld. WTO Leden hebben een pacta sunt servanda 
verplichting, waaronder de Leden vrijwillig hebben besloten tot het verlenen van een 
automatische compensatie voor een derde partij om handelsgeschillen te beslechten. Er lijkt 
een tendens te bestaan om het bindend karakter van zowel DSB en Appellate Body (AB) 
aanbevelingen te veronachtzamen.  
Hoewel de notie ‘aanbeveling’ een permissief karakter lijkt te hebben, geeft de analyse in 
deze studie aanleiding aan de term ‘aanbeveling’ een volledig bindend karakter toe te kennen. 
Vervolgens zijn in hoofdstuk drie bevindingen met betrekking tot economische asymmetrie 
van WTO Leden gepresenteerd, zoals economische, politieke en sociale asymmetrie die van 
direct belang is voor de discussie. Ook al jaagt multilateraal handel globale economische 
groei aan, blijven de verschillen tussen onderlinge WTO Leden substantieel.  
• De studie concludeert dat beperkt economisch gewicht en een gebrek aan 
juridische capaciteit om WTO geschillen aan te spannen zwaarwegende reden zijn die 
het gebruik van het systeem door ontwikkelingslanden, met name die met een kleine 
economie, beperkt. Deze redenen staan derhalve in de weg aan de mogelijkheid van 
dit soort Leden om effectief gebruik te kunnen maken van het 
geschillenbeslechtingssysteem. 
Zelfs wanneer deze ontwikkelingslanden de middelen vinden om de moeilijkheden met 
betrekking tot het verwerven van toegang tot het systeem te overwinnen, doemen er andere 
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problemen op. In een later stadium van het geschil speelt namelijk de economische en 
politieke asymmetrie op wanneer het aan komt op het afdwingen van nakoming in de 
implementatiefase van de aanbevelingen en de uitspraak. Goed beschouwd zijn traditionele 
compensatoire maatregelen, zoals het opleggen van douanetarieven, opgelegd door 
ontwikkelingslanden doorgaans contraproductief en er gaat geen druk vanuit om nakoming af 
te dwingen. In tegendeel, deze maatregelen schaden doorgaans het land dat de sanctie op 
wenst te leggen. In dat geval biedt de mogelijkheid van kruislingse vergelding een 
aantrekkelijke mogelijkheid voor ontwikkelingslanden. Met name kruislingse vergelding met 
betrekking tot TRIPS verplichtingen blijkt een zeer effectief wapen te zijn om een 
weerspannig Lid tot nakoming te bewegen. 
• De studie concludeert dat nakoming niet optioneel is voor WTO Leden. 
Integendeel, nakoming met WTO recht en DSB aanbevelingen en uitspraken is 
verplicht. 
• Waar het de vraag betreft of economische asymmetrie tussen Leden bij draagt aan 
niet-nakoming van aanbevelingen en uitspraken, is de conclusie van de studie 
bevestigend. Hoewel WTO Leden ervoor kunnen kiezen om hun verplichtingen op 
basis van allerlei andere redenen na te komen, neemt deze studie het standpunt in dat 
een geloofwaardige dreiging van vergelding een grotere incentive voor nakoming 
promoot. 
• Ten slotte leidt de analyse in hoofdstuk drie tot de conclusie dat een traditioneel 
mechanisme van compensatoire mechanisme van de DSU het tegenovergestelde 
bewerkstelligd van het doel van verhoging van levensstandaard en sociaal nut in WTO 
Leden. In tegendeel, vergelding resulterend in hogere douanetarieven kunnen zeer 
schadelijke hebben voor internationale handel. 
Hoofdstuk vier gaat in op intellectuele eigendom om de centrale hypothese van dit onderzoek 
te testen. Om de effectiviteit van de opschorting van concessies en andere verplichtingen 
onder het TRIPS Verdrag te begrijpen en analyseren, zijn allereerst algemene concepten van 
intellectuele eigendom (IE) beschreven. Het eerste deel geeft een overzicht van de 
(internationale) wereld van intellectuele eigendom: internationale verdragen en soorten IE 
rechten. Dit overzicht is noodzakelijk om functies en eigenschappen van afzonderlijke 
intellectuele eigendomsrechten te verhelderen, hetgeen de auteur in staat stelde om het veld te 
overzien en in kaart te brengen. Dit maakt het mogelijk de intellectuele eigendomsrechten te 
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selecteren die zich het best lenen voor kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS. Na IE rechten te 
hebben getoetst op hun geschiktheid als kruislings vergeldingsinstrument, kan worden 
opgeworpen dat in geval van een eventuele kruislingse vergelding, de opschorting van 
octrooi- en auteursrechten zich het best lenen voor het bewerkstelligen van de doelstellingen 
van zowel nakoming alsook verhoging van het sociaal nut. 
Het was derhalve logisch om in dit hoofdstuk na te gaan hoe de opschorting van TRIPS 
verplichtingen vast te stellen en de ratio te beschrijven voor de berekening van de omvang van 
de vergelding. De omvang van de kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS moet, volgens de 
bepalingen van de DSU, gelijk en proportioneel zijn aan de omvang van het verlies en 
handelsbelemmering die het gevolg is van het geschil dat bij de DSB aanhangig is. De huidige 
studie onderscheidt daarom vier elementen die in aanmerking moeten worden genomen in de 
berekening van kruislingse vergelding in IE, namelijk: equivalentie, proportionaliteit, sociaal 
nut, en export markten. Hoewel de arbiters het laatste woord hebben waar het de vaststelling 
en berekening van de omvang van de vergelding, moet het opschortende land zorgvuldig 
aantonen hoe equivalentie en proportionaliteit, en tegelijkertijd een verhoging in het sociale 
nut dat kruislingse vergelding op proportionele wijze bewerkstelligt, kan worden bereikt en 
moet het de mogelijke export markten identificeren. De vergelding in TRIPS is niet makkelijk 
in praktijk te brengen en er zijn zekere uitdagingen. Dit onderzoek gaat in op die uitdagingen 
die het meest relevant zijn voor het land dat verplichtingen op wenst te schorten. In het derde 
deel van hoofdstuk vier worden de uitdagingen en kosten –voor de klager- van het opschorten 
van concessies en verplichtingen onder TRIPS in kaart gebracht. 
• Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de primaire en essentiële voorwaarde voor 
opschorting die door de nationale wetgever moet worden geschapen gelegen is in 
nationale wetgeving over dit onderwerp. 
Om kruislingse vergelding mogelijk te maken moet het opschortende land voorzien in 
nationale wetgeving die een dergelijke procedure mogelijk maakt. Dit is noodzakelijk om 
onwettige maatregelen in de nationale rechtsorde te voorkomen. In tegenstelling tot 
traditionele compensatoire maatregelen welke betrekking hebben op publieke rechten –
douanerechten-, worden in geval van kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS private rechten 
getroffen, welke als eigendomsrechten voor de nationale gerechten kunnen worden geclaimd. 
In hetzelfde licht worden ook de internationale verplichtingen die in deze context relevant zijn 
belicht. 
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• De studie concludeert dat de vrees dat vergeldingsacties in TRIPS zich met 
andere internationale verplichtingen niet zou verdragen ongegrond is. Anderzijds 
brengt de incorporatie van de Conventies van Parijs en Bern in TRIPS, alsook de 
verplichtingen onder het WTO verdrag niet noodzakelijk met zich mee dat WIPO 
Conventies en verplichtingen niet zij uitgesloten. De systemen werken tezamen  (als 
geheel of incrementeel). 
Waar het de economische haalbaarheid van opschorting van concessies in TRIPS betreft, 
behandelt de studie de voornaamste uitdagingen voor de procedurele voorwaarden. De meeste 
WTO Leden hebben niet de economische condities die noodzakelijk zijn voor het indienen 
van kruislingse vergelding. Om kruislingse vergelding een rol te laten spelen in het bereiken 
van de doelstellingen van nakoming en toename van sociaal nut, moet het ontwikkelingsland 
dat TRIPS verplichtingen opschort over substantiële economische middelen beschikken om 
voordeel te behalen bij deze procedure.  
• In essentie concludeert de studie dat het opschortende land moet beschikken over 
(i) een omvangrijke nationale markt; (ii) voldoende kennis; en (iii) voldoende 
middelen om de kosten van vergelding op te vangen. 
Ten eerste,  is de omvang van de nationale markt van belang omdat in het land voldoende 
product or dienst-gerelateerde vraag moet bestaan om de investeringen die noodzakelijk zijn 
om te profiteren van de opschorting van IE rechten te verantwoorden en bekostigen. Ten 
tweede, indien het opschortende land niet over voldoende know-how en middelen beschikt 
om voordeel te verkrijgen uit het opschorten van (bijvoorbeeld) een octrooi, sorteer de 
kruislingse vergelding geen effect. Ten derde, de implementatie van de kruislingse 
vergeldingsmaatregelen kan hoge investeringen met zich mee brengen om te kunnen 
profiteren van de opschorting van IE rechten. 
Additionele uitdagingen van meer politieke aard worden behandeld in het derde deel van 
hoofdstuk vier. Hierin wordt aangegeven dat de grootste uitdaging voor ontwikkelingslanden 
om kruislingse vergelding uit te voeren waarschijnlijk gelegen is in de politieke druk die door 
regeringen en belanghebbenden van ontwikkelde landen wordt uitgeoefend. Van machtige IE-
afhankelijke bedrijven kan worden verwacht dat zijn intensief lobbyen om zo de reputatie van 
het ontwikkelingsland dat tracht kruislingse vergeldingsmaatregelen in te voeren te 
beschadigen. 
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Om te zien hoe alle elementen in de praktijk werken,  geeft het laatste deel van hoofdstuk vier 
een overzicht van de drie  zaken waarin verzoeken tot kruislingse vergelding werden gedaan 
en gehonoreerd door de WTO, namelijk: de zaken EC-Bananas II, US-Gambling en US-
Upland Cotton. Dit onderdeel belicht de procedurele moeilijkheden bij het effectueren van de 
maatregelen, blijkens het feit dat deze geschillen niet leidden tot praktische toestemming. De 
analyse in dit onderdeel bevestigt ook de gemaakte aannames met betrekking tot de 
bovengenoemde uitdagingen en moeilijkheden, en laat zien dat binnen de groep eisende 
ontwikkelingslanden (Ecuador, Antigua en Brazilië) alleen Brazilië een geloofwaardige 
dreiging uit kon laten gaan van de voorgenomen kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS. 
In het licht van de ambitie om te streven naar een betere balans in multilaterale handel 
concludeert de studie desalniettemin dat: 
• De bindende nakoming van handelsregels de primaire voorwaarde is voor fair 
play. Kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS kan werken als een instrument voor 
ontwikkeling door de totstandbrenging van de verspreiding van informatie, het 
bevorderen van innovatie, en derhalve het vergroten van sociaal nut. 
In licht van het voorgaande kunnen de conclusies van deze studie over kruislingse vergelding 
in TRIPS en nakomingsvraagstukken bij de WTO, met speciale de focus op de situatie van 
asymmetrie tussen leden gedurende de implementatie fase als volgt worden samengevat: 
 
(i) De opkomst van de WTO en zijn geschillenbeslechtingssysteem heeft geleid tot 
voorspelbaarheid en juridische veiligheid in internationale handel; 
(ii) Als leden van een internationale organisatie, zijn Staten (en Leden) op basis van 
het internationaal publiekrecht aansprakelijk voor hun handelen en niet-nakoming van 
verplichtingen vis à vis de WTO. Dit omvat de niet-nakoming van de verplichting 
uitvoering te geven aan Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) en Appellate Body (AB) 
uitspraken; 
(iii) Aangenomen DSB uitspraken en aanbevelingen zijn bindend en moeten door de 
WTO Leden worden nagekomen; 
(iv) De asymmetrie tussen WTO Leden, zoals beschreven in dit proefschrift, laat zich 
vertalen in grote discrepanties in Bruto Nationaal Product, marktaandeel, 
technologische middelen, innovatie en politieke macht; 
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(v) Veel WTO Leden genieten niet de voordelen van het 
geschillenbeslechtingssysteem omdat zij niet in staat zijn de financiële middelen te 
vinden om hun eigen juridische capaciteit om geschillen aan te brengen te verbeteren; 
(vi) Hoewel de WTO aangeeft een hoog percentage van nakoming met betrekking tot 
zijn geschillenbeslechtingssysteem te hebben, omvatten deze cijfers niet alleen de 
gevallen van volledige nakoming, maar ook gedeeltelijke nakoming of onderhande-
lingen tussen Leden. Echter, elk geval van niet-nakoming is zeer problematisch voor 
het multilateraal handelssysteem; 
(vii) Het mechanisme van vergelding is een politiek instrument, dat als zodanig in staat 
is een geloofwaardige dreiging op te leveren voor de in gebreke blijvende partij, en is 
essentieel voor de werking van het systeem; 
(viii) Wanneer men kruislingse vergelding overweegt, is de opschorting van IE rechten 
interessant, omdat dit gevoelige en belangrijke sectoren van IE-afhankelijke 
industrieën raakt, welke doorgaans zijn geconcentreerd in ontwikkelde landen; 
(ix) Nationale uitvoering, internationale verplichtingen, economische haalbaarheid -
omvang van de nationale markt, voldoende kennis kosten van vergelding-, en de 
politieke druk zijn elementen die door het ontwikkelingsland dat kruislings wenst te 
vergelden in overwegingen moet nemen; 
(x) De opschorting van TRIPS concessies is niet geschikt voor elk ontwikkelingsland. 
Alleen landen met een omvangrijke nationale markt met voldoende 
consumentenvraag, een ontwikkelde technische basis, en de kracht zicht te meten met 
de lobby’s van machtige IE-afhankelijke industrieën zijn in staat voordeel te behalen 
uit kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS; 
(xi) Niet alle ontwikkelingslanden zijn in staat om een geloofwaardige dreiging uit te 
laten gaan van kruislingse vergelding, waardoor collectieve vergelding een oplossing 
kan bieden voor het gebrek aan onderhandelingskracht van kleine economieën; 
(xii) Een geloofwaardige dreiging van kruislingse vergelding in TRIPS leidt tot een 
zeker niveau van overredingskracht bij de WTO Leden voor nakoming van 
beslissingen en aanbevelingen van de DSB en AB. 
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